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
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
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
US - PRC - USSR TRIANGLE:
AN ANALYSIS OF OPTIONS
FOR POST-MAO CHINA

FINAL REPORT

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US - PRC - USSR TRIANGLE:
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FOR POST-MAO CHINA

FINAL REPORT

The views and conclusions contained in this document are those of the authors, and should not be interpreted as necessarily representing the official policies, either expressed or implied, of the Office the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, or the U.S. Government.



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
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A. INTRODUCTION

The aim of this paper is to explore the factors which, from the Chinese point of view, are most important in determining post-MAO China's behavior in the triangular US-PRC-USSR relationship, whether it be maintenance of a position equidistant from the two superpowers, or the contraction of closer ties with one or the other of them. Recognizing the relative importance of the influences to which the Chinese are most sensitive in choosing between policies, this paper devotes primary attention to the domestic issues used by contending actors as avenues to political power, and only secondary importance to external influences, including the behavior of the superpowers themselves in non-crisis situations.

Internally, the determinants of future Chinese policy toward the superpowers are the factional infighting and regrouping of coalitions growing out of the current succession struggle. The research here reported addresses both the likely effects on political struggle of plausible future developments in the most critical domestic issue areas, and the implications of the current [in June 1976] political campaign centering on the fall of Teng Hsiao-p'ing.

B. IMPACT OF CRITICAL ISSUES ON FACTIONAL STRUGGLE

The political situation in China is usefully analyzed in terms of two main tendencies to which all Chinese interest groups must orient themselves in order to attain political influence: that of the "ideologist radicals" and that of the "pragmatists." The balance of power between the groupings that belong under these headings has been strongly influenced by Chairman Mao, who has also exerted a restraining influence on the more extreme tendencies in both camps. With Mao's passing, the radical group is likely to lose a good deal of power and the differences between its more moderate and more extreme elements will probably become more pronounced. With the

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probable decrease of pressure from the radicals, the pragmatist camp is likely to split into a spectrum of contending groups, ranging from bureaucratic gradualists to military hard-liners and advocates of a "Stalinist" course of forced-draft industrialization and rapid military buildup. A plausible outcome of this prospective factional shake-up is the formation of a centrist coalition of some of the less extreme radicals, a large segment of the state and party bureaucracy, and the less hard-line elements in the military.

Future developments in foreign policy are more likely to strengthen the pragmatist than radical positions. Barring some clash between US and Chinese interests that could discomfit the pragmatists (who advocate a limited "US connection") and a reversal of the current trend in which China enjoys more success in state-to-state relations than in its support for revolutionary movements, the results of China's foreign-policy activities are likely to favor the pragmatist camp. In military affairs, the radicals might conceivably benefit from a decline in the Soviet general-purpose force threat and an increase in the nuclear threat, while the more likely situation of an increase in both threats would probably favor the pragmatists.

In agricultural policy potential developments are more cloudy, but radical measures seem, at present, most likely to focus the discontent of agricultural workers and managers, to the advantage of the pragmatists. Excessive exploitation of agriculture to support industrialization, on the other hand, could put the radicals in a position to direct the discontent of agriculturalists against the pragmatists; but the latter group seem to be guarding against such a development by offering to let the agricultural sector share in the benefits of industrialization. The situation is similar in the areas of industry, commerce and trade, where current discontent is most likely to be directed at the radicals, while failures resulting from over-ambitious development (whether based on foreign technology and assistance or home-grown programs) could put the pragmatists at a disadvantage. The pattern is repeated again in the area of science and technology.

C. EFFECTS OF THE CURRENT IDEOLOGICAL CAMPAIGN

In consequence, the overall pattern of events in the major Chinese issue areas seems more likely to favor the pragmatists than the radicals; but the ideological campaign currently (June 1976) unfolding in China represents an attempt to alter the probable trends by massive political action. Its target in the leadership has been Teng Hsiao-p'ing; its chief program target appears to have been the pragmatists' new five-year plan, which was first announced by Chou En-lai in January 1975 but has still not received official authorization; the ideological stress has been upon the danger of the resurgent power of the bourgeoisie, which is coupled with the military and ideological threat from the Soviet Union, but in practice a good deal of the criticism has been directed at that old Maoist bugbear, the growing cadre of workers in many managerial, technical and scientific fields who are much more "expert" than "Red."

The campaign began in late 1975 in the field of education, with an attack on the pragmatic reforms which have undone many of the effects of the Cultural Revolution. From there it proceeded to denunciation of elitism in the scientific and technical community, and among the technocrats directing China's industry. Although these have been the areas in which the campaign has been most actively pursued, there has been no singling-out of individuals for denunciation, as there was in the Cultural Revolution.

There seems to have been a tacit agreement not to let campaign activities spread in force to the area of agriculture, where the course to be followed in agricultural development is a hotly-contested issue, to military affairs, where force-structure, doctrine, size of the PLA and overall military allocations are under review, or to foreign affairs, where there is strong disagreement over China's posture toward the Soviet Union, the extent of her efforts to develop relations with the US, the industrialized nations and the Third World, and the nature of China's foreign trade. The limitation of the campaign in these three areas appears to result from a shared concern that progress in the vital spheres of China's activity not be disrupted by political turmoil.

D. FACTORS CURRENTLY ACTING AGAINST NEW CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY INITIATIVES

Despite Chinese assurances to foreigners that the fall of Teng will bring no major changes in China's foreign policy, the present situation seems to be one of drift rather than purposeful movement, probably because a consensus in support of positive actions in any direction is difficult to achieve. The death of Chou En-lai removed the one leader with the skill and influence to pursue an active program, and the present international situation is insufficiently threatening to divert attention from domestic concerns. The current stagnation may end only after Mao dies and a durable resolution of the radical-pragmatist debate is reached; this resolution is most likely to favor the pragmatists, and radical options are likely to be limited by widespread desire to prevent anything like a recurrence of the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution; a possible tool of the radicals may be their sole control of the utterances (real or fabricated) of Chairman Mao.

For the Soviets, the stakes in the Chinese succession struggle will be exceedingly high, as it may represent their last chance to influence the development of a China that threatens ultimately to surpass them in size and might. Short of military intervention (which remains an important possibility) the Soviets' main options for influence in China include: an effort to convince the Chinese of their peaceful and friendly intent; the fomentation of rebellion in China's minority region; and covert activities such as support of opposition factions.

For the US, the course of hasty recognition of the PRC as the "sole government of China," which has recently been urged, is likely to have minimal political effect, and would have negative repercussions in other countries. The history of Sino-Soviet relations, and the nature of Chinese politics, makes it unlikely that a regime that is "pro-Soviet" in any significant sense will come to power in China. A more productive US policy would be explicit continuation of its long-standing practice of seeking to minimize foreign influence in China's affairs. If the explicit restatement of such a policy were coupled with continuing evidence of US will and ability

to counterbalance Soviet power worldwide, pointed warnings to the Soviets that interference in China's affairs will not be tolerated, and face-to-face discussion of US intent with PRC leaders, the benefits to US diplomacy could be substantial. Eventual US recognition of the PRC would then grow naturally out of this process, and US offers of arms to the PRC, should the occasion arise, could be made in the context of an overall image of US policy which it would be difficult for even the radicals to attack, instead of appearing as a hasty move to increase Sino-Soviet tension so as to take pressure off Europe.

E. POSSIBILITIES FOR SINO-SOVIET DETENTE

Any major thaw in Sino-Soviet relations appears to be unlikely without the achievement of three conditions:

- (1) Decline in the influence of the radicals, who are the most intransigent of the anti-Soviet forces, combining ideological with practical grounds for opposition;
- (2) Consolidation of power by the elements of the pragmatists who are the most amenable to the idea of a relaxation of tensions: bureaucrats who require a relatively tension-free environment to pursue long-term development programs, and military leaders who see an end to confrontation as the only way of reducing a nearly intolerable Soviet military threat;
- (3) Continuation of relative international stability, allowing China to maintain a position roughly equidistant between the two super-powers.

A position of equidistance, providing a good vantage point for balance-of-power politics, has long been a goal of Chinese policy. At the end of the Cultural Revolution, China's situation, both internal and external, was extremely disadvantageous. To have undertaken to settle differences with the Soviet Union at that time might well have proved disastrous, because China was bargaining from a position of such weakness. One major advantage

of the opening to the US was that it offered China the possibility of rapidly improving her international position, while giving her the breathing space to rebuild the domestic situation, and thus of arriving more quickly at the stronger position which would make it possible for her to initiate a reduction of tensions with the Soviet Union. Thus some degree of accommodation with the Soviets has been envisioned from the beginning of China's new policy initiatives in 1971, and steps to implement this accommodation need not betoken a repudiation of the US connection.

It appears possible that the failing health of Chou En-lai impelled the pragmatists to speed up their timetable for a reduction of tensions, releasing the imprisoned Soviet helicopter crew on 27 December 1975. But Chou's death followed this action by less than two weeks, and the result succession struggle made it impossible for the Chinese to build upon any answering Soviet signal of willingness to explore the opportunity further. Although there has been little discussion of foreign policy in the Chinese press -- apparently by agreement -- following Teng's fall, and although Teng has not been accused of trying to "sell out" to the Soviets as Lin Biao was, it appears likely that his (real or supposed) policy toward the Soviet Union was a major factor in his failure to become Premier, and in his ultimate disgrace. The still-unfolding ideological campaign attacks on a wide range of other issues, the very group which might be expected to continue the policy of reducing tension with the Soviets, and if the ideologists who are mounting the campaign are able to maintain their influence, appears unlikely the Sino-Soviet rapprochement will make any progress, least in the near future.

Both the historical experience of the two countries and the geopolitical aspects of their relationship impose strong limitations upon the extent of any eventual Sino-Soviet rapprochement, a fact evidently recognized by the Soviets early this year when they proposed establishing Sino-Soviet relations on a basis not of communist solidarity but of "peaceful coexistence." Since this phrase also defines the extremely narrow basis upon which American-Soviet relations are founded, it is reasonable to suppose that any eventual

Sino-Soviet "detente" would have some features in common with US-Soviet "detente," including: agreements aimed at lessening the chances of war over specific points of confrontation, such as disputed border areas; tacit or explicit agreements regarding spheres of influence (Outer Mongolia, Southeast Asia) and the status of national minorities (such as the Uighurs); continuing buildup of armaments and of industrial and economic capabilities in areas relevant to Sino-Soviet rivalry; and continuing competition for extension of political influence (both in the communist movement and in the Second and Third World).

Sino-Soviet rapprochement would be likely to go through cycles of relaxation and tension similar to those in the US-Soviet relationship, but the Chinese may be expected to show much less willingness to compromise in order to further the relationship than has been shown the US, both because of the insecurity of their position vis-a-vis the Soviets and because of the limited aims they seek from such a rapprochement. The establishment of PRC-USSR detente would probably not be followed by rapid withdrawal of Soviet forces from Asia and their redeployment in Europe, any more than the changing American-Soviet relationship has paved the way for arms reduction in Central Europe. There would likely be a continuation and extension of economic competition in which each nation tried to hinder third-country participation in the adversary's developmental schemes and to limit the adversary's access to world sources of raw materials. Moreover, the PRC and US will probably continue to share many complementary aims and to have few points of conflict, a situation which is likely to endure until China reaches a sufficiently advanced stage of development that it begins to come into conflict with the US over raw materials and markets. The continuing development of China as a significant second military threat to the Soviet Union is likely to limit Soviet options and increasingly restrict the possibility of bilateral US-Soviet arms agreements. Nonetheless, for the short term at least, the position of the US in the triangular relationship is likely to be, on balance, a favorable one.


F. IMPLICATIONS OF SOVIET INTERVENTION IN CHINESE POLITICS

In view of the high stakes involved for the Soviet Union in the Chinese succession struggle, the possibility of direct Soviet intervention in Chinese political affairs, either by use of military force or by overt assistance to disruptive or separatist elements, cannot be ruled out. Such intervention would presuppose a worsening of the succession struggle to the point that definite fragmentation of Chinese politics began to be visible. However, the dangers involved in such a course are considerable. The Japanese failure to resolve the "China Incident" in 1937, even after taking the Chinese capital and other vital points, indicates the difficulty of military intervention, and even an attempt to encourage fragmentation and "Balkanize" China without direct intervention would be likely to have the effect of reuniting the Chinese and perhaps of driving them closer to the US. Even were the US not to threaten strong measures in support of China, a closer US-Chinese connection in such circumstances would still be useful to the Chinese by introducing an additional unknown into Soviet calculations.

G. AFTERWORD [OCTOBER 1976]

In spite of the momentous changes that took place in China between June and October of 1976, the main conclusions of this paper still stand. The decline of the radicals' power after Mao's death has in fact occurred, and with unforeseen swiftness. Yet the radical tendency is by no means eradicated. The redistribution of the elements that formed its power at the grassroots level is undoubtedly in progress, along with the concomitant redistribution of the "pragmatist" coalition, and it may be months or years before the outcome becomes clear; the possibility of a centrist coalition, as suggested in this paper, is still a highly plausible one. Furthermore, most of the radicals are undoubtedly still working to impose their conceptions on Chinese society, whether by fair means or foul, and the tracing of their opportunities and vulnerabilities in the various areas of Chinese political life which is presented here may still serve as an approximate guide to the political landscape.

The anti-Teng campaign is now history, but the analysis of its course casts a revealing light on lasting issues and recurrent methods in Chinese politics. The issue which is most critical to US interests and which is the true focus of this paper, namely China's future orientation vis-a-vis the two superpowers, is just beginning to move towards center stage, and nothing that has occurred in the aftermath of Mao's death suggests any major alteration in the authors' judgments concerning the factors affecting the triangular relationship or its long-term trends. The major conditioning factors in the relationship persist, even with the passing of Mao and the alteration of China's top leadership.



CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

A. THE SUBJECT AT HAND

This study was substantially completed in July 1976. Since that time Chinese politics have undergone rapid and momentous changes. The death of Mao Tse-tung on September 9 completely altered the Chinese political balance, upsetting the equilibrium between the pragmatist and radical factions and altering the framework of their competition. The removal of the Chairman's support of the radicals allowed the pragmatists to expand their control of the PRC leadership, especially through the succession of Premier Hua Kuo-feng to the post of Party Chairman. Subsequently, the leading radical politicians, Maos' widow, Chiang Ch'ing, Wang Hung-wen, Chang Chum-chiao, and Yao Wen-yuan, were arrested and have been publicly branded as conspirators and traitors who allegedly were plotting to seize control of the government and Party by a coup d'etat based upon forged and altered instructions from Mao. At least for the present the pragmatists seem to have consolidated their positions and apparently are preparing to resume the economic expansion drive designed under the direction of the late Chou En-lai. The future of those development plans became an integral part of the conflict between the radicals and pragmatists in the anti-Teng Hsiao-p'ing campaign which widened after Chou's death in January 1976. The ultimate success of the pragmatists' seizure of governmental power will in large part be determined by the effectiveness with which those plans are elaborated.

While especially the early chapters of this study reflect the mid-July state of Chinese politics, it seems valuable to publish it in its present form for two reasons. The first is that events have proven that July of this year was the high water mark of the radicals' drive to ensconce themselves in strong positions in the Chinese leadership. Their evident purpose was to prepare a base for its post-Mao political battles with their pragmatist opponents. Chapter II of this study examines the nature of the

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conflict between the two factions, and Chapter III analyzes the limits of the success the radicals had in throwing the pragmatists on to the defensive in many important fields. Indications in July were that the radical failure to involve the PLA in their political struggle was strictly limited in the extent and effectiveness of the anti-Ten Hsiao-p'ing campaign. Even since July have indicated that that failure was the radicals' undoing. This instance demonstrates, the study's examination of the radical's campaign up to July is valuable because it defined the nature and the extent of the rival factions' political bases, and also because the campaign as it was being engaged in July indicated the sharp differences which separate the radicals and pragmatists on a wide variety of issues. Understanding of those differences is extremely valuable for anticipating the steps the pragmatists will now take to effect their program and for understanding the standards of achievement by which their success will be measured.

The second reason for publishing the study in its present form is that events have proven the papers' analysis of China's politics to be accurate both in general and in detail. Understanding of the analytical base that forms the first part of the study is essential for consideration of the papers' central theme, the future development of the relationships within the US-PRC-USSR triangle. Since events have not yet revealed the future of China's relations with the Soviet Union and the limitations of the pragmatists' new opportunities to develop their relations with the West, the ideological constraints which were imposed by the radicals are as yet unclear, consideration of the July positions of the two factions remains notably important for understanding possible alterations in Chinese foreign policy. Therefore, it seems valuable to publish the study in its present form rather than try to update the material, for it is likely that given the rapidity of change in PRC politics at this time, the unfolding Chinese political drama would overtake an altered revision as well.

As the business of succession becomes the primary political activity in China, it is useful to think of the People's Republic as poised at a

crossroads, from which that nation will soon proceed upon one or another policymaking course. The research summarized here identifies three alternatives courses which might be taken, analyzes the factors which will influence the selection of new policies, and examines the implications of each alternative course for China itself, and for the United States and Soviet Union.

B. THE CONTEXT OF THIS RESEARCH PROJECT

This project is the fourth in a series of efforts to simultaneously advance the state of the China analytical art and convey to American decision makers substantive information upon which they may act to initiate or refine US China policy. The first in this series, Chinese Assessment of the Superpower Relationship, 1972-1974, devoted considerable space to the exposition of an analytical model for evaluating the impact of external events upon Chinese policymaking. The three subsequent reports--this one, as well as China, MBFR, and the New American Targeting Doctrine and US Policy Toward Korea As An Issue In The Chinese Policy Process, 1968-1976 devote relatively less space to analytical niceties and focus more upon those substantive findings which provide feedback to the American policymaker on the effects US behavior is having upon China and upon the Sino-Soviet-US relationship.

The present study is different from the previous three in one important respect. The first three explained how US behavior generated inputs to the Chinese decision making process. In other words, as we approached Chinese policymaking from the input side, we confined ourselves primarily to that input stream which originated in the US-USSR relationship. It was found that the signals generated in the bilateral superpower relationship became inputs to virtually every Chinese policy arena--from force structure development to university entrance standards.

This project, in contrast, focuses upon the output side of the Chinese decisionmaking process. In defining three alternative courses which Peking might follow in regard to China's relations with the superpowers, this

report in effect identifies three alternative streams of output from the Chinese policy process. To explain Chinese policymaking as simply a function of superpower inputs would be very misleading. True, Chinese conclusions regarding superpower activity are important inputs to virtually every Chinese decision arena. But in no case is this the only input, and in only a few cases is it even the most important. Therefore, superpower activity--in particular, the behavior of US decisionmakers--is only one of the factors analyzed here as determinants of future Chinese policy toward the superpowers. Other factors which lie beyond (or just barely within) the influence of US decisionmakers--e.g., agricultural yields, or the progress of Chinese indigenous technological development programs, or the contribution of current price policies to capital formation--will be very important determinants of future Chinese relations with the US and USSR.

The same was true in the 1969-1971 period. For all that the US did to effect a new Sino-American relationship, most of the motivation for Peking's participation resided in factors beyond Washington's control. American policymakers did well to recognize that "the time was ripe," and the goal of this research is to provide policymakers with a similar ability to anticipate opportunities or dangers in Sino-American relations in the near future.

C. SUCCESSION IN PEKING

Research undertaken only a few months before the initiation of this project treated Soviet-US interaction as an external influence which tended to change the minds of a relatively fixed core of Chinese political elites. Now, however, it is more realistic to look at the superpowers and other factors as actually changing the membership of the decisionmaking elite. In discussing the role of various factors in the selection of new courses for Chinese policy, what we are actually discussing is the extent to which the factors determine who is going to make Chinese policy.

In recent weeks, the "personnel situation" in China has become so fluid that the idea of changing people's minds must take a back seat to the idea of changing the names on the decisionmaking roster. A simple way of visualizing the process being analyzed here is to picture the "factors (e.g., the superpower relationship, agriculture, the center-province dispute) as governing the hiring and firing of decisionmakers. The future course of Chinese policy will depend primarily upon which current leaders hold on to their power, and which members of the "opposition" are successful in acquiring power. Some readers may find the American primary and general elections of 1976 a fitting analogy.

A final word on succession: While it is useful to visualize the current succession as the hiring and firing of people, it is more realistic to think of the current activity as a succession of ideas, or political philosophies. People and ideas do not always coincide--particularly in the opportunist arena of Chinese politics--and a given leader may avoid becoming a casualty by radically altering his policy preferences, while a colleague may be fired and disgraced, only to be replaced by one of identical persuasion. There is nothing uniquely Chinese in this phenomenon; it is pointed out simply to explain why little attention is given to individuals in the following chapters, in favor of a focus on competing ideas within the Chinese policymaking elite.

D. ORGANIZATION OF THE RESEARCH

Chapters II and III of this study describe the Chinese political environment within which the succession struggle is taking place. Chapter II examines the nature of the separate factions which are active in the struggle and their general orientation to the issues being debated. Chapter III relates these factions and the succession struggle to the current ideological campaign to criticize Teng Hsiao-p'ing, describing the progress of that effort to date and noting the areas of Chinese national life which have become key issues in the campaign and those which have not. The remaining three chapters discuss the possible evolution of China's position within the US-PRC-USSR

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triangular relationship which will ultimately be determined by the course the succession struggle takes. Chapter IV describes the possible impact the intensification of the struggle could have if the current equilibrium of factional politics within the Peking leadership remains viable. Chapter V examines the nature of a possible PRC-USSR detente which might emerge if the pragmatists are unable to subdue their radical critics and consolidate their positions of leadership, and the final chapter discusses crisis situations which might force the PRC leadership to seek immediate improvement of US-PRC relations in order to offset increased Soviet pressure brought to bear in the midst of intensified Chinese factional competition. By examining the possible evolution of Chinese foreign policy in three scenarios (continuation of the current PRC relations with the superpowers, improvement of PRC-USSR relations, and development of closer US-PRC ties), this study is designed to provide US policymakers with a general but comprehensive analysis of the diverse effects the possible shifts in Chinese domestic policies can have upon the PRC's relations with the superpowers.

CHAPTER II
FACTIONAL POLITICS AND CHINA'S OPTIONS

A. INTRODUCTION

Under the highly fluid circumstances of the current succession struggle, the development of China's relationship with the two superpowers is likely to be determined not by the deliberations of a leadership of fixed composition, but by changes in the composition of the leadership as representatives of different political tendencies make use of the movement of events to raise themselves to power. With major redistributions of power thus in prospect, the central issues confronting China's present and future leaders tend more than ever to demonstrate their central political character, representing not merely arenas for administrative decision, but the raw material for the building of power bases, the construction of coalitions, and the manipulation of the way in which the battle-lines for political struggle are drawn.

Our concern in the present chapter is, accordingly, not the identification of theoretical "optimum" courses for China in various areas of importance in her development, but the identification of circumstances in these areas of major concern that may be exploited by different groups (or individuals) to improve their political position. We begin by examining the broad aims, and the political strengths and weaknesses of the two main policy tendencies ("ideologists" and "pragmatists") with which individuals and interest groups in Chinese politics tend to ally themselves, forming loose groupings whose composition varies as new controversies and new opportunities develop. The special significance of Chairman Mao's demise for the dynamics of factional politics is also examined. The discussion next focuses upon plausible developments in the various issue areas which might provide the impetus for alterations in the factional balance and thus change the composition and policy orientation of China's leadership. These developments plausibly include both the offering, by the leaders of one or the other grouping, of new inducements to specific interest groups (e.g. agricultural

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managers, managers in various branches of industry, elements of the military) that could prompt them to shift their allegiance, and the appearance of circumstances, either domestic or external, tending to discredit or firm one or the other program.

The following chapter will examine the effect of the current ideological campaign upon the issues and the more specific implications of this struggle for the future balance of power within the triangular US-PRC-L relationship.

B. MAJOR ACTORS IN FACTIONAL STRUGGLE

1. Mao

The general tendency of Mao's policy was to favor the ideological radicals and tolerate the pragmatists, putting checks upon each of these groups as their policies threatened to move China too far from his chosen course or to destroy the political fabric altogether. In dealing with pragmatists, he acted to check not only policies for economic development which threatened to discard proletarian ideology in favor of elitism in industrial management, but also the tendency to depend excessively upon foreign nations, especially the Soviet Union, for assistance in economic and military development.

If in his dealing with the pragmatists he stood for an ideological focus and for China's independence and self-reliance, Mao also worked to restrain radical tendencies toward the other extreme. Against the populist isolationist strain which seems to prevail in the thinking of the radical ideologists, he urged attentiveness to the external situation, both political and military, and the need for tactical concessions to practical necessity in the nation-building process. Thus, while opposing any close rapprochement with the Soviet Union, he set his stamp of approval upon dealings with the US, Japan and Europe, and he evidently gave tacit (an apparently temporary) approval to many of the economic policies announced at the Fourth National People's Congress in January 1975.

These considerations are particularly important in suggesting what will be the effect upon Chinese politics of Mao's impending passing. It appears that the radicals have been heavily dependent upon his support to maintain their political position, and that their power will decline now that Mao is gone. On the other hand, pressure from the radicals has effectively galvanized into united action a rather disparate set of political groups now conventionally called the "pragmatists," but whom analysts will probably be forced to treat as a spectrum of contending groups once radical pressure is removed. Once the impetus to unite against the radicals disappears and points of disagreement gain more importance, the organized power of the pragmatists may too decline. Furthermore, without Mao's mitigating influence (something it is easy to lose sight of when considering the instigator of the People's Communes and the Cultural Revolution), some of the positions on both sides are likely to tend more towards extremes: some elements of the radicals are likely to become more virulently isolationist and more uncompromising in their advocacy of ideology, while some elements of the pragmatist coalition are likely to press harder for the establishment of a bureaucratic-industrial state, for more military control, or even for a "Stalinistic" course in which all sectors of society serve the buildup of heavy industry and the military. It may be, accordingly, that the Chinese polity will become much more fragmented in the post-Mao era; but it is perhaps more likely that the disappearance of Mao's influence will make possible a centrist coalition of the less extreme members of the current radical grouping, a large segment of the state and party bureaucracy, and the less hard-line elements of the military.

2. Elements of the "Radical Coalition"

Although neither the ideologist "radicals" nor the "pragmatists" form a tightly integrated group, they represent the two political poles to which all smaller interest groups must orient themselves in order to achieve political effectiveness. Accordingly, it is useful to analyze Chinese politics in terms of these two, while identifying various interest groups that represent "swing elements" in the course of the discussion.

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Currently in Chinese politics the number of recognizable and influential radicals is small; most of them sit on the Politburo. Some of these recognizable radicals seem to be merely figureheads, for example Ch'en Yung-kuei, the visible representative of Tachai Brigade, and Wu Kuei-hsien, the embodiment of women's political aspirations and the only prominent woman in Chinese politics whose position is not primarily the result of being somebody's wife. Looking outside the Politburo, it is difficult to identify many influential subalterns or sympathizers. One explanation of this fact is apparently that the pragmatists have successfully opposed the promotion of many young radicals since the Cultural Revolution; this charge has repeatedly been made in the current campaign against Teng Hsiao-ping. One radical stronghold is the so-called "inner court" of persons who had close personal relationships with Mao Tse-tung. In this category belong his wife, Chiang Ch'ing, his bodyguard, Wang Tung-hsing, and apparently the propagandist Yao Wen-yuan. Access to Chairman Mao was not the only form of political activity of these figures; they had certain constituencies of their own elsewhere. Since the Cultural Revolution Chiang Ch'ing has maintained personal control of "cultural" matters, and she has many creatures in the Ministry of Culture and other organs devoted to literature and art. Yao Wen-yuan's ties are primarily with the journalistic and propaganda communities, as befits his status as the journalist chosen to initiate the media activities of the Cultural Revolution.

The connection with journalism and propaganda is continued outside of the "inner court": Chang Ch'un-chiao, perhaps the foremost of the radicals, has had a long career as a journalist. If we look outside the journalistic-propagandistic field, however, there are a good many areas where a strong radical power base is not evident. In the military, for instance, most of the radicals who figured in the Cultural Revolution period have fallen from power, and have not been replaced by other identifiable radicals. Although starting in 1975 Chang Ch'un-ch'iao and Wang Hung-wen held important leadership posts in the PLA (People's Liberation Army), as Director of the General Political Department and (apparently) Vice Chairman of the Milit

Affairs Committee respectively, it is not clear to what extent they have managed to find a constituency in the ranks. It is likely that the radicals find some support among the political commissars. However, the appointments of Chang and Wang to their posts in 1975 were matched by the appointment of Teng Hsiao-ping as Army Chief of Staff, demonstrating that the appointments represented a compromise between the two contending factions.

Other bastions of radical activity appear to include the universities (although there is considerable evidence that a large proportion of China's critical educational activities are carried out outside the universities), the Revolutionary Committees, which now function as government organs at the provincial and local levels, and the ranks of low-level party functionaries and cadres, especially in such showcase radical activities as the Tachai model brigade, the Tach'ing oil field, and in many industrial enterprises in Shanghai.

3. The "Pragmatists"

The "pragmatists" represent less an ideology than a tendency to put practical results ahead of abstract schemes. Most of the individuals who fall into the category have allegiance both to Communism and to China, although there are inevitably some who are interested only in power and others who would not object to seeing China under foreign influence if it furthered their own aims. For those pragmatists who think in terms of a program for China, the ultimate aim is to see China take her place among the superpowers, with a strong and harmoniously functioning economy, in as short a time as possible. Pragmatists tend to come from the ranks of those who have the responsibility for overseeing the day-to-day functioning of the various aspects of China's life: particularly members of the state bureaucracy, but also party functionaries. The military is also heavily represented, particularly the ground-force commanders, although as happens in many states the responsibility of daily confronting the ultimate catastrophe of war impels some military men to go even farther than other functionaries in identifying the national security with their own occupational concern. Accordingly, the pragmatist ranks include some hard-liners, who consider that a large proportion of China's present and future economic strength should be placed at the service of the military machine. Hence,

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the potential for a "Stalinistic" approach is present among the pragmatists; they are not merely the party of bureaucratic gradualism.

In the past, important pragmatists like P'eng Teh-huai fought against the damaging effects of radical economic programs on China's economy. Others, like Liu Shao-ch'i, favored continuing Soviet economic aid as the best means of building up China's economy, even while the Sino-Soviet split was growing from a crack to a chasm; military professionals like Lo Jui-ch'ing favored continuation of Soviet military aid as the best way of modernizing and professionalizing China's military forces. At present, some pragmatists may still consider Soviet economic aid to be a viable alternative, particularly if they are involved in areas where such aid was important before 1961; there are undoubtedly fewer who see any possibilities in Soviet military assistance, now that the Soviet Union is generally recognized to be China's main enemy. More recent pragmatist positions have advocated closer economic ties with Japan and Europe, or the United States, although it is possible to be both a pragmatist and an isolationist. Undoubtedly many industrial managers and state officials consider that China has the potential to build up her economy by "going it alone," through rational allocation of resources and implementation of development.

The arch-pragmatists have been Chou En-lai and Teng Hsiao-p'ing, although the former was especially adept in the art of compromising with radicals. Now that these two leaders have disappeared from the Chinese political scene, it is hard to predict when and by whom their shoes will be filled; but pragmatists of lesser stature than these two men are highly visible: they are the people with whom Western politicians and businessmen have most of their dealings.

Since 1971 and the fall of Lin Piao, a pragmatic coalition has been in the ascendant, although its power has been neither absolute nor unchallenged. In addition to the economic rationalizers and the advocates of state-to-state dealings in foreign policy, important elements of the military have supported the coalition; support has come particularly from the ground-force commanders, who since 1971 have been getting a much greater share of military allocations, even in the context of a military budget

that has shown an overall decrease in favor of the civilian sector. Military participants in the pragmatist coalition have had to make compromises in foreign policy as well as in economics. Their acceptance of renewed ties with the US and Japan, both former enemies, has been grudging; and their feelings about China's new policy towards the Soviet Union have been divided. Some commanders, particularly in the lower echelons, are reluctant to stop regarding the Soviets as friends, while others chafe at China's low-profile military stance toward the Soviets in view of their sizeable threat. If the pragmatists have gained at least a degree of primacy in economics, foreign policy, and military affairs, they seem to have granted the radicals effective control of cultural matters and primacy in the press and propaganda organs, by way of compromise. The radicals consider these areas valuable, because they place great emphasis on moral suasion as a factor in the Communist transformation of society; the pragmatists, on the other hand, evidently consider that if their power is confined to these areas, the radicals can do less damage than in the other aspects of China's life. The field of education is an anomaly. The radicals have evidently gained the right to pursue their policy of "open door education" and fill the universities with "worker-peasant-soldier" students; but as mentioned above, it is not clear that the established universities are the main centers of technical education and research.

Owing to their inclination to work with human frailties rather than purging or transforming them, the pragmatists are perhaps at an advantage in their attempts to gain support among the ordinary peasants and workers. While the radical ideologists try to make human nature flow uphill under the influence of propaganda and ideological education, the pragmatists try to harness its downward flow by the use of material incentives.

C. FACTIONAL STAKES IN KEY ISSUE AREAS

We now turn to consideration of occurrences in five key fields of activity which could be used by either the radicals or the pragmatists to strengthen their political position.

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In foreign policy, despite their strong anti-Sovietism, the radicals would gain important political advantages from any collision of US and Chinese interests because of the discomfiture a US-PRC conflict would cause for pragmatists. However, with the dwindling of the US role in Southeast Asia, the possible areas of US-Chinese conflict are rather limited in number; primary possibilities involve Taiwan and Korea, although collisions might occur elsewhere in the Third World. Although US resistance to Chinese attempts to reintegrate Taiwan into China has been visibly declining, it is possible that the Chinese leadership could be induced to force the issue, pushing matters faster than the US was prepared to accept and thereby creating an apparent conflict which could be exploited by the radicals. Again, if the Soviet Union attempted to establish a presence on Taiwan and a US reaction were insufficiently strong, the radicals' charge of US-Soviet "collusion" could be pressed with more political effect. In Korea, the US presence and posture tend to favor China's interests generally, so that a collision of US and Chinese interests there would be more apparent than real; but if an increase in South Korean aggressiveness appeared to have the support of US policy, or if the US were to overreact to North Korean provocations, the radicals might find a readymade issue in the fact. The Chinese have been cautious in their involvement in the Third World, but the fact of a Chinese presence in the initial stages of the Angolan crisis suggests the possibility that Chinese interests might get stepped on elsewhere in the Third World during the course of a heated US-Soviet struggle for influence, thereby creating another apparent example of the opposition of American and Chinese interests.

On the other hand, the Chinese are much more likely to find themselves in collision with Soviet aims, and that fact, coupled with the perception of continuing military pressure on the Northern border, is likely to strengthen the pragmatists' case for treating the Soviet Union as the primary enemy. Furthermore, despite the possibilities described above, the likelihood of a collision of US and Chinese interests remains slight, wh

visible manifestations of US-Soviet contention rather than "collusion" are likely to persist.

When they are not frankly isolationists, the radical ideologists tend to favor people-to-people dealings (support of revolutionary movements) over state-to-state dealings in their intercourse with foreign countries. At present, the state-to-state approach favored by the pragmatists seems to have the upper hand, following the improvement of Chinese relations with Europe and the recent Chinese coup in establishing a diplomatic foothold in Egypt. At the same time, the Angolan fiasco represented a signal failure in China's support of revolutionary movements. The radicals' foreign policy position would be considerably strengthened if future events were to reverse this tendency with the development of a succession of impasses in China's state-to-state dealings, along with successful support of a revolutionary movement somewhere in the Third, or Second, World (in Chinese parlance, "Second World" countries are industrialized nations other than the super-powers). Similarly, the radicals favor Third World dealings over Second World dealings, and accordingly successes in the Third World, even of a diplomatic sort, coming at the same time as difficulties in dealings with the Second World, would also tend to strengthen the radicals' position.

In military matters, the most visible radical position is the support of People's War over competing approaches such as the professionalization and strengthening of general-purpose forces and the building up of a strategic nuclear arsenal. This support of People's War is perhaps based more upon the conviction that the Soviet Union will not attack China than on the conviction that People's War is China's best military expedient in the actual event of war.² Accordingly, a decline in the Soviet military threat along China's northern border would, paradoxically, strengthen the hand of the anti-Soviet radical faction, by confirming their military approach. Such a development, apparently proving wrong the assertions of the PLA's ground-force advocates, both moderate pragmatists and hard-liners, could fuel a move to reduce their influence or remove them from office.

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Conversely, the continuation of pressure from the Soviet general purpose forces along the northern border presents the pragmatists with a strong argument for strong, modern general-purpose forces. Not only the military, but some of the industrial managers as well, may be expected to endorse this viewpoint, since it tends to make a case for more rapid industrial expansion. Recently, an effort has been made to win over agricultural planners as well to support for more rapid development of industry by offering them the possibility of increasing mechanization of agriculture as one benefit of industrial expansion.

Furthermore, the more likely the prospect of war becomes, the stronger is the pragmatist case for acquiring options other than the painful one of People's War. In the last two years, the military has been passing the assertion that the likelihood of war between the superpowers, which would probably spread to China, is increasing.³ They point to the US-Soviet confrontation in the Mideast in October 1973, the rapid growth of Soviet land, air and naval power and the continuation of the strategic nuclear arms race. However, their opponents (apparently including some pragmatists) argue that the continuing Soviet and American absorption with Europe makes it likely that China will be far distant from the outbreak of any US-Soviet conflict, and that the balance of forces in Europe is such that the standoff there will continue for some time in any case.

Of the three competing military approaches just mentioned, the radicals' second line of defense is the strategic nuclear arsenal. During the radical preeminence of the late 1960's, particularly at the insistence of Lin Piao, the rapid development of a strategic nuclear capability was coupled with a People's-War philosophy, both because of natural complementarity between the two doctrines, and because this approach made it possible to concentrate a (comparatively) small military allocation on securing the support of a potentially congenial and potentially influential segment of the military. The technocrats engaged in high-technology military programs have little background in common with the ground-force commanders against

whom they compete for resource allocations during times of relatively low military spending; they are therefore a natural target for radical advances.

The successful Soviet development of a MIRVed, mobile missile, the SS-X-20, further increases the Soviet nuclear threat to China. The ability to suggest interim methods of coping with China's extreme vulnerability to nuclear attack might offer the radicals an opportunity to further strengthen their hand. While China is likely to continue or accelerate the development of her own nuclear capability, for a long time to come she will inevitably be vulnerable and will have only a limited (and possibly counterproductive) retaliatory capability. Under these circumstances, the only reasonable response -- outside of always opting for political solutions -- is a civil defense program, with emphasis upon dispersion and hardening of vulnerable targets. The radicals, by virtue of their control of the people's militia, are in a good position to implement the population control elements of civil defense, and to organize such activities as the rapid hauling of sandbags (a critical element in the defense of factories and other facilities). Furthermore, this war-survival approach is the natural first step towards acquisition of a war-fighting capability, and accordingly the radicals would be in a position to win over war-fighting advocates by their pursuit of a war-survival policy.

Because the positions of the separate factions regarding agricultural policy overlap, the political benefits and disadvantages that would flow from various events are harder to foresee. The radicals tend to give agriculture a higher priority than industry and to champion further implementation of the commune movement while opposing material incentives and private plots. The major developments which could be influential are the quality and quantity of the harvests of various crops and in various regions, and the attitude of the cadres and the peasants themselves. Political arguments stemming from good harvests or poor harvests could tend to favor either the radicals or their opponents; the outcome would probably depend upon the political balance in other arenas external to agriculture. Peasant unrest and disaffection among the cadres have up to now mostly resulted from the failure of radical experiments, and would seem to offer an

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opportunity for the economic rationalizers among the pragmatists to gain ground against the radicals by making material concessions in the agricultural sector. The use of agriculture as a source of capital for the development of industry has recently been advocated by some of the pragmatists (although it had the support of a rather different grouping in the early 50s). If such a policy were implemented in a less than cautious manner, particularly if the agricultural sector were heavily exploited in the service of a major industrialization program, it would be the radicals' to focus the resulting discontent among cadres and peasants against the pragmatists. At the moment, however, the pragmatists are covering their flanks by proposing that industrial development should pay back dividends to agriculture in the form of mechanization, leading to higher production. If such a line is adopted, the future is particularly difficult to foresee, for further mechanization of agriculture may presuppose larger-size agricultural units to insure efficiency. Organizational questions would then become acute: Should the formation of these larger units be treated as a step forward in communalization? Or should some other approach be tried? It is too early to tell how such a debate might develop.

In the areas of industry, commerce, and trade, the primary issues are development of elite bureaucratic control, speed of modernization and industrialization, sources of capital formation, purchase of foreign technology or acceptance of foreign aid, and the ubiquitous question of political organization of the activities in question.

Those elements among the pragmatists who favor fairly extensive use of foreign technology and have some leaning toward the Soviets would find their position strengthened if the Soviet Union were to offer the Chinese cheap credits with which to acquire Soviet technology. Where Soviet processes and technology were inferior to those available from the US, cheapness might still be the deciding factor for, in the current stage of China's industrial development, a high level of sophistication is unnecessary in a large number of industrial areas (although the Chinese have heretofore demonstrated a preference for acquiring the most sophisticated

available technology). On the other hand, if the Soviets were to offer credits and equipment on terms which were ultimately unacceptable because of restrictive stipulations, the advantage could go to the radicals, since they could argue convincingly that any Soviet cooperation with China would inevitably have the primary ulterior aim of influencing China's internal politics. In fact, in view of past Soviet performance, the pragmatists might well hesitate to take the chance even of opening initial negotiations with the Soviets, fearing that an unacceptable Soviet offer was likely and that their political position stood a good chance of being eroded as a result.

US sale of plants and equipment to the Chinese could also have consequences favoring either side. Successful deals between China and US companies, resulting in a smooth integration into the Chinese economy of new techniques and new equipment, would naturally tend to strengthen the pragmatist argument for dealings with the outside world. If a "US connection" were seen as the major alternative to a "Soviet connection," it might even find some support from the anti-Soviet radicals. However, if the technology or equipment supplied by US companies were so complex and sophisticated that the Chinese had difficulty mastering it and integrating it into their economic system, or if it threatened to result in excessive dependence upon the US for its continuing viability, the radicals would be likely to take the opportunity to argue both against dependence upon outside sources of technology and against premature efforts toward rapid industrialization. A similar radical argument could be based upon difficulties experienced by a purely Chinese program which encountered difficulties because it attempted to attain too high a level of complexity and sophistication.

There is another way in which difficulties in China's US connection could serve to fuel the radicals' propaganda mills. If, as sometimes happens, the US Congress failed to go along with a technology transfer agreement negotiated by the Executive Branch, or if a new administration repudiated an agreement made by a former administration, the progress of Sino-American industrial relations would probably be set back considerably and the tendency of China's leadership to opt for a "go-it-alone" policy strengthened.

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In China's industrial development, the agricultural sector is likely to be a primary source of capital. However, if future industrial efforts turn out to have inordinately high capital costs, either because of the difficulty of obtaining suitable foreign technology or because of management problems endemic to China, the radicals are likely to stress increasingly their contention that it is too early for China to engage in rapid industrial development, that the development and communization of agriculture should take precedence over industry, and that the primary effort in industry should be directed to "discovering latent energies" in the masses and toward using the workers' natural cunning to get the most out of old equipment. On the other hand, if industrial difficulties threaten to harm the whole economy, or if China experiences crop failures which could plausibly have been avoided by greater mechanization of agriculture, it is the pragmatists who are likely to have the stronger argument as they press for a greater effort in industrialization.

Labor unrest is likely to be on the increase in China, both because of the persistence of difficult conditions and because of the growth of informal factions in industrial cities, in competition with the infrastructure which the Chinese Communist Party has tried to establish. The pragmatists were strengthened as a consequence of the labor difficulties in Hangchow in 1975, owing to the radicals' inability to exert any influence over the workers. In future rounds, the pragmatists are also likely to have the better position, primarily because the workers' unfavorable reactions to such radical measures as the abolition of material incentives are likely to be highly visible and to permit of only one interpretation. The argument for a more pragmatic policy, including the restoration and broadening of material incentives, is likely to be a strong one. It is possible, however, that in individual cases where worker grievances result from conditions in general rather than from visible radical programs, the radicals may succeed in depicting the problems as the result of insufficient attention to ideologically correct procedures.

On the whole, it appears likely that developments in industry, commerce, and trade are more likely to favor the pragmatists than the radicals.

and that any radical exploitation of developments in these fields is more likely to result from a favorable political balance in some other area (such as was once provided by the weight of the Chairman Mao's support) than from the arguable implications of the developments themselves.

In science and technology, the situation favors the pragmatists even more strongly. Scientists and engineers in a wide range of fields have been mounting increasingly vocal opposition to ideological interference with their research, in spite of continued and strident attempts by the radicals to silence them and to brand the tendency as counterrevolutionary. The radicals' defense of their policy has rested mainly upon the achievements of the strategic weapons and space programs during the Cultural Revolution period, plus a few widely-separated achievements in other fields. The radical press has been at pains to extol more recent achievements such as some relatively rudimentary advances in computer technology, and the successful development by "worker-peasant-soldier teams" of what can only be described as miscellaneous gadgets. The radical program for science and technology appears to be living on borrowed time, and only the unlikely event of a genuine breakthrough by the "scientific proletariat" can restore its respectability. What is more likely is the occurrence of an R&D impasse or the collapse of some critical developmental program owing to radical restrictions on theoretical research and on the use of foreign technology at difficult points in research and development; if this happens the pragmatists will be in a position to mount a strong counterattack against the radicals' methods.

CHAPTER II

NOTES

1. That the Taiwan issue was a ploy used by the radicals in their strenuous push for political power immediately before Mao's death strongly suggested by the fact that despite the furor surrounding non-admission of the Taiwan Olympic team to Canada and the abundant hints through diplomatic and press channels that a forcible solution to the question of Taiwan's status was under consideration, the Chinese never alluded to the subject during the Schlesinger visit and have made no further public statements on it since Mao's death.

2. This assertion is not as unlikely as it might seem at first thought. For a nation so profoundly vulnerable as China, it is quite arguable that the consequences of no modernization and expansion could not be much worse than the consequences of partial modernization and expansion. Moreover, although there may well be field commanders with highly selective memories of past battles in Korea and North China who believe in the practicability of People's War, the advocacy of policy of reliance upon People's War is in the hands of leaders whose prime ideological orientation is toward isolationism and whose combined military experience is close to zero. The linkage between isolationism and unwillingness to make military preparations is not unknown in American politics; and if the nations of Europe, which have the means to ensure their own security if they would make the effort, take such an apparently sanguine view of Soviet intention it is surely not surprising that the Chinese, who could perhaps not ensure their own security even with Herculean efforts and who have extremely pressing domestic problems, should carry the same attitude somewhat further. Finally, it is useful to realize that (as Edward Luttwak has pointed out) to ignore the Soviet threat by an act of will or of inattention is to deprive the Soviets of the political advantages of their military power in east Asia.

3. This interpretation of available evidence is an extension of analysis presented in three earlier BDM studies: Peter L. Sargent and Jack Harris, Chinese Assessment of the Superpower Relationship, 1972-74 (June 1975); Thomas Nadolski, Peter L. Sargent and Jack H. Harris, China, MBFR, and the New American Targeting Doctrine (draft, April 1976); and Peter L. Sargent, Chinese Appraisals of the Superpower Relationship, 1972-74: Contention and Collusion (January 1976; also included as Appendix A of the preceding). In outline, the reason is as follows: the "contention-collusion" debate in the Chinese media during 1972-74 was, among other things, a cover for an attempt to decrease the influence of the military in the wake of the Lin Biao affair. The victorious "contention" view, backed by Chou En-Lai and other moderate party and state leaders, asserted that the two superpowers were too deeply engaged in their own struggle to be a

to attack China, and that there was accordingly no need for a rapid upgrading of PLA capabilities. The "collusion" view, which is clearly identifiable as the preferred PLA position (see "Chinese Assessment," Chapter III), asserted that the two superpowers were united in hostility to China, and that a military attack on China, if not by the two in concert then by one (the Soviet Union) with the connivance of the other, was likely; upgrading of PLA capabilities was therefore urgently needed. The "collusion" argument disappeared from the press for good in early 1974, indicating that advocates of the other viewpoint and program for the PLA had won out.

Starting in late 1973, the military's interests appear to have been urged through a new argument: granted that the superpowers are contending and not colluding, their arms race is certain to lead, perhaps very soon, to general nuclear war, which cannot fail to spread to China; PLA capabilities must be upgraded to deal with this imminent threat. The US-Soviet confrontation over the Middle East in October 1973 provided the initial opening for this new interpretation of the superpower rivalry. Chou En-Lai, who was apparently still leading the opposition to the military's demands, seems to have been rebutting this new line of argument by minimizing the danger of US-Soviet conflict when in late October he made an otherwise puzzling reference to the "superpowers with their few nuclear weapons" ("Chinese Assessment," p.VI-5). This question of the "number" of superpower weapons did not surface again until April 1974 (shortly after the publication of Secretary Schlesinger's FY 1975 Report, which included an official statement of the new US nuclear targeting doctrine -- another piece of evidence for prophets of the nuclear-war danger). At this time, Wang Hung-Wen made a further reference to the superpowers' "few" nuclear weapons. A week later, Teng Hsiao-p'ing took an opposite position, referring to "many" superpower nuclear weapons in a speech that received wide coverage and was inserted, with every indication of extreme haste, as a supplement to the same issue of Peking Review that carried Wang's speech. (See "Chinese Assessment", pp.VI-11 to VI-15 and "China, MBFR..." pp.IV-8 to IV-10). If we assume that Teng was an ally of the military professionals and the natural advocate of their demands, and that Chou as the adversary of PLA primacy in politics and Wang as "People's-War radical" would be the natural opponents of these demands, the view that the "numbers" debate (which ended with the speeches of April 1974) was one aspect of a military argument for more weapons and probably more policy influence suggests itself strongly.

There are further bits of evidence that seem to support the above interpretations: between his rehabilitation and his second disgrace, Teng was the most vocal advocate of the view that superpower nuclear war was inevitable; Wang, on the other hand, made few public statements, but in the April 1974 speech in which he minimized the importance of superpower nuclear weapons, he declared that China stood ready to

repel a Soviet invasion, indicating that this possibility (the one against which People's War is of most importance) was the one he to regard as most likely.

It now appears (see US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Allocation of Resources in the Soviet Union and China-1976 pp.31-32) that it was in 1975, when Chou En-Lai had all but disappeared from Chinese politics and Teng Hsiao-p'ing seemed firmly entrenched in power, that Chinese military spending began to go up again (after a drop from a peak in 1971). Teng's second disgrace in April 1976 was followed by attacks in the media on military professionalism, giving further credibility to the view that he was the advocate of the professional military's interests. If, as seems possible, Teng now manages another comeback, his relationship to the military and the nature of its desired policies may become clearer.

CHAPTER III

ISSUES IN THE CURRENT CHINESE IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE

A. THE PROGRESS OF THE CURRENT CHINESE IDEOLOGICAL CAMPAIGN

As demonstrated in the history of the progress of the Cultural Revolution, ideological campaigns in China usually begin as theoretical discussions of a given theme and then, if successful, spread outward to different sectors of Chinese national life. The Cultural Revolution began with media discussion of the nature of proletarian culture and spread naturally from this basis into consideration of the direction of Chinese education while criticizing those in positions of leadership who opposed the theoretical principles elaborated in the primary discussions. Because Mao Tse-tung sought to use the Cultural Revolution as an instrument for reasserting his control over the Chinese Government and Communist Party apparatus which was falling increasingly under the control of bureaucrats and pragmatic planners, the movement spread quickly across China and engulfed every aspect of Chinese society. In recent months there have been theoretical campaigns like the movement to criticize Confucius and Lin Piao and the Water Margin campaign which apparently have been aborted and hence have not spread far beyond the confines of theoretical discussions which often were heavily coated with historical allusion. The current ideological "campaign to criticize Teng Hsiao-p'ing," however, already evinces the ripple pattern of the Cultural Revolution in that it has spread beyond theory to educational concerns. From a far-ranging discussion of revisionist educational policies, the campaign has spread on to include evidence of revisionist tendencies in China's technological and scientific communities. That stage apparently served as an adequate base for making Teng Hsiao-p'ing's approach to industrial modernization a central issue in the propaganda campaign. However, while it has mushroomed to include these important areas of Chinese policy making, the campaign has manifested restrictive tendencies in the discussion of Teng's agricultural policies, his approach to military force-structure, and China's foreign policy. Whether the campaign will spill into these areas too remains to be seen.

This chapter describes the impact the campaign, as it has taken to date, may have upon China's external relations and hence upon the USSR triangular relationship. The effects the educational, industrial and agricultural aspects of the campaign which have formed the central focus of the movement could have upon China's foreign relations would be indirect and long-term. Nevertheless, consideration of the progress of the campaign in those areas is important because it can indicate the direction the movement would take if Chinese policy regarding military force-structure and external relations are inundated by the ideological flood. Consequently, this chapter reviews the progress of the campaign's waves from one area of Chinese policy decision making to another and concludes with consideration of the impact the current movement might have upon Chinese military force-structure and foreign policy.

China's Pragmatists, first under the direction of Premier Chou En-lai and then under former Vice-Premier Teng Hsiao-p'ing, have sought to consolidate their post-Cultural Revolution position of leadership and prevent a disruptive succession crisis after Mao Tse-tung's death. Under a Maoist inspired slogan, "Take the Three Directives as the Key Link!," Teng and his associates have attempted to commit China to an ambitious industrialization program in its fifth five-year plan that is supposed to run from 1976 to 1981. The Three Directives taken from the works of Mao himself were:

- (1) Study the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat and consolidate it and prevent revisionism!
- (2) Promote stability and unity!
- (3) Push the national economy! ¹

The first of these directives, an obvious bow in deference to the teachings of Mao's revolutionary doctrine, was useful for developing mass enthusiasm for the program within the framework of revolutionary ideology. Moreover, by giving the program an appropriately Maoist tone, the pragmatic planners were more likely to attract radical support for their objectives. The second directive stressed the need for peace and national unity and was aimed at excluding disruptive ideological and political campaigns like the Cultural

Revolution during the five-year plan in order to provide the stability necessary for rapid industrial expansion. The third directive, "Push the national economy," was the heart of the five-year plan proposed by Teng Hsiao-p'ing which aimed at reorganizing agriculture and building a wide integrated industrial base for economic expansion in the last part of this century.

The radicals who assert the primacy of maintaining Chinese ideological commitment to the Marxist doctrine of dictatorship of the proletariat have opposed the pragmatic program of industrial expansion through their campaign to criticize Teng Hsiao-p'ing, and the extensive five-year plan has not yet been authorized. Especially through their control of the Chinese propaganda media, the radical ideologists have been orchestrating an increasingly more strident campaign to undermine the pragmatic planners' position.

The campaign began in early January as an attack against the so-called "right-wing revisionists" and quickly focused upon Teng Hsiao-p'ing, although his name was not initially used. After the 5 April riots in Tien An Men Square, the radical attack was aimed specifically and by name at Teng. Immediately after the disruptions in Peking, Teng was stripped of his impressive list of titles and Hua Kuo-feng emerged as a compromise premier. Under him economic development has continued, but so also has the ideological campaign. Using quotations of Mao Tse-tung, the radicals have sought to demonstrate that both the objectives and the methods of Teng Hsiao-p'ing and his associates, the pragmatic bureaucrats who have been directing China's economy, are contrary to the fundamental direction of the Chinese Communist Revolution. One of the main weapons the radical ideologists have had in their effort is the apparent support of Mao Tse-tung. Mao is reported to have contradicted Teng's program slogan with the words; "What? Taking the Three Directives as the Key Link? Stability and unity do not mean writing off class struggle, class struggle is the key link and everything else hinges on it." 2

The radicals perceived the program of emphasizing the national economy while downgrading radical political considerations as

an effort to divert China from the course established by Mao. Aware of the short time left to them before Mao's death to receive the Chairman's blessing for their position, the radicals are laboring in this current succession struggle to prevent the bureaucratic pragmatists from entrenching themselves in positions of power. The success or failure of this effort in the near future will determine the direction the Chinese economy will take during the period of the current Five-Year Plan and beyond.

B. THE IDEOLOGICAL ROOTS OF THE CURRENT POLITICAL TENSION IN CHINA

The current succession struggle is being waged by two groups with competing views concerning the direction the development of Chinese society should take. The radicals who associated themselves with a strict interpretation of Maoist doctrine call for a continuation of the Communist Revolution and for intensified criticism of any trends or thoughts which weaken the strength of China's commitment to the revolutionary ideals of proletarian domination of society. Those who oppose the radical program of intense politicization of PRC national life argue the need for an increase in the rate of industrial expansion which they judge to be essential if the country is to develop its vast potential and thereby be able to compete with the superpowers into the next century. Unlike the radicals this group is not a cohesive unit held together by commitment to agreed upon ideological objectives. Their goals are determined by the pragmatic work of developing the Chinese economy.

The radicals' perspective for governing China is based upon strict application of the doctrines of Mao Tse-tung. Mao has proposed making China into a country literally run by the workers and peasants, not by officials like the bureaucrats or technocrats who administer the Soviet system in the name of the proletariat. The goal of "relying upon the workers" for determining plans and production schedules is indeed revolutionary. No system like that has ever existed in world history, surely not on the scale envisioned by the Chinese radical ideologists. Those who have attempted

put this policy into effect have yet to prove whether it is compatible with the very structure of advanced industrial organization. The development of all industrial societies including post-revolution China has been marked by the following features:

- (1) The emergence of a relatively small number of highly trained individuals with managerial skills who can direct economic expansion. In capitalist societies these individuals do their work in industrial enterprises and in government organizations designed to oversee and assist private enterprise. In socialist societies they are the bureaucrats who produce comprehensive state economic plans.
- (2) The development of specialized scientific communities. The specialized nature of advanced scientific research creates natural communities of scientists. Scientists form a kind of world community with each other, often having more in common with their professional confreres than their fellow-countrymen. In all other societies, scientists have, because of their specializations, tended to form relatively homogeneous, closely related communities of interest.
- (3) The creation of educational institutions to provide recruits for the elite managerial and scientific communities. Without a means of providing rigorous training for new recruits to their ranks, the managerial and scientific elites which exist in both capitalist and socialist societies would find it impossible to provide the continuity needed for long-term industrial expansion and scientific progress.

The strict Maoist ideologist cannot tolerate the natural emergence of these elite groups in China because they are considered to be incompatible with the ideal of dictatorship of the proletariat. According to that doctrine, workers and peasants are to own and control every stage of production. Thus, the development of scientific, bureaucratic, and educational elites, exempt from worker domination, is abhorrent to the fundamental tenets of the Maoist doctrine.

Since the military success of the Chinese Communist revolution and especially since the disappointment of the industrialization program supported by the Soviet Union in the 1950's the strict Maoists have repeatedly tried to win general acceptance in the Chinese leadership for their views. There has been strong resistance not only from individuals inside and outside the governmental system and Party apparatus but also from the large group of managers who believe that they, not the Party ideologists, are capable of directing Chinese industrial and agricultural development along coherent and meaningful paths. These technocrats argue that the stage of class struggle and disruptive political campaigns has passed, that the proletariat controls the means of production, and that, through the efforts of highly trained specialists, the efforts of the proletariat can be directed toward increased industrial production. To the strict radicals, this argument represents unrepentant bourgeois sentiment and proof that actually those elitists are only trying to deflect the force of class struggle from themselves while they rebuild China's capitalist system. Consequently, those Chinese who seek to focus the energies of the people upon economic development to the exclusion of the radical political ideals bear the chief brunt of the radicals' assault, because they are seen as a force which could transform China into a bureaucratic socialist state, a system similar to the Soviet Union. The conflict between the two Chinese factions represents the opening round of the long-awaited succession struggle for control of China after Mao's death. To understand the impact this struggle can have upon the PRC's relations with the superpowers, it is important to examine the direction and substance of the debate now being carried on.

C. EDUCATION AS AN ISSUE IN THE CURRENT IDEOLOGICAL CAMPAIGN

During the Cultural Revolution, the radicals succeeded in breaking up the university and preparatory school systems which they perceived to be dominated by revisionist intellectuals who aimed at perpetuating the existence of elite groups within China. The formalized pattern of education

was disrupted by politicization of campus life and efforts to bring the students into contact with the life of peasants and workers. Professional preparation was interrupted both by political movement and by forced sojourns in the countryside or factories for all students. In the years since 1969, under the direction of pragmatic educators, this program has been significantly altered; and the most promising students have been allowed to skip the formerly compulsory year or two of manual "productive labor" in order to pursue their academic courses. Bureaucratic planners have argued that only through intensive, continuous training can the engineers who will be required to carry forward Chinese industrial development be adequately prepared.

To the radicals, the goal of rebuilding an educated elite is a bourgeois objective. A recent radical attack on this position reads:

"The bourgeoisie has lost the means of production, but it still has a superior force in the cultural and educational fields, and it is bound to make use of this (hereditary domain) to continue its trial of strength with the proletariat."³

This particular article went on to identify education as the arena where the bourgeois assault would be first mounted against the proletariat.

"Since the Great Cultural Revolution started first in the field of culture and education, the bourgeoisie is certain to make the first move in these fields in its efforts to negate the Great Cultural Revolution and launch counterattacks against us."⁴

Analysis of the Chinese media pronouncements indicates that the radicals' assault upon the pragmatists' educational reform began in the summer of 1975 with an attack upon the elitist trend at Tsinghua University. The educational controversy spread from Tsinghua to Peking University and other campuses in the fall of 1975 and has continued into 1976. The radicals' attack was widened beyond narrow educational concerns to discussion of national problems by two important theoretical articles which appear in the first week of January 1976 in Red Flag.⁵ Thereafter, the ideologists treated the elitist tendencies in the educational system as a symptom of a larger problem infecting all of China.

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D. THE ORGANIZATION OF CHINA'S SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY AS AN ISSUE IN THE CURRENT IDEOLOGICAL CAMPAIGN

The attack upon educational elites begun in 1975 spread naturally to the denunciation of scientific elite research groups. By mid-February 1976 the campaign took the shape of calling for so-called "open-door scientific research." The pragmatists were accused of trying to create a scientific elite community that did not relate its efforts directly to the needs of the proletariat. A 20 February 1976 article pointed to a "model" organization which eschewed Teng's "take the three directives as the key link" line. The article read:

"Since the start of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in 1966, the workers, cadres and researchers of the Institute of Genetics and the Chinese Academy of Science have under the leadership of the Party, taken class struggle as the key link, continually criticized the revisionist line in scientific research and persisted in the principle that scientific research should serve proletarian politics, serve the workers, peasants and soldiers, and be integrated with productive labor."

Arguments by scientists that scientific research should be pursued to advance pure science have been dismissed by the radicals as bourgeois attempts to avoid domination of their work by the workers and peasant radicals assert that every aspect of Chinese life, including scientific research and technological developments, should be closely linked to revolutionary politics. Describing the so-called reactionary arguments to the contrary, a radical writer in April 1976 noted:

"Yet advocates of the Right deviationist trend in the scientific and technological circles openly declared: 'Don't talk about the dictatorship of the proletariat in scientific and technological circles. One of their reasons was: 'You can't exercise dictatorship over science and technology'."7

Noting that the dictatorship of the proletariat is to be exercised over people, not things, the article went on to strongly assert that Chinese science must be thoroughly politicized and made the handmaiden of the proletarian workers, peasants, and soldiers and directly linked to all aspects of productive labor. To prevent an elite scientific community from dominating technology, the radicals have attempted to give workers and

peasants direct access not only to the fruits of scientific advances but also to the laboratories themselves. Under this scheme, the workers and peasants are expected to share in scientific and technological research in order to introduce a note of practicality to the on-going research. The long-range impact the radical ideologists' efforts will have upon Chinese scientific developments is very difficult to judge. It is certain that if the campaign were extended throughout China and pursued to its logical limits, the scientific community's ability to train recruits and push forward with sophisticated research would be seriously hampered. Any disruption of scientific research would have far-ranging effects on the course of industrial and agricultural development as well as very likely severely limiting Chinese advances in arms technology.

E. CHINESE INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION AS AN ISSUE IN THE CURRENT IDEOLOGICAL CAMPAIGN

The radicals attempted in the spring of 1976 to extend their campaign, begun in the educational and scientific fields, to criticism of the elitist tendencies among the technocrats directing China's industry. An article appeared in the 2 April 1976 edition of Peking Review denouncing Teng Hsiao-p'ing. The article declared:

"The unrepentent capitalist roader (Teng) in the Party placed the national economy in the position of key link, as if he was the only person who cared about production and was most dedicated to the realization of the four modernizations (of agriculture, industry, national defense, and science & technology). This is a sheer fraud. Our difference with him on this question is not whether production should be pushed foward and the four modernizations realized, but what line should be carried out and what roads should be followed to achieve these purposes."⁸

Teng, and by implication people sharing his attitude, was accused of treacherously disregarding the proletariat's struggle to dominate the bourgeoisie by trying to focus China's energies exclusively upon economic development. The radicals have accused Teng of secretly trying to rebuild elite groups in Chinese society and of attempting to push China

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along the revisionist path which would lead to the development of Soviet style bureaucratic and technocratic control of the economy. Specifically the pragmatic approach taken by Teng and his associates has been criticized for:

- (1) Reimposing the practice of "direct and exclusive control of enterprises by the ministry concerned." The planners have attempted to implement a comprehensive system of industrial discipline which would gather into the hands of the technocrats of the respective ministries the reins on the productive resources of China in order to push forward an integrated industrial program. The ideologists are opposed to this approach because it establishes a chain of command from an elite at the center instead of relying upon the working class for initiative in production. Teng and the bureaucratic pragmatists are accused of opposing the "Charter of the Anshan Iron and Steel Company" (the Maoist model industrial plant) and advocating the rules and regulations of the Magnitogorsk Iron and Steel Combine of the Soviet Union. The distinction is that Anshan's production goals are supposed to be set by the workers themselves whereas the Soviet plant's goals are set by the technocrats of the Soviet central industrial planning apparatus. According to Maoist doctrine, the planning is supposed to take place in "three-in-one" groups designed to harness the optimum collective energies of workers, cadres, and technicians.
- (2) Laying one-sided stress on "things big". Teng and his associates are accused of laying too great an emphasis upon heavy industrial development which implies the creation of massive factories and integrated industrial complexes. The radicals are determined to prevent the concentration of power in the hands of elite bureaucrats and assert the importance of the development of smaller factory units and light-industrial plants.
- (3) Advocating a policy of relying upon foreign industry. To achieve their expansion objective, the planners are willing to import machinery and plants from foreign sources. The radicals insist

upon following a course of industrialization which assures China's independence from foreign sources and avoids servility to foreigners. This attitude unquestionably reflects the Chinese xenophobia which was exacerbated by the high-handed method of foreign capitalists in the prerevolutionary times and the nature of Soviet assistance in the years before 1960.⁹

In short, the radicals have accused Teng of pursuing goals which ignore the fundamental objectives of the revolution by abandoning the "key link of class struggle" and working to rebuild a society in which industrial organization would be controlled by an elite few.

It is important to note that while the radicals have attacked a trend that is viewed as pernicious to the fundamental goals of the Chinese revolution, the assault has not turned into a Cultural Revolution-style witch-hunt of individuals in the educational, scientific, and industrial communities who may hold "deviationist" attitudes. Rather, Teng Hsiao-p'ing has been presented in the radicals' propaganda broadside as the quintessence of the bourgeois tendencies to serve as a negative example to everyone. The campaign attack has thus focused on a trend, a tendency, rather than upon personalities with the exception of Teng. Consequently, it has not disrupted the leadership and Chinese productive capacity as the Cultural Revolution did. To date, then, the campaign has been relatively narrow in scope--aimed at the tendency for elite groups to rise in specific areas of Chinese life.

F. AGRICULTURE AS AN ISSUE IN THE CURRENT IDEOLOGICAL CAMPAIGN

While the current radical offensive against the pragmatists' position has been spreading from purely theoretical attacks through educational and scientific matters to calls for the full implementation of Communist ideals in Chinese industry, several areas of PRC policy have not yet received comparable attention. Among these is agricultural policy, and it is significant that to date agriculture has not yet been made the focus of intense media concern.¹⁰ This apparent lack of emphasis upon agriculture

is all the more remarkable because agriculture as an issue was preempted by the pragmatic planners in the fall of 1975 through their program to mechanize Chinese agricultural production under the slogan "Learn from Tachai." It might, consequently, be expected that the radical ideologists would make a major effort to reassert their exclusive control of the Tachai program.

The "Learn from Tachai" program had originated as a radical initiative in 1964 and was associated with the complete communization of agricultural production. In 1975, when the planners were pressing for industrial development, the radicals countered by calling for concentration of Chinese resources upon the development of agriculture. The technocrats met this argument with a demand that Chinese agriculture be developed by mechanization and extensive use of chemical fertilizers, methods which implied the existence of a broad industrial base to support agriculture. The technocrats planned to use the October 1975 National Conference on Learning from Tachai as a platform for announcing the full range of their programs. Hsiao-p'ing gave what was meant to be a keynote address, but he was interrupted publicly several times by Chiang Ch'ing, and the report was never published. In its place a statement by Hua Kuo-feng was issued. Hua's statement blended the call for mechanization with appropriate denunciations of "Right deviationist elements within the Party" thereby producing a skillful compromise between the positions.¹¹

Through that intervention the radicals partially succeeded in regaining a place in the ideological control of the "Learn from Tachai" campaign, but the technocrats were able to realize their objective of laying the foundation for massive mechanization of Chinese agricultural production. It seems that this compromise arrangement has continued in effect and their direct assault upon Teng Hsiao-p'ing's agricultural policies has not been made a central element of the current ideological campaign.¹²

G. FORCE-STRUCTURE AS AN ISSUE IN THE CURRENT IDEOLOGICAL CAMPAIGN

Like the treatment of his agricultural policies, criticism of Teng Hsiao-p'ing's approach to military policy has not been made the center

intense media concern in the current ideological campaign. This is not an indication that Teng's military policies have not played an important role in the conflict between the pragmatic planners and the radicals; but, rather, it is possible that the absence of discussion of Teng's program for the PLA is evidence that military matters have been exempted from discussion in the current campaign through compromises worked out within the political and military leadership. Information obtained by US intelligence indicates that Teng had set out to radically reorganize and reequip the PLA through advocating "the theory of weapons." What he prepared to do was reduce the size of China's three-and-a-half-million man Army by about 30 percent and rechannel the money saved into reequipping the PLA with advanced tactical weapons. The evidence is that in the summer of 1975 he won the support of the military central authorities for his program.¹³ If implemented, Teng's reform would have advanced still farther the professionalization which has characterized PLA policy since the purging of Lin Piao in 1971 and has been accelerating since the shifting of regional military regional commanders in December 1973.

Lin Piao and the radicals associated with him had advocated pursuing a strategy of "people's war" against the Soviet menace. That approach called for establishing a wide base from which the Chinese people could wage protracted guerrilla warfare against Soviet armies. Lin contended:

"Guerrilla warfare is the only way to mobilize and apply the whole strength of the people against the enemy, the only way to expand our forces in the course of the war, to deplete and weaken the enemy, gradually change the balance of forces between the enemy and ourselves, switch from guerrilla to mobile warfare, and finally defeat the enemy."¹⁴

Lin had argued that the weight of Chinese dedication and the enormity of the task confronting the Soviet Union would offset China's inferiority in advanced weapons. The advantages of the PLA would be maximized in hand-to-hand combat. Lin declared:

"However highly developed modern weapon and technical equipment may be and however complicated the methods of warfare, in the final analysis, the outcome of the war will be decided by the sustained fighting of the

ground forces, by the fighting at close quarters on battlefield, political consciousness of the men, by their courage and spirit of sacrifice."¹⁵

Preparation for "peoples' war" required the reorganization of the PLA in the following four areas.

- (1) Army Organization. The military command structure had to be decentralized so that regional military commanders would be able to carry on the battle independently if they became separate from the central command.
- (2) Army Size. Success in a "peoples' war" can be had only if a large body of trained fighters is available for resisting the enemy. To achieve this capability the PLA was maintained at around three-and-a-half million men with millions of trained militia as reserve.
- (3) Military Budget. The strategic weapons doctrine of the PRC pre-1971 period was based on the assumption of anti-China coalition by both superpowers.¹⁶ Because it was believed that China might face threats from both the US and USSR simultaneously, there was a need for a sizable inventory of IRBM's and ICBM's to deter attack. Because of the limited resources available, the Chinese strategic position required heavy investment in high-technology strategic weapons and the allocation of residual funds to sustain a relatively impoverished non-strategic force.¹⁷ This budget constraint was compatible with the people's war doctrine, because low-cost guerrilla warfare requires access to large quantities of easily transportable unsophisticated weapons.
- (4) The political role of the Army. In a "peoples' war" the Army would serve as the chief font of political consciousness in separate military regions. This need required close involvement of regional military commanders in political matters.¹⁸

This political role of the PLA was intensified by the progress of the Cultural Revolution. The disorder which followed the Red Guard assault upon the Party and governmental systems left the PLA the only remaining

integrated instrument of national control. As a result, the PLA was given the task of organizing revolutionary committees, and the military commanders emerged from the Cultural Revolution with significantly enhanced political power.

Since 1971 and the fall of Lin Piao, the trend has been away from the involvement of the PLA in politics and toward greater emphasis upon military professionalism. The reforms proposed by Teng, which would have advanced this professionalization tendency, were based upon a general reorganization of Chinese strategic and tactical doctrine. The main thrust of this military reorganization has been:

- (1) Emphasis upon general-purpose capability. Chinese military preparation in recent years has been away from the building of a base for a "peoples' war" and stresses the need for expanding conventional military capabilities.
- (2) Reexamination of the question of men versus armor. Examination of the Yom Kippur War is having significant impact upon international military planning.¹⁹ The Chinese High Command is aware that victory or defeat in war is not dependent solely upon having large numbers of armored divisions and aircraft. The 1973 war indicates that advanced anti-tank and advanced anti-aircraft weaponry can determine the outcome of future battles. If the PLA is to be a credible force on the battlefield, it must be supplied with these advanced weapons.
- (3) Reexamination of PLA size. Budgetary constraints have forced the Chinese leadership to consider reduction of the PLA in order to allocate available funds to provide advanced weapons as well as mobilization and upgrading of tactical air capabilities. Reduction of the PLA can also result in a smaller, potentially more cohesive military force.

In late 1975, Teng Hsiao-p'ing had the support of the central military authorities for his program of strengthening the PLA and also backing for his plan to stress production and reorganize industry. After Chou En-lai's

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death in January 1976, the central military authorities fought hard to secure the premiership for Teng; but the radicals, unhappy with the trend set in motion with Teng's program, joined hands with the regional military commanders, whose interests would have been adversely affected by Teng's reforms in order to prevent Teng from succeeding Chou. Hua Kuofeng emerged as a compromise candidate. The radicals were prevented from improving their position by the intervention of Marshal Yeh Chien-yi who blocked their attack.

As a result of that intervention, it appears that a compromise was reached which at least for the present has restricted the ideologists' campaign of criticizing Teng's military policies. Consequently, military policy was not discussed in the Chinese propaganda media in the first part of the campaign. However, in May 1976, discussion of the role the PLA was expected to play in Chinese society was initiated by the republishing, on its tenth anniversary, of Mao's "May 7, 1966 Decree" concerning the PLA which emphasized the tactical role the military was expected to play. The decree read in part:

"The People's Liberation Army should be a great school. In this school our army should study politics and military affairs, raise its educational level and also engage in agriculture and side-occupations. We should run small or medium-sized factories to make products for its own use or for exchange with the state against equal values. Our army should also do mass work and participate in the Socialist education movement in the factories and villages. When the socialist education movement is over, it will always find mass work to do so as to be always with the masses. Also our army should always be ready to participate in the struggles to criticize and repudiate the bourgeoisie in the Cultural Revolution..."²⁰

Mao's instructions stress the PLA's sharing in productive work, and since the republication of the decree, there has been increasing emphasis in the Chinese propaganda media upon the participation of the military workers and peasants in productive work.²¹ Commemoration of the Tenth Anniversary of the Communist Party of China Central Committee's "May 7 Circular" provided an opportunity for reviewing the "constructive" part the PLA played in pushing forward the Cultural Revolution. The article discussing the PLA's celebration of the Tenth Anniversary tied those former movements with the soldiers' effort to join the current ideological campaign. The article read:

"With great indignation (the soldiers) denounced Teng Hsiao-p'ing's crime of scheming to restore capitalism and they resolved to play in a still better way their role as the pillar of the dictatorship of the proletariat and defend and develop the fruits of the Great Cultural Revolution with concrete actions..."

They pledged to heighten their vigilance and be ready at all times "to smash sabotage activities by class enemies at home and abroad and to defend the great socialist motherland and the gains of the Great Cultural Revolution."²²

It is difficult at this time to judge the implications of this statement. It might indicate that the compromise effected in January by the intervention of Marshal Yeh which had kept the Army outside the radicals current campaign has broken down. If this proved to be the case, it could be anticipated that there would be further breaches in the system of compromises which until May restricted the ripple effect of the campaign. The spreading of the campaign to include the PLA might signal the opening of a reconsideration of Chinese tactical and strategic doctrine, something which would have direct impact upon China's relations with the superpowers. However, although there are indications that the PLA may become the object of a propaganda media discussion by the radical ideologists, it is still too early to determine the effect this will have upon Chinese force-structure.

H. : EXTERNAL RELATIONS AS AN ISSUE IN THE CURRENT IDEOLOGICAL CAMPAIGN

Analysis of the effects the current ideological campaign and the succession struggle may have upon the PRC's external relations is frustrated by the paucity of Chinese statements concerning changes in foreign policy. The attacks upon Teng Hsiao-p'ing and the "Right deviationist wind", with a few exceptions, have scrupulously avoided any mention of China's foreign policy under Teng's administration. The theoretical attacks of the radicals upon the "Right" dwell almost exclusively upon domestic issues and particularly upon the need to prevent the emergence of a Soviet-style bureaucratic elite. This failure by the radicals to pursue their attack of Teng into the foreign policy arena is significant evidence that a compromise on this matter has been struck between the moderate pragmatic planners and the

more radical ideologists. The radicals have apparently been given rein to point out the danger of elitist tendencies in the Chinese bureaucracy as long as development and production are not adversely affected, but they have agreed to leave Chinese foreign policy outside their current ideological campaign.

This compromise might have taken the shape of a more or less formal agreement between the factions, or it might represent only unwillingness on the part of the radicals to attack the pragmatist programs in highly sensitive areas until the ideological campaign has generated enough momentum to be effective. Whatever the motivation behind the radicals' failure to pursue an attack in this area, the effect has been to exempt Teng's foreign policy approach from intense media criticism. Indeed, Premier Hua Kuo-feng has made special efforts to assure both Prime Ministers Muldoon of New Zealand and Lee of Singapore that the foreign policy pursued by Teng Hsiao-p'ing would be continued. The chief elements of that policy have been:

- (1) Continued antagonism toward the Soviet Union. Intense Chinese criticism of Soviet foreign and domestic policy has continued unabated through the current campaign to "criticize Teng Hsiao-p'ing." Among others, articles have appeared damning Soviet efforts to build an Asian Security System,²³ attacking the Soviet position on maritime rights,²⁴ and criticizing Soviet agricultural policies.²⁵ The Soviet Union has been responding in kind with attacks upon "the Maoist clique" ruling China and waging a particularly pernicious campaign to win the support of the Uighur people in Sinkiang.²⁶ Moreover, the Chinese initiative to improve Sino-Soviet relations in late 1975 has not been pursued.
- (2) Efforts to develop relations with the US. While occasionally there have been Chinese attacks upon US policy positions, these expressions were part of generalized discussions of superpower ambitions in which the Soviet Union received explicit, pointed criticism.²⁷ On the other hand, there have been important signals that there is strong Chinese desire for improving relations with the US. While it perhaps did not have its intended effect, the invitation to ex-President Nixon might have been

at demonstrating this desire. Chiang Ch'ing's escorting the Nixons to the opera may be taken to indicate radical support of the policy of closer relations with the US. More substantive evidence comes from Chinese officials' conversations with Western statesmen in which they have emphasized China's support of the Australia, New Zealand, United States, Mutual Defense Treaty (ANZUS), the Chinese acquiescence to the stationing of US troops in Japan, and the extreme unlikelihood of renewed conflict in Korea. Chinese media statements have also continued their calls upon the Western Allies to be vigilant against the Soviet threat. In this vein, a long article was devoted to criticism of the so-called "Sonnenfeldt doctrine."²⁸ The article argued that the "doctrine" was playing into Soviet hands. Thus, although there has recently been a slowing down of the evolution of American - Chinese ties, evidence indicates that at this juncture the Chinese leaders continue to depend upon the US to offset Soviet power and they remain basically interested in improving US-PRC relations.

- (3) Efforts to improve PRC relations with the Second World. The effort to improve relations with the Second World has been an integral part of the Chinese diplomatic offensive initiated by Chou En-lai which has aimed at breaking down China's isolation from the flow of world events which had characterized its position during the Cultural Revolution. By linking China's interests with those of a wide circle of friendly nations, the Chinese leadership determined to frustrate Soviet efforts to encircle and isolate the PRC. In recent months, Hua held conversations with Second World statesmen and at the same time Chinese press has been engaged in an effort to educate the European states and Japan concerning the dangers facing them from the Soviet Union.²⁹
- (4) Efforts to improve PRC relations with the Third World. During the current ideological campaign the PRC has continued its support of the Third World countries against exploitation by the superpowers. The most dramatic manifestation of this policy was Chinese criticism of Soviet attempts to dominate Egypt. Egypt subsequently

broke off its formerly close relations with the Soviet Union and turned to the PRC for assistance. The Chinese media gave considerable attention to the visit of the Egyptian Vice-President to Peking. In his speech at the banquet welcoming Prime Minister Lee of Singapore, Premier Hua Kuo-feng warned of the Soviet menace and said the PRC was trying to establish itself in Southeast Asia.³⁰ The course of Chinese relations with Egypt and Singapore are clear indications that the PRC continues to identify itself with the Third World nations and seeks to marshal the forces of those countries against what it perceives to be the chief threat to world peace, Soviet aggression.

- (5) Efforts to insure Chinese access to world markets. Although the 1976 Canton Trade Fair which ran from 15 April to 15 May 1976 was a disappointment to foreign buyers because the amount and type of goods were limited, the Chinese officials there expressed continuing desire to expand China's trade with other nations.³¹ Moreover, international trade authorities in contact with the Chinese bureaucrats controlling the PRC trade believe that the exchange of goods which has been open since the Cultural Revolution will continue to expand.³²

I. THE LIMITS OF THE CURRENT IDEOLOGICAL CAMPAIGN

Indications are that China's foreign policy under Hua Kuo-feng has been changed in its basic direction although development of PRC relations with the superpowers has recently shown signs of slowing (see Chapter 1). It is significant that this foreign policy has not been made the subject of close criticism by the radicals. Like agriculture and military policy, the discussion of China's foreign policy seems to be restricted by the series of either explicit or tacit compromises which to date has prevented the waves of the current ideological campaign from breaking out to engulf all aspects of Chinese national life. To date the currents of the campaign have apparently been restrained by compromises which seem to include:

- (1) Agreements that criticism of the agricultural policies developed and pursued under Teng Hsiao-p'ing's leadership is to be restricted. The expansion of China's agricultural production through mechanization is too important to disrupt. The slogan "Learn from Tachai" encapsulates the compromise of leftist ideology which provides a covering for pushing forward the planners' pragmatic program of mechanization and modernization of agriculture.
- (2) Agreement that the criticism of elitist trends within Chinese educational, scientific, industrial and bureaucratic communities is to be strictly limited in order not to disrupt industrial development and production. The campaign is directed not at dismantling the bureaucratic apparatus but at warning of elitist trends in the bureaucracy, and, thus, is aimed more at ideas than individuals, and at its current level it is not disrupting the bureaucratic system.
- (3) Agreement that force-structure and strategic doctrine are to be exempted from the ideological campaign. Teng's programs of military reorganization and advanced-arms acquisition have not become central issues in the current campaign. The PLA, which holds the pivotal position in the succession struggle, is thus not directly involved in the campaign.
- (4) Agreement that Teng Hsiao-p'ing is to be criticized only for his domestic policies and that mention of his foreign policies should be restricted. Teng has been attacked for favoring bourgeois elements in China and for attempting to push the Chinese revolution into the pattern of Soviet revisionism, but mention of possible ramifications this policy might have upon the PRC's foreign policy is restricted.

Within the limits of the compromises which have apparently been reached by the factions, the current campaign of itself will have no immediate or dramatic impact upon China's foreign policy and relations with the super powers. However, changes in Chinese external relations might be anticipated

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if the radicals' campaign begins to affect the direction of Chinese industrial and agricultural development because ideological reorientation of China's modernization to the left would have serious impact upon China's trade with the West by affecting Chinese acquisition of Western industrial products.

The radicals now declare that they have no quarrel with the goal of modernizing China's industry, agriculture, national defense, and science and technology. The argument has been, they assert, over the methods their opponents in the bureaucracy have used to achieve the modernization objectives. Nevertheless, the radicals' ambition of limiting the growth of cohesive bureaucratic control of Chinese industry, the desire to rotate the leaders within the educational and scientific communities, the desire to introduce workers and peasants into every stage of scientific development and industrial planning, and most especially the desire to develop industrial self-reliance, if realized, would have serious impact upon the speed and direction of development of China's economy. Moreover, the ideological campaign will not win ready acceptance for their program; and if they continue to assert it, it is likely that China's industrial production will be seriously affected by the protracted political struggle which will ensue. While the radicals' goals, as enunciated to date, are far more limited than those proclaimed for the Cultural Revolution, nevertheless, their implementation could still have seriously disruptive influence upon the Chinese economy. The disruption in the educational and scientific communities could have long-term effects on the preparation of technocrats to push Chinese industrialization forward and also upon the direction of scientific research. Because the ideological campaign's emphasis on practical matters prevents researchers from following theoretical and abstract lines of study, the scientific foundations of China's industry may be unbalanced. Moreover, if the radicals' emphasis upon self-reliance precludes importing technology and machinery from abroad, Chinese scientists could be forced to duplicate much of the research already well-progressed in the West. Self-reliance, pursued to extremes, could also inhibit the Chinese arms development by requiring the industry to build Chinese jet engines and advanced arms rather than rely on foreign supplies. If this were to happen, the development of China

ties with Western sources for key elements in its arms program would be precluded. This outcome would weaken a possible bond that holds promise of providing a strong link tying Western and Chinese political interests.

Disruption of China's agricultural production by the ideological campaign could also have serious long-term effects upon China's foreign policy. In recent years, expansion of China's agricultural production has progressed at about 2% or just slightly more than the Chinese population growth. This agricultural expansion can only be maintained as long as there is political stability. If the ideological campaign to involve the peasants in class struggle against local authorities were to become widespread, Chinese agricultural and transportation systems could be seriously affected. The result would be a decline in essential grain production and consequently growing dependence on Western sources to make up the short-fall. While increasing Chinese dependence upon Western supplies might seem a desirable outcome, that dependence might stimulate further intensification of the self-reliance campaign and affect China's scientific and industrial planning, thus blocking China's access to Western technology and equipment. At this time, the political compromises between the radicals and the pragmatic planners have evidently restricted the current ideological campaign to the comparatively narrow issues of elite bureaucratic training and organization while at the same time preserving the content of the planner's programs for achieving the "four modernizations." Assuming that the campaign is not widened to include the sensitive areas of military force-structure and foreign policy, the forces being unleashed by the campaign could nevertheless have significant impact upon China's foreign policy by affecting the patterns of its external trade. The compromises reached by the factions seem to preclude immediate change of China's foreign policy. There are various factors, however, which in certain configurations could destabilize the present situation. The next three chapters discuss the possible changes of direction in Chinese foreign policy which might take place during the succession struggle or after the succession issue has been resolved.

CHAPTER III

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CHAPTER IV
CURRENT PRC RELATIONS WITH THE SUPERPOWERSA. CONFUSION IN CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY

976.

Since the death of Premier Chou En-lai and the subsequent removal of former Vice-Premier Teng Hsiao-p'ing from all his offices in the Government and Chinese Communist Party, China's relations with the superpowers have apparently been directed more by consensus of the leadership than by any one individual. The new Premier, Hua Kuo-feng, has little background for undertaking new policy initiatives; and indications are that he has been delegated by the Peking leadership to continue the policies which have been pursued in the last four years. Hua and the upper ranks of Chinese officialdom have made special efforts to reassure the West that the fundamental direction of China's foreign policy has not been changed. Thus, the reassurances to Western statesmen concerning Chinese support for ANZUS and the presence of US troops in Japan as well as China's interest in preventing renewed conflict in Korea are clear indications that the PRC is committed to continuing close relations with the West. The Chinese leaders have also explicitly informed the West that the PRC's trade policies will not be altered.¹

These assurances of the Chinese leadership notwithstanding, there is evidence that has surfaced, in spite of the apparent agreement not to discuss foreign policy issues in the open press, that the campaign to criticize Teng Hsiao-p'ing is having definite impact upon formulation of China's foreign policy. One key indicator in this regard has been the nature of the Peking reception given the new Chief of the US Liaison Office in Peking, Thomas Gates. Initially, the Chinese expressed impatience with the slowness of the Ford Administration in appointing someone to fill the position previously occupied by George Bush; and, when the Gates appointment was announced, it was well received by the Chinese. However, in the month after his arrival in Peking, Gates was not received by a single Chinese official of any importance.

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This is clear evidence that those within the Chinese leadership who have argued the importance of improving the PRC's ties with the United States have been unable to see their policies implemented. Similarly, as will be discussed in detail in Chapter V, those within the leadership who interpreted the late December release of the Soviet helicopter crew to signal the start of a new phase in Sino-Soviet relations, those who believed that the PRC would welcome an improvement in Sino-Soviet relations have been frustrated in their efforts to follow through on their original initiatives.

This apparent pause of China's policies regarding both superpowers has resulted in part from the political debate and factional competition being waged in Peking. The effect has been that the evolution of China's foreign policy has been halted and the resultant foreign policy formulation is unsatisfactory not only to the factions within the Chinese leadership but also to the nations with which the PRC interacts in the international arena. The United States would welcome signs that its relations with the PRC are improving, that the Taiwan issue has not blocked further progress in American relations, and that the complementarity which has existed between US and Chinese foreign policy in recent years is continuing. For their part, the Korean leaders are disappointed that the promise of a thaw in Sino-Soviet relations, apparently betokened by the release of the helicopter crew simply has not developed. The result has been that in spite of Peking's assurances that foreign policy is not an issue in the current ideological campaign, the leaders of both the US and USSR have become increasingly concerned about the pause in the development of Chinese foreign policy in recent months, and it has become obvious that the sure hands which had directed Chinese policy in recent years no longer are exercising firm control of the foreign policy formulation process. This chapter investigates that pause, describing the factors which have caused it and the implications this seeming non-directional movement could have upon the triangular relations between the US, PRC, and Soviet Union.

B. FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE CURRENT DRIFT IN CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY

Certainly the central factor behind the apparent loss of initiative in the development of relations with the superpowers has been that the succession issue has not yet been resolved. Before Chou En-lai's death in January 1976, Chinese foreign policy was apparently unfolding in carefully designed stages. Chou En-lai, the architect of that policy, had won Mao's blessing for his comprehensive program which was providing coherent and integrated objectives not only for foreign policy but also domestic policies. In 1975 the implementation of the grand design worked out by Chou fell to Teng Hsiao-p'ing. It is now evident that, beginning in the summer of 1975 and then picking up tempo in the fall, criticism of Teng from the ideological radicals brought increasing pressure not only upon Teng and the pragmatists around him but also upon the programs they were pursuing. Deprived of the support of Chou En-lai, that group has been unable to maintain its firm control of the Chinese policy making apparatus. For their part, the radicals have succeeded in blocking the accession of Teng to the premiership and in advancing their current ideological campaign, but they are still far from control of the bureaucracy, the Party, or the PLA. Therefore, neither side in the struggle has sufficient strength at this time to provide firm direction in decision making. The consequent drift in Chinese policy promises to continue until one faction or the other is sufficiently strengthened to be able to win long-term acceptance for its program.

The second major factor contributing to the drift in Chinese foreign policy formulation is the international environment. While the Chinese have expressed unhappiness over the advances Soviet arms-diplomacy has made recently, especially in Angola, and while the very large Soviet army on China's border is a constant threat to the PRC, the international stability in Asia which has followed the conclusion of the Indochina War has provided a sheltered framework for the Chinese political battle in which the state of China's external relations does not promise to force an early conclusion to the succession struggle. Conceivably, if the

Soviet Union threatened the PRC with imminent invasion of Manchuria or US threatened Chinese interests through its Asian allies, the resultant international pressure could unite the Chinese factions in a compromise solution of their differences or impel one side or the other to seek PL support to displace its adversaries in the name of national defense. A is, however, the threats posed by Soviet power are sufficiently distant be a significant but not overwhelming factor in the Chinese political s and, moreover, the threat from the United States has been neutralized b establishment of close US-PRC ties. Consequently, unless either the Un States or the Soviet Union moves dramatically to alter the progress of PRC political struggle in its favor, the state of the PRC's external re tions will be secondary to domestic considerations in the succession st

C. EVOLUTION OF CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE CU STRUGGLE

Assuming that there is a continuation of the general Chinese domes and international factors which have contributed to the current drift i Chinese foreign policy formulation, it is important for US policymakers consider carefully the American options for dealing with the PRC during period. Those options, as well as those of the Soviet Union, will be shaped by the situations that arise because of the impact of the tenden and trends now observable in the Chinese political process.

The first possibility that confronts US policymakers is that the current indecisive situation will continue into the indefinite future. This would happen if the forces now operative in China remain in equili Since the radical ideologists seem to depend upon the presence of Mao T tung to maintain their position vis-à-vis their pragmatic critics, it i likely that the present balance can only be continued as long as the we of Mao's blessing rests authoritatively with the radical faction. Simi larly, given the enormous prestige Mao can exert on behalf of his

radical followers, it is unlikely that they can be completely excluded from the political process as long as Mao lives. The apparent worsening of Mao's health in the spring of 1976 gives promise that his influence will soon not be an effective force in Chinese decision making, and undoubtedly the prospect of losing their most effective weapon against the pragmatic bureaucrats has been an important factor in the timing of the radicals' ideological campaign. Therein, the radicals are attempting to tip the balance of Chinese politics in their favor while Mao can still exert pressure on their behalf. If the radicals, through their criticism of Teng Hsiao-p'ing, are successful in extending their power base and putting the bureaucrats on the defensive, the ideological input into China's domestic and foreign policy decisions could continue to be an important force into the future beyond Mao's death. A more likely possibility would be that the bureaucrats, who have been thrown onto the defensive by the radical ideological assault for the present, will succeed in preventing the campaign from affecting industrial and agricultural production and from altering the PRC's basic military and foreign policies. It might very well be that the pragmatists are content to bide their time for the present and to frustrate the radical efforts. When the force of the current ideological campaign is spent and when Mao no longer exercises his power on the side of the radicals, the bureaucrats may move decisively to eliminate the power bases of the radical factions. Should this occur and should the bureaucrats and technocrats be successful in establishing firm control of the Chinese political machinery, US policymakers can expect that the indecisiveness and drift currently evinced in China's relations with the superpowers would be brought to a swift end.²

Another possibility US policymakers should prepare for is that the current indecision in the PRC caused by the radical assault upon the pragmatic policies pursued by the bureaucrats will spill over the limits defined by the apparent compromises which have contained it and plunge Chinese society into the kind of disorder seen in the period of the Cultural Revolution. However, this eventuality is unlikely for two reasons. First, Mao Tse-tung

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was the force behind the Cultural Revolution. He used that movement to reassert his waning control over the governmental and Party systems in the late 1960's, but he only narrowly succeeded in reining in the movement in 1968 with the intervention of the PLA. That experience serves as an effective incentive for avoiding a similar crisis at this time. Mao, infirm and unable to deal with affairs of state, is most unlikely to actively seek that kind of explosive situation again; and, without Mao's blessing and positive assistance it is doubtful whether the radicals will develop a campaign of the proportion of the Cultural Revolution. The second deterrent against a replay of anything approaching the Cultural Revolution in scale and intensity is the resistance the campaign would meet in every level of the governmental, Party, and PLA bureaucracies. The experience of the pragmatists during the Cultural Revolution indicates clearly that not only the future of their programs for modernizing agriculture and industry and pushing China into the ranks of the advanced nations are directly threatened by the political movements inspired by radical ideologists, but also their own careers and, indeed their personal safety can be jeopardized. It is likely that few Chinese bureaucrats in 1964 realized the danger the Cultural Revolution movement held for them. Now, educated by their frightening experiences in the 1966-1968 period, the pragmatists have sought to quash recent radical movements before they reach threatening proportions. Since the Cultural Revolution was brought under control in 1968 there is evidence that the pragmatic bureaucrats have been vigilant in preventing the radicals from mounting effective ideological campaigns. In 1973 the radicals attacked the policies being pursued by Premier Chou En-lai with an anti-Confucius campaign. Chou was successful in parrying that thrust and stifled the campaign before it reached dangerous proportions.³ Likewise, Teng Hsiao-p'ing was successful in aborting the Water Margin campaign of 1975 before it could directly threaten his position.⁴ Undoubtedly the protection afforded by the presence of Chou En-lai was the most effective weapon he had at that time against his radical critics. Deprived of the influence of Chou in January 1976, the bureaucrats were apparently caught off

guard by the radical attack which was quickly mounted against their position. While they failed to prevent the campaign from damaging them, the bureaucrats have apparently succeeded, at least for the present, in establishing well-defined limits which have been dikes preventing the waves of the campaign from overwhelming their positions in key areas.

While the absence of Mao's active support of a Cultural Revolution-type campaign and the vigilant resistance of the bureaucracy are powerful forces retarding the spread of the current ideological campaign, the very desperation of the radicals to firmly establish their position, heightened by their awareness of the crucial importance of the succession struggle in the history of the Chinese Communist revolution, may impel them toward widening the current campaign as far as possible. To achieve this end, the radicals have the powerful weapon of quotations allegedly coming from Mao Tse-tung. This weapon has recently been used to widen the campaign, which initially had been aimed only at Teng Hsiao-p'ing, to include assaults upon other as yet unnamed "capitalists roaders." Mao allegedly said, "A number of Party members have moved backward and opposed the revolution. Why? Because they have become high officials and want to protect the interests of high officials."⁵ For the present, the targets of this attack against bureaucratic elitists have not been clearly identified, however, future quotations of Mao could be used to specify who the "capitalist roaders" are and used to "root them out" of their positions of power. It is significant in this regard that the radical assaults upon Teng Hsiao-p'ing began with similar imprecise accusations; but, after the 5 April riots in Peking, Teng was specifically identified.

Control of Mao's oracular pronouncements may become an increasingly important support for the radical campaign. Because of the political weight Mao's statements hold, the radicals in the person of Mao's wife, Chiang Ch'ing, may have found it expedient in April 1976 to remove from Mao's presence the three young women who have served as his interpreters. Deprived of this "outside" influence, the radicals may have significantly improved their position to use Mao's utterances as weapons against their bureaucratic rivals. This radical control of the Maoist oracle may prove

to be an effective instrument for widening the campaign even after Mao physically incapacitated and unable to make any significant policy decisions. Indeed, it is intriguing to speculate whether that situation has already developed and whether the radicals are using these quotations of Mao in the Chairman might not have condoned when his perspicacity was more in evidence. The desperation of their cause might lead the radicals to use this tactic further and thereby delay the bureaucratic counterattack against their position. If Mao were to lapse into a coma, the radicals might be tempted nevertheless to use the Maoist oracular statements to maintain the thrust of their assaults and widen the scope of their ideological campaign. Increasingly radical statements attributed to Mao combined with his conspicuous absence from the public view might be an indication that this approach is being pursued by the radicals. If this tack is taken, it is likely that the radicals would be gambling everything on this one throw of the dice and there would be a dramatic heating up of both the ideological campaign and the bureaucrats' efforts to control it. The struggle between the two factions waged at this level would consume Chinese national energies; and, until the issue was resolved, there would be intensification of the indecisiveness and drift noted in China's relations with the US and USSR. Undoubtedly, if the struggle absorbed the Chinese leadership's interests and prevented new policy initiatives or the development of established policies, the result would be increasing withdrawal of China from international affairs.

Another possibility within the framework of trends evident in Chinese politics today that US policymakers should prepare for is that a political testament attributed to Mao Tse-tung would be published and that the radicals would be catapulted into positions of leadership in the PRC. Whether it were authentic or not, a political testament specifying radical leaders whom Mao would like to have succeed him and defining the policies he would like to have pursued could prove to be an effective weapon for the radicals. Their current control of Mao's oracular pronouncements would give the radical leaders the opportunity for obtaining at least the appearance

of Mao's blessings upon such a document. Conceivably the words of the Chairman might be sufficiently powerful to greatly increase their political clout. The radicals could then be expected to move quickly to expand further their power base and use their strengthened position to attack their rivals in the bureaucracy. While the weight of the pragmatists' opposition to the radical advance would very likely eventually bring about the removal of the radicals from their entrenched positions because the pragmatists could be expected to resist the radical assault with every resource at their disposal, it is likely that a political testament of this type could both intensify and at the same time prolong the succession struggle. If this should happen, the Chinese would be absorbed in their domestic political affairs until the denouement of the struggle was decided. If PRC foreign policy becomes an openly debated issue in an intensified and prolonged succession struggle, the consequent paralysis in policy formulation would prevent the Chinese from effectively protecting their interests, and this situation could have extremely negative influence upon the position of the PRC in the international arena and directly affect the balance of power in the US-PRC-USSR triangular relationship. Moreover, if the pattern of the Cultural Revolution is a descriptive paradigm of the approach the radical faction might take towards foreign policy, it is safe to say that there would be a direct relationship between increases in radical power in Peking and the withdrawal of the PRC into self-imposed international isolation.

D. IMPLICATIONS FOR SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

Confronted with intensification of the Chinese factional struggle, the Soviet Union, like the US, will be faced with the basic decision of whether it wishes to intervene in the Chinese succession struggle in order to produce an outcome congenial to Soviet interests or whether it will stand by and await the denouement of the conflict. Because this opportunity represents the best Soviet chance since 1949 for insuring the creation of a pro-Soviet Chinese regime and for neutralizing the long-term Chinese threat to Siberia, it is unlikely that the Soviets will be willing to

wait passively while a struggle crucial to their interests moves forward. Because it would be out of character for the Soviets to scruple at any means that would achieve their purposes, the range of possibilities open to Soviet policymakers is extremely wide. Moreover, if the succession struggle is expanded into an intense and prolonged conflict, the opportunities for Soviet mischief will increase in direct proportion to the breakdown of unanimity within the Peking leadership. The Soviet range of possible options for influencing the course of Chinese politics goes from extreme indirect approaches like the recent posturing of representing the Soviet Union as a peacemaker⁷ to outright military intervention. At some point along that line, the Soviet policymakers are aware that their efforts to influence the Chinese succession struggle will have counterproductive results because of the predictable Chinese backlash against Soviet interference. When that threshold has been crossed, the Soviets will be presented with a choice between outright military intervention or backing out of the arena altogether. The consequences which might flow from a decision to intervene militarily in China will be discussed in more detail in Chapter VI. Before that threshold is reached, however, there are several alternatives open to Soviet policymakers including the following:

- (1) Demonstrations of peaceful intentions. The first alternative the Soviets have for influencing the political competition in Peking is to make moves calculated to show Soviet peaceful intentions. Ideally, the Soviets by the success of these efforts could remove the state of Sino-Soviet relations from the center of Chinese political debate and the Soviet Union would be in a position to deal with whatever regime emerged in Peking. However, because of Chinese skepticism about Soviet intentions, it is unlikely that Soviet diplomatic gestures and propaganda initiatives designed to demonstrate peaceful Soviet intentions would convince many Chinese leaders. Consequently, the effectiveness of this instrument will be extremely limited at this time and it might be reserved for use as a signal that the Soviet

Union is willing to improve Sino-Soviet relations especially if the pragmatic bureaucrats succeed in consolidating their position in Peking. (See Chapter V) In the current raw political competition and especially if the struggle intensifies, this demonstration would prove too subtle for significantly influencing the course of the Chinese political debate.

- (2) Appeals to minorities in China. A more hostile approach the Soviet Union can take is moving appeals to racial minorities within the PRC. By redoubling their propaganda appeals to the minorities along the Sino-Soviet border, the Soviet Union can soften up target populations for a rebellion against "Han Chinese domination." This might eventually provide a pretext for intervention in Chinese affairs and might even lay the foundation for fragmentation of the PRC if that seemed desirable. Since February 1976 the Soviets have been engaged in propaganda blasts against the Chinese "repression of the Uighur minority in Sinkiang."⁸ The Chinese propaganda media have responded in kind with denunciations of Great Russian racial chauvinism within the USSR.⁹
- (3) Covert activities to influence directly the outcome of the Chinese succession struggle. The Soviets have a wide range of possible options for covertly influencing the outcome of the Chinese succession struggle. Positive action could include arms and money for factions that would be more likely to pursue a policy of improving Sino-Soviet relations. Actions that would negatively affect extremely anti-Soviet groups could include assassination of leaders and Soviet attempts to encourage the Chinese tendencies toward fragmentation into regional power centers. In all these activities, the Soviet Union would run the dangerous risk that its efforts would be uncovered and a backlash produce results opposite the effects intended. Deprived of these instruments, the Soviet Union would be forced to employ more overt forms of pressure to influence the direction of the Chinese political struggle.

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Thus, the Soviet Union like the United States will be forced to carefully weigh any option before trying to influence the Chinese succession struggle. However, because of the extreme importance of the struggle for the future of the power balance within the US-PRC-USSR triangular relationship, the Soviet Union can be expected to take whatever options promise to accomplish its purposes.

E. IMPLICATIONS FOR US FOREIGN POLICY

The eventual outcome of the Chinese succession struggle will have serious impact upon the balance of power within the US-PRC-USSR triangular relationship; and, faced with the possibility that the results not be congenial to US Interests, American policymakers would have to make a series of difficult choices, the most basic of which is whether the United States should attempt to influence the outcome of the struggle or stand aside and await the outcome. In June 1976, this issue was sharpened by publication of Roger Brown's article in Foreign Policy. Brown advocated US recognition of the PRC as the "sole government" of China before the death of Mao Tse-tung because failure to act before Mao's passing could undermine the "pro-US" faction in Peking and strengthen the "pro-USSR" forces.⁶ Brown's point of view maximizes the importance of foreign policy inputs into the Chinese political process presuming that a move by the US at this time could influence the direction of China's domestic political situation.

Contrary opinion, which seems more cogent, is that while the influence of international events unquestionably has significant influence upon the Chinese political system, the diplomatic recognition of the PRC by the US would not be an event of sufficient magnitude to influence a political struggle in which domestic issues are of paramount importance. US failure to grant diplomatic recognition to the PRC simply is not at the heart of the current struggle and the connection between this aspect of US-PRC relations and Chinese domestic politics is too tenuous to affect

seriously the Chinese political process. Thus, while the Peking leadership would welcome a move by the US to implement one of the unwritten understandings of the Shanghai Communique, it is far from clear how that move would stay the attack of the radicals who are determined to reverse elitist trends in the Chinese governmental, Party, and military bureaucratic systems. Moreover, in the context of the raw political struggle between the entrenched factions which has now begun and may intensify, the US diplomatic recognition of the PRC is too subtle an instrument for seriously affecting the development of Chinese politics. That recognition would not alter the direction of US-PRC relations; it would not reverse the cordial ties that have been established since 1971; it would only confirm and ratify the progress that has been made in building friendly American-Chinese relations in the past five years. The failure of the United States to extend diplomatic recognition to the PRC has provided the radicals with one weapon among many for demonstrating the ineffectiveness of the bureaucrats' policies. Extension of recognition by the US would have the effect of eliminating that weapon and easing the position of those who have advocated ties with the US, but would very likely not have further impact upon the Chinese domestic competition because the issue does not appear to be at the center of the radical-pragmatist struggle. The impact of US recognition of the PRC upon the Chinese internal debate could be very indirect, but it would contribute to improvement of US-PRC relations. Consequently, when it is appropriate, considering US domestic and international factors, the US Government should act expeditiously to effect the recognition of the PRC. However, US policymakers should not take that action under any illusions that their initiative will affect decisively the outcome of the Chinese succession struggle.

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Consideration must also be given to the negative impact US recognition of Peking will have upon its relations with the ROC Government on Taiwan upon the future US negotiating position with Peking. It might be questioned whether now is the time for the US to reject the ROC in order to advance its influence in Peking while the Chinese are in the midst of their all-imperialist succession struggle. Indeed, reserving the option of extending diplomatic recognition to the PRC for future use might prove extremely effective in indicating future US good intentions toward whatever regime is eventually able to consolidate its position in China or for deterring Soviet intervention in Chinese politics. An ill-timed, ill-considered US attempt to influence the succession struggle for the moderates could result in the alienation from the US one or both fractions which have until now acquiesced to the establishment and improvement of US-PRC ties. Through such an attempt the state of US-PRC relations could become a central issue in the succession struggle, an outcome that would be pernicious to US long-term interests.

If the United States is unlikely to influence the outcome of the Chinese succession struggle by formally recognizing the PRC, it might fairly be asked what can be done during the time the struggle is going forward. The establishment of a "pro-Moscow" regime in China would contribute to a major upset in the balance of power in the US-PRC-USSR triangular relationship. Because the Chinese nationalistic and racial instincts have been sharpened by the historical experience of interaction with tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union, it is extremely unlikely that any overtly "pro-Soviet" faction will emerge spontaneously from the Chinese political struggle. As they are understood by Western analysts, the Chinese factions might be willing to deal with the Soviet Union to gain certain objectives, but in all cases the motives for that action would be the advancement of Chinese not Soviet interests (See Chapter 1). Consequently, it is likely that for the Soviet Union to achieve its purposes of establishing a pro-Moscow regime, it will be necessary for it to intervene in the Chinese succession struggle.

The effectiveness of US action for preventing the Soviets from achieving their purposes is difficult to predict because of the large number

of operative factors within the Chinese political competition as well as the US-PRC-USSR triangular relationship. However, it is certain that indications that the United States did not consider the outcome of the Chinese domestic struggle to be extremely important or that the United States would not allow Soviet intervention in China to affect US-USSR relations, would encourage those within the Kremlin who favor Soviet action in China to produce an outcome compatible with Moscow's objectives. Conversely, evidence that any direct Soviet intervention in PRC politics would seriously affect US-USSR relations would provide an important argument for those in Moscow who are against intruding into the uncertainties of PRC politics. Thus, by indicating to the Soviets that their intervention in Chinese politics would have serious impact upon the progress of US-USSR detente, US policy can influence the Kremlin debate on this issue.

In the history of its relations with China the United States has consistently, though often ineffectively, sought to minimize foreign influence in Chinese affairs. Secretary of State John Hay's "Open Door" notes of 1899 and the US efforts in the 1930's and World War II to prevent Japan from dominating China are the highlights of a US policy of seeking to limit the influence of foreign military power upon China's destiny. A US policy which sought to deter the Soviet leadership from deciding to intervene overtly in the current Chinese succession struggle would be firmly rooted in that tradition; and, since the dangers to PRC sovereignty inherent in the possibility of Soviet intervention into Chinese politics are apparent to the contending factions within the Chinese leadership, a American policy aimed at forestalling Soviet intervention would most likely be well received in Peking. There are various steps the US could take to implement such a policy and update the traditional US resistance against foreign interference in China. Some of these steps are:

- (1) Projection of an image of power. The Chinese are depending upon the United States to serve as a counterweight to Soviet power,

especially while their own political problems are absorbing their energies. Perception of the US as a pusillanimous superpower, unable to protect its own interests from Soviet advances, could have serious impact upon Chinese decisionmakers faced with mounting Soviet pressure. It is conceivable that the assumption that the United States is not a sufficient weight to offset Soviet pressure could persuade some Chinese leaders to press for some kind of settlement with the Soviet Union to forestall Soviet intervention in the succession struggle. Conversely, demonstrations that the US has both the means and the will to prevent the Soviets from advancing their position in Peking would be important elements in the Chinese leadership's calculations of the steps that are necessary to keep the Soviet Union from intervening while the succession issue is resolved.

- (2) Discussions with the Soviet Union. The US Government could make it understood in Moscow that any Soviet attempt to subvert the PRC Government would be against US national interests and would not be tolerated. US officials could inform the Russians that the continuation of US-USSR detente would be jeopardized if the Soviet Union intervened in Chinese affairs and thereby upset the power balance with the US-PRC-USSR triangle.
- (3) Discussions with the PRC. The United States can make the Chinese leadership aware of steps it is taking to forestall Soviet intervention in China's domestic affairs. If the US took this step, it would best be made before an audience which represents the different factions in Chinese politics so that no interpretation of US interference in Chinese domestic affairs could be made. The intent of the US presentation would be that whatever the outcome of the Chinese succession struggle, American interest in resisting Soviet pressures upon China remains constant.

- (4) US recognition of the PRC. If Soviet pressure upon China were increasing, the recognition of the PRC Government by the US would be a significant signal to the Russian leaders that the US was prepared to support the Chinese. US policymakers might decide that the value of using the recognition of the PRC as an instrument for countering Soviet pressure upon China outweighed the importance of reserving that move until the succession struggle was resolved. This move would not be taken to alter the course of China's internal politics but to indicate to both the Russians and the Chinese the importance the US attaches to continuing the ties between itself and China.
- (5) Offers of US arms to the PRC. Although there are definite restraints upon the limits the Chinese wish to go in the development of US-PRC relations and there has been no specific interest in obtaining US arms to date, an offer of US arms to the PRC would underscore the strength of the US will to resist Soviet pressures upon China. Announcement of an American-Chinese arms supply agreement would be a positive signal to the USSR that the US was willing to support the PRC Government against Soviet pressure, although the limits of that American support would remain ill-defined.

The appropriateness of these instruments for projecting the US policy posture would depend upon the circumstances in which they were employed. However, taken singly or together, these steps could provide definite signals to the Soviet Union not to intrude into Chinese affairs. Moreover, the unwillingness of the US to interfere in Chinese domestic affairs to maximize its own advantage and American efforts to protect the PRC from Soviet advances, if known to the various factions within the Peking leadership, would provide uncontestable proof of the extreme value of US-PRC relations to China. Whatever the outcome of the succession struggle, the US would then be in a position to further improve those relations.

CHAPTER IV - REFERENCES

1. Chinese Foreign Minister Ch'iao Kuan-hua told the Japanese ambassador to Peking that the campaign would not affect China's foreign policy and that relations with Japan, including economic links, would remain unchanged. Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 99, #22, p. 1.
2. For a discussion of possible changes in PRC foreign policy under a bureaucratically dominated government see Chapter II of the present work.
3. Chou En-lai was criticized by allusion to alleged similarities between his policies and the teachings of Confucius. The campaign was particularly aimed at Chou's bringing people like Teng Hsiao-p'ing back into power after he had been purged in the Cultural Revolution. Washington Post, 16 February 1976, p. A17.
4. In the current campaign to criticize Teng Hsiao-p'ing there have been explicit references to Teng's handling of the Water Margin campaign. One Peoples' Daily commentary for February 29, 1976 noted:
"They also resorted to all possible means to resist Chairman Mao's instructions on criticism of Water Margin by alleging that one should not assume that all winds foretell the coming of rain."
Issues and Studies, Vol. XII, #5, p. 10.
5. New York Times, 7 June 1976, p. 2.
6. Roger Glenn Brown's article appeared in the June edition of Foreign Policy.
7. New York Times, 29 April 1976, p. 10.
8. Washington Post, 10 May 1976, p. A18.
9. Peking Review #22, 28 May 1976, pp. 19-23.
"Soviet Social-Imperialism Pursues a Policy of National Oppression"

CHAPTER V
DEVELOPMENT OF PRC-USSR DETENTE

United States policies have received valuable support from the rift between the USSR and the PRC, and Chinese presence has provided an important counterbalance against Soviet expansion in Asia. In Southeast Asia there was great danger that a power vacuum would result from the collapse of South Viet Nam, a vacuum which could be exploited by the Russians, but the antagonism between the two Communist giants has prevented either from solely dominating the region. The Sino-Soviet competition has also relieved the Japanese of fear of military attack and left Japan in a favored position to deal with both the Chinese and Russians. These pressures have contributed significantly toward the confirmation of stability in Asia, one of the cardinal objectives of American Asian policy.

Because the US has profited from the rift between the PRC and the USSR, it is natural for Americans to be concerned about the possibility of rapprochement between the Communist powers. There is fear that the rebuilding of their alliance could betoken the beginning of a new stage of Communist expansion. If Chinese and Soviet military power were unified, most surely the position of the US in Asia would be brought under severe pressure, especially in Korea and Japan. Moreover, there is fear that the healing of the ideological split in the Communist movement would mean that the disruptive force of world Communism would increase its momentum. This chapter of the perspective, examining the likely conditions under which it could be achieved, what the nature of that detente might be, and what some of the implications of this shift in Chinese and Russian policies would be for US and Soviet foreign policies in general.

A. PRECONDITIONS FOR PRC-USSR DETENTE

The first precondition for the establishment of PRC-USSR detente would be the decline of the power of the radical ideologists who have exercised

strong influence upon Chinese domestic policy and also Chinese foreign policy at different times in the disruptive cyclical explosions of revolutionary fervor which have characterized Chinese history since 1949. Particularly during the Cultural Revolution, the radicals dominated Chinese foreign policy. They required all but one of the Chinese ambassadors to return home for reindoctrination, and they focused the immense energies of the Chinese people upon domestic affairs while at the same time fanning flames of ideological conflict with the Soviet Union.

The connections the radicals make between their domestic objective and their antagonism toward the Soviet Union is the chief reason their power must be eliminated from the Chinese policy process before any initiative like detente with the USSR can be pursued by Chinese diplomats. The radicals like other Chinese factions, are deeply fearful of the strategic threat posed by the very large Soviet army on the Sino-Soviet border, and they are also concerned about the long-term implications of the geo-political struggle between the PRC and USSR for domination of Northeast Asia. However, for the radicals, ideological questions are more important than for other groups in the Chinese leadership; and, therefore, it is not surprising that they view the struggle between China and the Soviet Union less as a conflict of military and geo-political interests than as a battle over doctrinal issues. To the Chinese radical ideologists the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has gone wildly astray from correct and orthodox Marxism-Leninism. The building of elites within the bureaucracy who control every aspect of Soviet life, the establishment of exclusive educational and scientific communities, and the exploitation of the masses in order to provide special luxuries for a privileged few are to them nothing short of the overturning of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the reestablishment of the power of the bourgeoisie. Unlike the US, which in the Communist view of history is a declining bourgeois social system exercising no significant influence upon the Chinese social and economic order, the Soviet example represents an immediate threat to the future of the Chinese Communist revolution. What makes the Soviet Union's experience such a

pressing threat to the radicals is that there is every indication that the forces which led to the elitist rule in the USSR are operative within China as well. Thus, in the radicals' perspective, the Soviet Union is a regative example of all that is perverted within the Communist movement, and pointing to Soviet failures becomes an instrument for attacking the so-called revisionist forces within Chinese society itself. Consequently, the antagonism for the Soviet Union is an expression of the radicals' fear that their opposition in China will one day overthrow what they consider to be the dictatorship of the proletariat. Because of this connection it can be assumed that as long as the radical ideologists are a force in Chinese decision making, it will be extremely difficult for the Peking leadership to establish detente with Moscow.

In the current ideological campaign the radicals are demonstrating considerable strength. Apparently with the blessing of Mao Tse-tung, they have succeeded in widening their campaign from a purely theoretical base to attacks upon elitist trends in education, science, and in industry in less than five months. It is too early to tell whether this propaganda campaign will seriously affect the plans of the bureaucrats and technocrats or whether the ripple effects of the campaign will be contained by the compromises apparently made within the leadership. However, the campaign is demonstrating the still considerable political clout of the radicals, a power that had been largely eclipsed when Chinese policy was being directed by Chou En-lai. Since no figure of stature comparable to the late Premier is likely to appear, it can be expected that the radicals will continue to be a force in Chinese policy making at least as long as Mao is present to underwrite their campaigns and political objectives.

The second precondition which would have to be realized before PRC-USSR detente could be effected would be the consolidation of power by the pragmatic bureaucrats and technocrats withing the Peking leadership. From January to June 1976, the position of these pragmatists has been dealt serious blows. Deprived of the leadership and protection of Chou En-lai, they will find it increasingly difficult to exert overwhelming power against their adversaries. Until they do, however, it is likely that

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the advancement of their plans to push forward the modernization of Chinese industry, agriculture, national defense, and science will be in jeopardy.

The pragmatic bureaucrats' objective of modernizing China's economy is the key for understanding their foreign policy goals. In order to advance their projects they require long-term regional stability and access to foreign technology and markets. The security threat from the United States which was a pressing problem for Chinese planners from the time of the Korean war until Nixon's visit to Peking has largely been neutralized. The last significant threat to China's security interest therefore comes from the Soviet Union.

The planners require relative freedom from the fear of Soviet intervention in Chinese affairs to be able to pursue their goals. Until the PLA has been reorganized and reequipped with advanced weapons, Chinese military power, dependent upon a nuclear retaliatory power of questionable effectiveness, will be a weak deterrent against Soviet mechanized might. The Chinese bureaucrats will have to push forward the modernization of China's national defense, but, during the process of rebuilding the PLA, it will be essential that the Soviet threat be at least partially neutralized. PRC-USSR detente can serve this end. The needs China's industry also impel the bureaucrats toward detente because before 1958 the Soviet Union was the source of China's advanced industrial material. Since advancements that have taken place in Chinese industry and technology have been built upon that base, there is still a great complementarity between Soviet and Chinese industry. The expansion of trade with the Soviet Union which could be eased through PRC-USSR detente could therefore provide Chinese industry with renewed access to important industrial and technological information. Another factor which is driving planners toward detente with the USSR is the need to defuse the highly explosive issue of Sino-Soviet confrontation which the ideologists use as a weapon attacking the direction in which the bureaucrats are leading China. The combination of the present military and ideological threats posed by the Soviet Union is a serious disruptive influence upon PRC politics. By reducing

military threat through detente and quieting the radicals' constant refrain that the Chinese bureaucrats are pushing the Chinese Communist revolution along the same track as the Soviet technocrats, the pragmatists may be able to reduce the issue of detente with the USSR to more rational and manageable levels. This defusing of an explosive issue can only take place when the radicals have been deprived of their nearly exclusive control of the propaganda media.

The third precondition for the establishment of PRC-USSR detente is the continuation of international stability. Chinese diplomats have used the equilibrium which exists between the US and USSR to advance China's objectives. Indeed, there are indications that since the opening of their relations with the US the pragmatists have sought to move the PRC into the optimum position of being able to take advantage of the competition between the US and USSR. One of the most explicit descriptions of this policy objective is found in the "Kunming Documents," a series of instructions which were meant to explain the rationale behind the dramatic changes in Chinese foreign policy in 1970 and 1971. The documents state:

"The two archenemies facing us are US imperialism and Soviet revisionism. We are to fight for the overthrow of these two enemies. This has already been written into the new Party Constitution. Nevertheless, are we to fight these two enemies simultaneously, using the same might? No. Are we to ally ourselves with one against the other? Definitely not. We act in the light of changes in situations, tipping the scale diversely at different times."

This statement indicates that Chinese diplomacy has sought to place China in a "swing position" between the US and USSR. In that place the pragmatists would be best able to guarantee China's security against the threats of either superpower and would be able to exercise Chinese influence to insure regional stability in order to push forward with their "four modernizations." To appreciate the impact China's holding this swing position would have upon the US-PRC-USSR triangular relationship, it is important to review the steps taken by China's diplomats which might be interpreted as moves toward realizing this policy objective.

During the Cultural Revolution period the political chaos caused by the disruptive campaigns of the Red Guards greatly weakened the Chinese position

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vis-à-vis both superpowers. That weakness was compounded by the PLA's poor ground-force capability and the relatively unsophisticated arms available to China's military. Because of the dislocation of the political campaign, the Chinese economy was ill-prepared to make the substantial progress necessary to provide new weapons even if strategic doctrine and budgetary constraints would have allowed it. The weakness of the PRC in this period was symbolized by the almost total isolation of China from world affairs, an isolation in which Albania and a handful of weak Third World nations represented China's chief allies. It may be supposed that under those pressing circumstances, Chinese statesmen considered deeply the problem of insuring the PRC's survival into the Twenty-First Century, and in their calculations the first prerequisite for providing China with necessary stability to reorder itself would be neutralization of the threats of the United States and Soviet Union against Chinese interests. Because China was so internally torn and weakened, dealing with the Soviet Union in 1950 would have placed the Chinese in an extremely inferior position vis-à-vis Soviet negotiators. Any settlement of border questions and ideological issues at that time would have reflected that weakness, and it may have been that it was in order to improve its relative position in dealing with the Soviets that the Chinese moved to open ties with the United States, using even their reduced power, as the "Kunming Documents" put it, "to the scale" toward the American side, the Chinese would be able to link their interests with those of the US. Fortuitously for the PRC, Chinese and American interests could be harmonized because the US was anxious to redirect its Asian policy away from its Cold War thrust.

For China to be able to deal with the United States it was necessary to develop among the Peking leadership a new understanding of the superpower mutual relationship. As the rift between Moscow and Peking had deepened in the mid-1960's, the Chinese leadership increased the cutting edge of their criticism of the Soviet Union's policies of "peaceful co-existence" with the US. By 1965 the Chinese were moving toward the damning accusation

that the Soviet leaders were involved with the US in an anti-China conspiracy, and in 1966 Chou En-lai accused the Soviet Union of "colluding" with the US to contain the PRC. Thereafter, throughout the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese propaganda assaults against both the US and USSR echoed the theme of their supposed anti-China "collusion."² The "collusionist" interpretation predicated a unitary threat against Chinese interests by both superpowers and consequently precluded dealing with either in detail. There was a need to reappraise the former assessment of the superpower relationship before China could expect to reach a swing position between its adversaries. Beginning in the 1968-1971 period, the Chinese statements concerning the superpower relationship moved away from their consistent accusations of US-Soviet collaboration and "collusion" against China to a somewhat contradictory position of arguing that the superpowers were struggling against each other and at the same time "colluding". This was an indication that during those years the Chinese leadership had not developed a unified analysis of the global power system and China's place in it and that a debate between those maintaining that the superpowers were "colluding" and those who argued that the superpowers were "contending" was being carried on.

In the years between 1969 and 1971 Chinese media references and policy statements about the "collusion" of the two superpowers declined; and, simultaneously with the breaking of the isolation which had characterized Chinese foreign policy during the Cultural Revolution, Chinese statements concerning the superpower relationship began depicting the US and USSR as simply "contending" against each other for world hegemony. The argument of those within the Chinese leadership who viewed the relationship between the superpowers as one of "contention" led to the conclusion that neither the US nor USSR could afford to attack China, and therefore the PRC Government was in a position to redirect many of the energies of the nation which had been pinned down in the years when the superpowers were perceived as posing a joint threat to China's security. The "contentionist" interpretation also led logically to the conclusion that China was in a favored

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position to exploit the mutual rivalry of the superpowers to achieve its ends. The debate within the leadership was brought to a conclusion in part by the evidence of the intensification of the "contention" between the US and USSR which was provided by the October 1973 Middle East War. The Chinese leaders were deeply impressed by Nixon's move of declaring a world-wide Defense Condition Three which indicated the strength of US willingness to resist the Soviet Union. The Chinese leaders took two months before announcing their official reaction to the alert. When the Chinese position was stated, it predictably stressed the interpretation that the relationship between the superpowers was one of "absolute contention." The new interpretation of the superpowers' relationship could have allowed the Chinese pragmatists in the leadership debates to argue the importance of exploiting US and Soviet differences and of moving China into the swing position between the two super powers. The progress in reducing China's international isolation while establishing links with the United States and its allies was swift and dramatic. In a little more than a year after the July 1971 announcement of Nixon's impending visit to Peking, the PRC managed to take the China seat from the Republic of China in the UN, establish the basis for a developing relationship with the US, and open diplomatic and trade ties with Japan. Thereafter, the threat from the Cold War arc of containment the US had pieced together against China along the eastern edges of Asia was neutralized.

It is important to note that the relationship China has established with the United States goes beyond mere detente because "detente" implies only a relaxation of strained or difficult relations. The complementarity of US and PRC interests has developed a far closer relationship and consequently it might be useful to refer to US-PRC relations as an "entente cordiale" word which implies an understanding based upon mutually shared objectives. This US-PRC entente has not involved any coordination of the long-term strategic objectives of the two countries which remain diametrically opposed. However, short-term considerations have pressed American and Chinese interests into parallel positions which provide complementary support for each other. Issues which divided the US and the PRC have been resolved--with the

of the issue of the future of Taiwan which may be resettled after the 1976 US elections and the question of Korean unification which both powers agree should not become an issue in US-PRC relations. Antipathy toward Soviet expansionism not only in Asia but also in Africa has provided the basis for the close US-PRC interaction. Moreover, the Chinese need for grain and advanced machinery can only be met by Western nations. The development of ties with the US has aided in the expansion of China's trade not only with the US but also with other Western states.

While the entente between the US and PRC has been based upon mutually shared short-term interests, it is apparent that there have been limits upon the improvement of those ties imposed by both American and Chinese political considerations. For the Chinese the US implementation of the Shanghai Communique simply has not been rapid enough because the question of US diplomatic recognition of the PRC has not been resolved in the spirit of that document. From the Chinese perspective, the impact of the Watergate scandal, the fall of South Viet Nam and the political weakness of the Ford Administration have inhibited US adherence to the intent of the Shanghai Communique. There are apparently also Chinese limitations upon developing the US-PRC link. In the spirit of the "Kunming Document" statement, there seems to be no Chinese intention to convert the relationship between the United States and China into anything approaching an alliance. There has been discussion of the United States option of providing arms to China, but the evidence is that, perhaps because of internal political considerations, the Chinese have not sought formally an arms agreement nor openly expressed willingness to take US arms if they were offered. Another consideration might have been that being supplied by US arms could reduce China's independence. If it requires foreign supplies, it is perhaps more in China's interest to turn to European suppliers, as in its ordering of jet engines from the United Kingdom, rather than to the US, because at sometime in the future China's ability to "tip the scale diversely" between the superpowers could be inhibited by dependence on US arms supplies. Thus, because of the limits put upon the relationship by both American and Chinese policy considerations, the US-PRC tie has remained restricted in this scope.

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However, the development of the US-PRC entente greatly improved the position of China vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. In the 1973-1975 period, no longer isolated internationally, with its political debate stilled, its economy moving forward, and its science and technology becoming organized for significant long-term advances, the PRC had greatly improved its negotiating position with the Soviet Union. Any settlement reached with the Russians in that period would have reflected China's strength, whereas a settlement in the 1968-1971 period would have reflected China's extreme weakness.

While it might be anticipated that China's strength would continue to grow and that therefore it was in Chinese interest to put off any settlement with the Soviet Union, Chinese domestic political consideration could have served to make more immediate negotiations with the USSR desirable for the pragmatists. Establishing detente with the Soviet Union, like developing links with the US, would be extremely difficult without the guidance and blessings of Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai. In order to quiet the muttering of the extreme radicals who perhaps would have preferred revolutionary China not to have ties with either of the superpowers, it has been all-important that Mao Tse-tung's immense prestige be used to bless the policy. Similar, dramatic Chinese policy initiatives have been dependent upon Chou En-lai. The inside story of the relationship between Mao and Chou may never be told, but it is evident that it was to Chou that Mao turned when the Cultural Revolution threatened to dismember the PRC. Chou proved himself able not only to effect domestic peace by establishing a compromise between the ideological radicals and the bureaucratic pragmatists but also to redirect the focus of China's diplomacy and thereby reduced the threat from the superpowers against Chinese security interests. Without Chou to argue the necessity of establishing PRC-USSR detente with Mao, it would be difficult for the Chinese diplomats to persuade Mao of the need to make the move.

Chou En-lai may have been working with Mao's blessing toward the improvement of PRC-USSR relations in his last years. At the Tenth Party

Congress in October 1973, Chou introduced the theme that the Soviet menace was making a "feint toward the East while attacking in the West," meaning that the Soviet Union was not preparing to attack China but was directly threatening Europe. From that time forward Chinese media statements proclaimed that Europe was the focus of US-USSR contention. Chou's assessment of the Russians' intentions might have been both a signal to the Soviet Union that China no longer feared attack from the Red Army massed along the Sino-Soviet border and it might have served also as an important basis from which to explain a policy of detente with the Soviet Union in Chinese leadership debates. If Chou's statement were taken as the premise for policy discussion, those pushing for PRC-USSR detente could argue that, because the Soviet armies no longer intended to attack China, it was time to achieve some kind of relaxation of the dangerous tension which had dominated the Sino-Soviet border regions for four years. If indeed Chou had been working toward reducing tension with the Soviet Union, the instability caused by the Middle East War and the vacuum created by the withdrawal of US troops from Indochina and the eventual collapse of South Viet Nam did not provide the kind of atmosphere conducive to the Chinese initiative. The Chinese and Soviets were competing fiercely to advance their separate interests. Moreover, the Chinese could only hope to take a swing position between the US and USSR as long as the two superpowers remained locked in contention. The spirit of the European Security Conference which culminated in the Helsinki Summit meeting was directly contrary to the Chinese ideal of the sharp contention which they would like to see between the superpowers. It might have been that, in their dealings with US statesmen, Chinese officials have sought to persuade the Americans to be more firm in dealing with the Soviet menace. Chou En-lai had been successful in subtly emphasizing the danger of Soviet ambitions in his discussion with American officials, but Teng Hsiao-p'ing's heavy-handed harping on that theme succeeding only in irritating Henry Kissinger when the Secretary of State travelled to Peking in October 1975 to make preparation for President Ford's December visit. In their speeches on both occasions the Chinese officials were explicit in

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their denunciation of detente and in their attacks upon the Soviet Union. It might have been that their goal was to underline the deep differences between US-USSR interests and sharpen as much as possible US and Soviet contention in preparation for the improvement of Chinese relations with the USSR because at the end of December the PRC made a dramatic move to signal to the USSR that it was ready to review the state of their mutual relations. On 27 December 1975 the PRC Government announced that after 21 months of detention for possible espionage, the crew of the Soviet helicopter shot down on 14 March 1974 was to be released, because, as the announcement put it, "now things are clear after investigation by Chinese public security organs, and they consider credible the Soviet crew members' statement about their unintentionable flight into China ..."³ The announcement went on to indicate that not only was the crew sent home but a farewell banquet was held in their honor by a representative of the PRC Foreign Ministry Deputy Director of the Department of Soviet Union and East European Affairs.

The detention of the helicopter crew had been one of the chief irritants in Sino-Soviet relations, and its release seemed to presage a significant Chinese initiative toward resolution of the conflict with the Soviet Union. In response, the Kremlin momentarily hushed its almost daily vitriolic attacks upon the PRC and Mao Tse-tung. Then, on 8 January 1976, Premier Chou En-lai died. On 9 January the Council of Ministers of the USSR expressed condolences to the State Council of the People's Republic of China.⁴ If the Chinese had intended to move toward improving Sino-Soviet relations, the political competition for the premiership and the advance of the radicals' propaganda campaign eliminated whatever opportunity was present. However, the Soviet Union apparently hoped to emphasize its readiness to meet the Chinese when Premier Kosygin sent a message of congratulations to the new premier, Hua Kuo-feng on 14 April 1976. The message read in part:

The USSR Government is prepared to normalize relations with China on the principles of peaceful co-existence and to facilitate the return of Soviet-Chinese relations to the path of good neighborhood (sic)."⁵

SR If indeed the Chinese had been signaling the Soviet Union that they would welcome a relaxation of Sino-Soviet tension, it is intriguing to speculate about what could have precipitated the Chinese initiative of releasing the Soviet helicopter crew. That Teng Hsiao-p'ing felt it necessary to make strident warnings of the dangers implicit in US-USSR detente in October and December of 1975 indicates that the Peking leadership did not consider that the situation provided the optimum opportunity for improving relations with Moscow, but perhaps the rapid deterioration of Chou's health forced the moderates within the leadership to take action. Another factor might have been rising pressure from the radicals' propaganda campaign in the universities. Less than a week after the release of the helicopter crew, the radicals published the two theoretical articles in Red Flag which broadened the scope of the ideological campaign.⁶ That event might have indicated that the radicals were determined to begin their direct attack upon Teng Hsiao-p'ing in order to prevent him not only from succeeding to the premiership but also from making any kind of rapprochement with the Soviet Union.

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e One of the compromises which has apparently accompanied the blocking of Teng Hsiao-p'ing's drive for the premiership has been that foreign policy has not been an issue to date in the ideological campaign now being waged. However, indications of the reaction of the radicals to Teng's attitude toward the Soviet Union are found in a press review of news reports and commentaries from "Marxist-Leninist friendly countries." After noting the righteous indignation of various Communist groups around the world against the "counterrevolutionary" riots in Tien An Men Square, the review turned to a discussion of the Soviet reaction. It noted: "in a striking contrast with the acclamation of the revolutionary people and progressive public opinion of various countries, the Soviet revisionist clique, which has been dreaming of restoring capitalism in China, was struck with dismay at the publication of the two resolutions of the Central Committee of the Communist Part of China and the heavy blow dealt to the handful of counterrevolutionary elements."⁷

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After noting Pravda support for Teng Hsiao-Ping, the article went on to quote from Japanese correspondents in Moscow who reported that: "the Soviet Revisionists have been 'expecting a pro-Soviet faction to gain an upper hand.' 'There are indications that the Soviet Union did not expect that Teng Hsiao-P'ing would have been toppled so soon.' 'Moscow is shocked at Teng Hsiao-p'ing's downfall' It 'feels disappointed at the failure of Teng Hsiao-p'ing'."

The review article concludes with a strong statement: "The Soviet revisionists' dejection shows what a heavy blow the Chinese people's struggle and victory are to the Soviet revisionist clique which wants to have capitalism restored in China and turn China into a colony of Soviet social-imperialism."

This material is evidence that the radical ideologists believed Teng was dealing with the Russians. Of course, in their perspective, Teng's permitting elite groups to form in the Chinese bureaucratic, educational, and scientific circles was viewed as an attempt to restore bourgeois capitalism in China and his dealings without the Soviet Union compounded the heinousness of his "crimes." To the radicals Chinese elitism and Soviet revisionism are inseparably linked because the class struggle against the bourgeoisie is indivisible. In their perspective, then, Teng was not only a traitor against the Chinese nation but also against the Chinese proletariat because of his willingness to improve Sino-Soviet relations.

Teng's foreign policy has not been made a central issue in the current ideological campaign, but if the ripple effect of the widening of the campaign into all areas of Chinese national life overwhelms the compromises which have kept it in check, it can be anticipated that Teng's so-called crimes against China will be given wide coverage in the media. This could be accompanied by a review of Chinese foreign policy pursued in the years since the Cultural Revolution. In this regard, it is pertinent to note that the theoretical framework for China's foreign policy during the Cultural Revolution, which was founded on the assumption of superpower "collusion" against China, has recently once again been put forward in

Chinese press. In an article reporting on the fourth session of the UN Sea Law Conference a Chinese writer wrote:

"In collusion with the other superpower, the Soviet Union doggedly objected to the effective control of international seabed (sic) by an international administrating body."⁸

If the media references to Teng's policies and the radicals' attitude toward the superpowers presages an open debate on foreign policy, it can be safely assumed that there will be no Chinese rapprochement with the Soviet Union in the near future unless two essential preconditions for PRC-USSR detente, the decline of the radicals and the consolidation of power by the modern pragmatists, will have been met.

B. THE NATURE OF PRC-USSR DETENTE

If the current state of Chinese politics seems to preclude the development of Sino-Soviet detente, nevertheless it is important to examine the kind of rapprochement which could be effected if the political debate were to swing in favor of the pragmatists within the Chinese leadership. There are severe limitations upon the shape PRC-USSR detente could take. The first is the limitation imposed by the historical experience of the Chinese and Russian people. The Chinese suffered grievously at the hands of the Tsars. In the Chinese perspective the Russians alone, among the European powers, have failed to return the lands taken from China at the end of the Manchu Dynasty. More recently, the Communist Kremlin bosses have trampled upon Chinese sensitivities. The Sino-Soviet rift has resulted in the publishing of both PRC and USSR reports which chronicle the long story of the mutually irritating relationship between the Chinese and Soviet Communist Parties. Stalin worked against Mao Tse-tung, Khrushchev tore out the base of China's industrial development program, and Brezhnev has threatened China with invasion. It should be noted that even when their relations were apparently at their best, in the years between 1949 and 1960, the Sino-Soviet alliance was shot full of distrust and suspicion. The Soviet Union was niggardly in its efforts to encourage Chinese industry

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and the large units of the Red Army remained in place along the Sino-Soviet border to protect Soviet interests. Consequently, it is highly unlikely that the history of three centuries of antagonism between the Chinese and Russians can be put aside lightly. This historical experience will prove to be a powerful factor restricting the scope of PRC-USSR detente.

Limits are also imposed by geo-political considerations. The Chinese and Russians are locked in a struggle for control of Northeast Asia. The pressure of China's enormous population upon the relatively empty, resource-filled expanses of Siberia is the chief factor guiding Soviet policy toward development of its eastern half. The Soviets are under great pressure to rapidly develop the Siberian resources and populate the Sino-Soviet border areas in order to build a counterweight to the Chinese. This geo-political conflict will not be resolved by rapprochement between the PRC and USSR Governments.

The ideological struggle between Peking and Moscow also imposes limits upon any possible Sino-Soviet detente. The ideological battle between the Communist giants would not be resolved by the accession to power of the Chinese moderate pragmatists. Rather, it is likely that the domination of Chinese policy making by the pragmatists would intensify that antagonism. In the 1969-1975 period when the pragmatists were the dominant force shaping Chinese foreign policy, the Sino-Soviet struggle was transformed from the level of bitter propaganda duels and border skirmishes into a world-wide contest for influence in foreign capitals. This latter transformation of the struggle has proven to be more far-reaching in its consequences than the localized phase which preceded it. Thus, historical, geo-political, and ideological factors promise to severely limit the scope of any Sino-Soviet detente which might emerge after the moderate pragmatists consolidated their position in Peking.

For their part, the Soviet leaders are clearly aware of the limitations placed upon the improvement of Sino-Soviet relations by these factors. In the congratulatory message Kosygin sent Hua Kuo-feng this year, the Soviets proposed establishing Sino-Soviet relations not on a basis of

Communist solidarity but upon principles of "peaceful co-existence." Those principles are the extremely narrow basis upon which US-USSR relations are supposed to be founded. Thus, if the Russians are proposing establishing some parallel between US-USSR relations and PRC-USSR relations, might not PRC-USSR detente resemble the conditions that govern the American-Soviet relations? The chief features of those relations are:

- (1) Agreements upon specific areas of tension. Just as the US and USSR were able to reach agreements concerning areas of tension like Berlin, so also it is likely that even given their fundamental antagonism, the Chinese pragmatists and Russian leaders could reach some agreements which would lessen the chances of war breaking out along the Sino-Soviet border. This kind of settlement would not imply the resolution of basic differences but merely an agreement to limit the scope of potential conflict.
- (2) Territorial Agreement. The Helsinki Conference and the "Sonnenfeldt Doctrine" notwithstanding, the US has not permanently "given over" the nations of Central and Eastern Europe to Soviet control. However, the US inaction when the Hungarian Uprising was crushed, when the Berlin Wall was built, and when Czechoslovakia was invaded has signaled the Soviet Union that the US will respect the Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, at least for the present. Because they would be willing to compromise immediate problems to achieve long-term goals, the Chinese and Soviets could also probably develop a modus vivendi along these lines concerning the future of Outer Mongolia and the homelands of the Uighur peoples without permanently ceding any territory.
- (3) Arms Competition. While US-USSR detente is founded upon the notion that significant arms control can be established, the SALT agreements seem to be elements channeling the arms race rather than halting or even slowing it. The ceilings on the numbers of weapons of various categories only seem to encourage the development of new types of arms and refined ways of using older weapons. Thus, US-USSR detente has been characterized by continuing arms competition.

PRC-USSR detente would very likely evince the same characteristics. If the pragmatists came to power in China, they would resume the modernization of China's armed forces begun by Teng Hsiao-p'ing. The reduction of the size of the PLA and the development of the Chinese GNP under moderate pragmatic control would provide new resources for China's leap into advanced-arms development. As a pragmatic economic program took hold, the competition between the Soviet Union and China would very likely intensify.

(4) Industrial Competition. Just as US and USSR industry are striving for advances in computer and laser technology in order to convert this knowledge into weapon capability, any advances in Chinese technology and science under a pragmatic Chinese government program would be quickly translated into improved weapon systems. The Chinese industrial advances, especially if stimulated by trade with the West, would become a new source of threat against Soviet security interests.

(5) Political Competition. US-USSR detente has not precluded American and Soviet political competition in Africa, the Middle East, and Western Europe. A pragmatically oriented Chinese Government would very likely continue the world-wide anti-Soviet campaign begun under the direction of Chou En-lai in all the capitals of the world, especially in those of the less developed countries.

If PRC-USSR detente would be so limited in scope, it might fairly be asked why the Chinese moderates and the Soviets are anxious to effect it. The two chief reasons would be:

(1) Peace. Both the PRC and USSR require peace for the development of their industry and agriculture. The current confrontation along the Sino-Soviet border, even though substantially reduced since 1969-1971, threatens to embroil both Communist powers in a war neither wants at this time. The kind of detente described above would at least reduce the possibility of accidental or un-planned war and provide a more disciplined context for competition.

- (2) Time. Both the PRC moderate pragmatists and the Kremlin planners need time to make preparations for the long-term Chinese-Russian contest. The PRC technocrats have every reason to believe that time is on their side, that the growing industrial power and population of China weights the struggle with the Soviet Union heavily in their favor. For their part, the Kremlin planners consider that with time the vast reaches of Siberia can be settled and the resources of the area developed so that the Russians will be able to control Inner Asia into the next century.
- (3) International Politics. The leaderships of both the PRC and USSR are anxious to gain the most advantageous positions possible in the US-PRC-USSR triangular relationship. The confrontation between China and the Soviet Union has provided significant advantages for the United States in that relationship. PRC-USSR detente would reduce those American advantages and provide both the Chinese and Soviets with greater latitude in dealing with the US. For the Chinese, PRC-USSR detente would allow China to assume the "swing position" in the relationship described in the "Kunming Documents."

If PRC-USSR detente were established, it would very likely go through cycles of relaxation and tensions similar to the US-USSR detente. However, the differences separating China and the Soviet Union would remain unresolved, and consequently it would be extremely difficult for Chinese and Russian diplomats to move the relationship from the detente stage to one of entente. If these would be the general outlines of Sino-Soviet detente, it is important to consider the implications this advancement would have for Soviet and US foreign policies.

C. IMPLICATIONS OF PRC-USSR DETENTE FOR SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

The emergence of the type of detente described above would in effect signal the postponement until a later date of armed conflict between the Russians and Chinese for control of Asia. While the backing away from the threat of imminent war would be welcome for the Soviet Union, the forward

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movement of Chinese industry and science and the development of a modern PLA would put Soviet planners under intense pressure because it would add to the already extreme competition the inefficient Soviet economy is facing with the West.

The first order of business for the Soviets would be speeding up plans for the development of Siberia. To accomplish this they would be required to draw upon foreign technology and capital. It is likely that when the Russians attempted to obtain both, they would find the Chinese busy trying to thwart the Soviet objectives. The case of Japan in the years of 1972-1976 is illustrative of this kind of Sino-Soviet competition for technology and capital that would very likely occur if Chinese moderate pragmatists were directing Chinese policy in a stage of Sino-Soviet detente. The Chinese could threaten to preclude the entrance of any third country into Chinese markets and access to China's resources if it participated with the USSR in the development of Siberia. The Soviets could bring similar pressures to bear, and this kind of competition would become most severe in Second World countries which possess sophisticated industries but do not have the political clout of a superpower to frustrate the economic blockade.

At the present time both the Soviet Union and the PRC are largely self-sufficient in raw materials, except for grain. The expansion of Chinese and Soviet industry and technology may, however, eventually make them more dependent upon overseas supplies. This economic need could lead to increased Chinese and Soviet competition for political alliances with Third World governments which control those supplies. The 1973 oil embargo was only the opening round in the use of economic resources as weapons. It can be expected that intensified Sino-Soviet competition for limited supplies of rare resources will become one of the important factors in the future use of this weapon. Sino-Soviet competition would also affect world allocation of resources in another way. Close alliance between the PRC or the USSR with the Third World countries which control access to strategic raw materials would provide an additional means for bringing pressure to bear against Second World countries which provided technology and capital to the adversary. Thus, for example, it might be conceivable

that one day a Chinese-backed "people's government" in Zaire might threaten Europeans with restriction of raw materials if they provided technology and capital for the development of Siberia.

Because the basis for the geo-political confrontation between the Soviet Union and China would remain unchanged, the establishment of PRC-USSR detente would not very likely be followed by the rapid withdrawal of Soviet forces from Asia and their redeployment in Europe any more than the emergence of US-USSR detente has prepared the way for arms reduction in Central Europe. To the contrary, the number of Soviet troops in Europe has increased in recent years, and both NATO and Warsaw Pact forces are constantly engaged in the study of the tactical balance in Europe in order to find ways to improve their respective positions. PRC-USSR detente would very likely result in the development of the same kind of competition in Asia. The cost of developing both fronts would be enormous for Soviet industry. Increasing pressure in Europe and in Asia would very likely strain Soviet resources and force the allocation of even larger shares of the Soviet GNP for arms production. This would sharpen the already top-heavy Soviet industrial profile in which the military-related industry is advancing on a poorly developed base of non-military industries. The likely result would be restriction of funds and resources necessary for the all-important task of developing Siberia and growing dependence upon foreign sources of technology and capital.

Thus, if this analysis is correct, the emergence of Sino-Soviet detente would not represent a period of relaxed pressure upon the Soviet Union. If PRC-USSR detente followed the patterns observable in the American-Soviet relationship, the Soviet Union would find itself locked in intense struggle not only with an established superpower, the US, but also with an emerging one, the PRC, which eventually might have the capability of pinching off Soviet supplies, development technology and foreign capital resources for Siberian development. Consequently, PRC-USSR detente would have all the energies for translating the current crude state of Chinese-Soviet antagonism into a sophisticated economic-military struggle of far-reaching consequences.

D. IMPLICATIONS OF PRC-USSR DETENTE FOR US FOREIGN POLICY

If, as Kosygin suggested in April 1976, future Chinese-Soviet relations might be based upon the restricted principles of "peaceful co-existence," the development of PRC-USSR detente analogous to US-USSR detente would have significant impact on every area of global competition. It might be anticipated that the development of US relations with the PRC would proceed in two phases.

The first phase would be characterized by the continuing complementarity of US and PRC policy imperatives because the threat of Soviet expansion and the limited nature of the outstanding issues separating the United States and China provide a firm base for the entente which has been established between the two countries. Because the members of the US-PRC-USS triangle are distinctly unequal in military power at this time, the relationship between the actors in the triangular drama might be characterized as being isosceles in nature. That is, the US and USSR have obtained near parity in arms capabilities, but the smallest actor in the triangle, the PRC, needs the support of the US to deal with the Soviet Union. Put another way, PRC detente with the Soviet Union would be founded upon the continuation of entente with the United States. Because, at least in the initial stages of Chinese economic expansion and military modernization, all the forces limiting the scope of PRC-USSR detente and the supports undergirding US-PRC entente would remain in place, and there would be strong forces driving American and Chinese relations toward further improvement.

The United States, Japan, and Western Europe would be the places where China would actively seek technology and development capital. Because of the antagonism between the West and the Soviet Union, the PRC would have distinct advantages over the Soviet Union in the competition for both technology and capital. Thus, political forces would contribute to the development of trade relations between China and the West, and those relations would very likely expand rapidly as PRC industry, transportation, science, and agriculture were modernized.

Until Chinese agriculture is mechanized and farm methods modernized, China may be periodically dependent upon Western sources for supplies of cereals. The US and Canada would be sources of supply of these grains. The Soviet agriculture shortfalls in recent years have been far greater in proportion than the Chinese; and, consequently, if, because of natural causes, the world wheat crop were significantly lowered in any year, it might be more difficult for the Soviet Union to meet its needs than the PRC. In addition, if control of resources is used as a weapon against American policy, US domestic forces may pressure the US government to use grain as an instrument of American policy. If this should happen, the Soviet Union, because of its political and military competition with the US, would be more likely than China to become the object of this kind of aggressive policy.

Therefore, although there is considerable American fear that Sino-Soviet reapproachment would result in the formation of a monolithic anti-US Communist force, there are good reasons to believe that the chemistry of the relations between the US and PRC would encourage the development of expanded and complementary American-Chinese relations, at least as long as the PRC required US weight in the balance against Soviet power. If Chinese-Soviet relations followed the course described above, many of the forces operative in the competition would favor the PRC, especially if the Chinese economy expanded as the Chinese pragmatists have programmed. Combined with the need to intensify military deployment and advanced-arms reequipment in both Europe and Asia, the Soviet resources would be stretched thin by the emergence of China as a second antagonistic superpower. If this occurred, Chinese-Soviet relations would remain extremely tense. The long-term competition, especially if the Soviet economy were forced to commit increasingly larger shares of scarce capital into non-productive arms expansion, would exacerbate long-term tendencies already apparent in the Soviet system.

The convergence of American and Chinese interests would make it increasingly difficult for Soviet policymakers to differentiate between the US and

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PRC, especially in arms control policy. As the Chinese forces obtain more sophisticated weapons, the type of threat posed against Soviet security by the PRC would tend to resemble the profile of the US deterrent threat. This would inject notes of new urgency for developing the Soviet ABM system and air defense capabilities. Moreover, as the Chinese war-making capabilities grew, the Soviets would be pressed to provide expanded deterrent power. Consequently, the development of a significant second threat against the Soviet Union would increasingly restrict bilateral agreements between the US and USSR.

If Chinese economic progress is stalled by fruitless political battles, China will fail to reach its development potential; but if the nation's energies can be brought under the control of efficient technocrats, it can be argued that China has the natural resources, the population, and the political and economic discipline necessary to raise itself into the rank of the economic superpowers early in the next century. Should this happen, the triangular relationship between the US, the PRC, and the USSR will become increasingly equilateral in character. That would initiate a second phase in US-PRC relations in which competition for scarce raw materials would become a dominant feature. The world's natural resources would simply not be able to supply equally the needs of several competing superpowers. This hard fact of world resource capability would be a force increasingly driving the US and PRC into competition for resources as the needs of China's industry develop.

Competition for new raw materials will be an important factor in increasing the strain in US-PRC relations regarding Japan. Assuming that Japan does not rearm and build a military empire to supply its raw materials, the Japanese will be increasingly dependent upon those superpowers which can guarantee Japanese access to resources. Thus, Japanese foreign policy will become increasingly a function of resource acquisition. The lightning swift realignment of Japanese policy at the time of the oil embargo of 1973 gives an indication of the current sensitivity of Japan to this problem. If the PRC is better able than the US to guarantee supply of Japanese needs

perhaps from its own resources or those of "friendly" states, American influence in Japanese policy making will decline. If this factor reinforces the economic complementarity and cultural ties which bind the PRC and Japan, the convergence of Chinese and Japanese interests could work to exclude the US. Thus, at this second stage of development, US competition with the PRC could very likely to become more pronounced.

However, in the short-term phase of the triangular relations which would develop between the US, PRC, and USSR upon the emergence of PRC-USSR detente, the US would find itself in a favored position. During that phase the possibility of nuclear war breaking out between the PRC and USSR would be reduced, and there would be at least a potential for establishing the foundations of a lasting peace in the time before the scarcity of raw materials brought the superpowers into increasingly bitter competition.

CHAPTER V

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CHAPTER VI
RAPID IMPROVEMENT OF US-PRC RELATIONS

A. GENERAL IMPLICATIONS OF SOVIET INTERVENTION IN CHINESE POLITICS

In Chapter V of the present study the long-term forces that will continue to aid in advancement of US-PRC entente were reviewed. If Chinese economic development is not derailed by continued political disruption by leftist radicals, and if the pragmatic planners and bureaucrats are able to consolidate their positions in Peking, the nature of the issues (Taiwan and Korea) separating the American and Chinese policy positions and the common interest both nations have in halting the progress of Soviet influence (as well as the natural complementarity of the economies of China and the West) will very likely exert pressures for gradual improvement of US-PRC relations, especially in the first phases of Chinese development as a superpower. There remains the possibility that the PRC leadership would be unable to reach the advantageous "swing position" alluded to in the "Kunming Documents" because of pressing threats from the Soviet Union, and that consequently the Chinese would immediately seek much closer relations with the United States. This chapter discusses this more crisis-oriented possibility, examining the circumstances in which the Chinese might be forced to move rapidly in the direction of the US and the implications such action would have for both Soviet and US foreign policies.

The kind of pressure that would force the pragmatic bureaucrats, who have been engineering the elaboration of the balanced foreign policies sketched by Chou En-lai, to upset the equilibrium they have apparently been seeking in the PRC's relations with both the US and USSR would be the disruptive intrusion of the Soviet Union into Chinese political affairs. Chapter IV of this study indicated moves the Soviets might make to influence the direction of the Chinese succession struggle, short of direct interference. However, because of the importance the movement of Chinese politics will have for the long-range security of the Soviet Union and the

unity of the world Communist movement itself, the Kremlin leaders may decide that indirect methods will not accomplish their purposes and that more proximate involvement in Chinese politics is therefore essential. Should that decision be made and acted upon in the face of firm US disapproval, the kind of political support the US had provided the PRC in the last five years through indirect association of US and PRC diplomatic and military objectives would be inadequate to redress the balance of power to prevent the Soviets from achieving their objectives. Therefore, should the USSR decide to intervene in Chinese politics, especially at a time of intense political infighting, in order to tip the scale toward factions that would be more amenable to the improvement of PRC-USSR relations, US policymakers will be forced to review the state of US-PRC and US-USSR relations to determine what steps should be taken. In fact a situation of this type would force a fundamental choice upon the United States of whether it would choose to withdraw from the competition with the Soviet Union in China or whether it would be willing to increase both the intensity of its pressure upon the USSR and also expand the variety of instruments of political and military pressure to prevent the Soviet Union from achieving its purposes. Should the Soviet Union opt for direct military intervention in Chinese politics, the move would very likely be made somewhat in the decisive manner of the 1968 Warsaw Pact intervention in Czechoslovakia. Because of the immense international implications of a decision by the United States either to withdraw from supporting the PRC against the USSR or, on the other hand, to actively support the Chinese against the Soviets in that type of intervention, US policymakers should begin early to define their objectives and prepare the possible instruments the US can use to accomplish its purposes.

B. RELATIVE EXPANSION OF SOVIET INFLUENCE UPON CHINESE POLITICS

Intensification of Soviet pressure upon the PRC could occur in two stages. The first would be caused by the decline of Chinese political unity and military capability because of internal factional struggles.

The second stage would be direct Soviet military intervention in Chinese politics.

If factional warfare within the PRC intensified along the lines described in Chapter IV, China's power relative to that of the Soviet Union would decline dramatically. Whether the USSR intervened or not, the sheer weight of the Red Army's presence on the PRC-USSR border and the potential the Russians would have for intervention would greatly increase the Soviet pressure upon the Peking leadership. In a situation in which the PRC leadership would be paralyzed by internal factional disputes and unable to serve as a cohesive force for national unity, the traditional Chinese tendencies toward fragmentation could exert increasing influence upon the political situation. Regional power centers with the regional military commanders as war lords could emerge in the provinces to challenge the central authority of the military High Command in Peking. This fragmentation of PLA power could be sharpened by intervention of the militia units controlled by the radicals. The development of military conflict within China would greatly weaken the deterrent power of the PLA toward the Soviet armies and perhaps eliminate the Chinese ability to pose a nuclear threat against the Soviet Union. Moreover, given a collapse of central leadership in Peking and Chinese absorption in domestic struggles, the strength of the racial minorities in the Sino-Soviet border areas, vis-a-vis the Han Chinese, would be increased. The potential the Soviets would have for exploiting Uighur, Mongolian, and Tibetan antipathy for Chinese domination would provide another form of pressure for the Soviet leaders to exert upon Peking.

The disruption of Chinese political power at the center through intense political struggle, compounded by fragmentation of military power would provide the Soviet Union with the best opportunity for effecting its general objectives, i.e., the neutralization of the threat the PRC has posed against Soviet control of Central Asia and the restoration of unity to the Communist movement. If that stage of disruption of Chinese affairs arose spontaneously from the conflict between solely indigenous Chinese

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forces, the Soviets might seek to prolong this state in order to maximize their influence upon the direction the political struggle was taking. The ideal outcome for the USSR of this stage of political disruption would be that Soviet political influence or threat of using military power would be able to exercise decisive impact upon the struggle to terminate it in favor of Chinese elements willing to restore the unity of the Communist movement and consequently improve the state of Sino-Soviet relations.

The relative increase of Soviet power because of the political dis-sension in China could force the Chinese leaders to seek means of preventing the Soviet Union from intervening. That could be accomplished by either agreeing to meet Soviet demands and therefore preclude direct military involvement in the Chinese struggle or by finding ways to increase US support of the PRC in order to reestablish the equilibrium of the power balance vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Because of their ideological antipathy for the Soviet leadership, it can be expected that the radicals would strongly resist compromise with the Soviet Union. On the other hand, again for ideological reasons, the radicals would be highly unlikely to lead the way toward seeking increases in US support of the PRC. However, because of the consideration that it is better to deal with the lesser of two evils, the radicals could probably be brought to acquiesce to increased US aid if it seemed to hold promise of keeping the Soviet Union from intervention. The pragmatic coalition, while united in their opposition to the radical domestic program, would very likely be divided on the issue of finding means of preventing Soviet interference in Chinese affairs. Some would argue that leaning toward the US would simply not be effective and that it would be far better to treat with the Russians while they were still beyond the Amur than when they were in Peking. Their opposition would argue that if the US showed that it had both the will and the power to restrict direct Soviet intervention in Chinese affairs. A decisive factor in that debate would be US actions when the Chinese political struggle began intensifying and the slide toward domestic disorder began. If the US international position at that time were weak and if it acted indecisively to forestall

Soviet intervention by early enunciation of its policies, the position of Chinese leaders urging reliance upon US strength to resist the Soviet Union would be weakened. Conversely, if the US demonstrated capacity for frustrating Soviet international arms-diplomacy advances in Africa, Europe, the Middle East, and elsewhere, and if the US took early, firm action to clarify its position concerning the undesirability of Soviet interference in Chinese politics, the "pro-US" elements within the Chinese leadership would be strengthened. Therefore, combined with the emergence of a Chinese consensus concerning the absolute need for resisting Soviet pressure, assurance of US support could be a decisive factor in the decisions reached in Peking. Decisive US action might lay the foundation for general expansion of the US-PRC entente when the Chinese political struggle was resolved, because it would provide incontestable proof of the value of "US ties" to the PRC which transcended differences in factional approaches to foreign policy. Consequently, whatever party emerged victorious from the succession struggle, US-PRC relations would very likely remain close. However, this frustration of Soviet objectives could force the Kremlin leadership into direct, overt intervention in Chinese politics.

C. DIRECT SOVIET INTERVENTION IN CHINESE POLITICS

Frustrated in their attempts to effect their purposes, the Kremlin leaders could decide that employment of more direct methods was imperative. The manner the Soviet leaders chose to intervene in the Chinese political crisis would be determined by the goals they believed were obtainable. Ideally, Soviet military intervention would tip the scale in favor of a "pro-Moscow" faction. Again, ideally, this "tipping" would have to be accomplished by short decisive action that resulted in the installation of a "friendly" regime in Peking and its rapid consolidation of power. The Czechoslovakian precedent would represent the kind of swift resolution the Soviet planners would like to achieve. The obvious differences between Czechoslovakia and China in size and population would, however, make that

kind of outcome unlikely unless the factions in China had reached a stalemate which could be resolved by Soviet intervention. After that kind of intervention, the Soviet objective of neutralizing the geo-political threat posed by China to Russian interest and the restoration of unity to the Communist movement could best be accomplished by the reduction of the PRC to satellite status. The circumstances under which the regime would be installed would facilitate this transformation. However, the size of China itself, the diversity of the political groups involved in the Chinese political struggle, and the general antipathy of the Chinese for Russians would militate against the emergence of an opportunity for a quick, decisive intervention in Chinese affairs by the Soviet Union.

If reducing China to satellite status seemed beyond the means of the Soviet Leaders, they could opt for "Balkanization" of China which would in effect reduce the threat from China and eliminate Peking as the disruptive force within the Communist movement. Balkanization of the PRC would mean the fragmentation of Mao's PRC, possibly into independent socialist republics for the several racial minorities within the PRC and perhaps the de facto division of China proper into contending war lord fiefdoms. The methods the Soviets would employ to achieve this goal would be far different from those which sought to reduce a unified China to satellite status because they would not be aimed at gaining control over the central Peking Government and then over all of China. A program of Balkanization would begin with preparation of the minorities for revolt against Chinese rule, an activity which perhaps already has begun with the Soviet propaganda offensive aimed at the Uighurs of Sinkiang. The Soviets could then encourage Chinese tendencies toward fragmentation by covert arm supplies to factions which would advance the disruptive processes within China.

The decision to give covert aid to Chinese factions would have to be accompanied by Soviet recognition that this action could have counterproductive results caused by a Chinese backlash. Evidence that the Soviets were attempting to add to China's political disruption could provide stimulation for unification of factional elements in the face of external danger.

The Soviets could attempt to minimize that backlash by arming Uighurs in the USSR and Mongols in Outer Mongolia to aid their brothers in the PRC. That step, however, could lead directly to increasing Soviet military intervention in Chinese affairs which, within the context of the Balkanization program, would imply long-term Soviet military involvement in a Chinese civil war.

The same results could flow from the failure of a Soviet attempt to tip the scales decisively in the favor of a "pro-Moscow" faction by military intervention. Soviet decision makers could be tempted by the development of a political stalemate in Peking to support one or the other faction in China. However, miscalculations concerning the nature of the factional balance or of Chinese nationalism could lead to intense involvement of the Red Army in the PRC in a long-term struggle. The Japanese failure to resolve the "China Incident" in 1937 even after taking the Chinese capital and several major centers must serve as a powerful example of what the Soviet decision makers would most like to avoid. Nevertheless, the importance of the objectives they wish to obtain might tempt them to take military action in China, even in the face of clear US opposition. If successful, the Soviets with one stroke would succeed in upsetting the current balance of power in the US-PRC-USSR triangular relationship in their favor; but if they failed, they would be faced with the prospect that their activities in China could develop into a long-term involvement.

D. IMPLICATIONS FOR SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

Because of the enormous risks involved in direct Soviet intervention, especially in the use of military force, the Kremlin leadership will undoubtedly consider carefully before moving into Chinese political affairs. On the other hand, the opportunities for establishing a new foundation for Sino-Soviet relations might be so tempting that under optimum circumstances, to achieve their purposes, the Soviets would probably be willing to take the necessary risks inherent in intervention. After having worked covertly, to maximize the impact their intervention would have upon the Chinese

political struggle, the Soviets might decide that the advantages that accrue to them by intervention far outweighed the strains in US-USSR relations that follow. While trying to minimize the impact their aggressive China policy would have on those relations, the Soviets might intervene in the Chinese political struggle, and, if successful, would effect a decisive shift in Chinese policy toward greater unanimity with Moscow. However, if the Soviet intervention proved to be indecisive or if the military exercise were stalled, perhaps in the face of Chinese use of nuclear weapons, the Soviets would find themselves involved in a long-struggle.

If the Soviet Union became tied down by a protracted involvement in Chinese political and military struggle, there would be severe impacts in all areas of Soviet life. While Soviet preoccupation with Chinese affairs would reduce the Soviet Union's activist foreign policy in other areas of the world, both because the Russians would require their resources for China and because they would want to lower the possibility of conflict with the US while they were involved in China, this seemingly desirable effect for the West would be vitiated by the probable nervousness which would characterize Soviet dealings with Eastern European satellite nations and the effect a long war in China could have upon political competition within the Kremlin.

Eastern European nationalists could be expected to attempt exploitation of Soviet absorption in Chinese affairs. Because of Soviet nervousness, political dissent in Eastern Europe would very likely be suppressed with ruthless vigor. Suppression of this kind in Eastern Europe would greatly sharpen East-West tension in Europe and produce increased danger of military confrontation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

E. IMPLICATIONS FOR US POLICY

It is debatable which event, whether successful Soviet intervention in China which resulted in the installation of a "pro-Soviet" regime in Peking or unsuccessful Soviet intervention in China which created long-term Soviet

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involvement in a Chinese civil war, would produce the more undesirable effects for the United States. A Soviet dominated Peking regime would be a major force upsetting the balance of power within the US-PRC-USSR triangle in the Communists' favor, but the uncertainty and tension that would flow from long-term Soviet involvement in Chinese affairs would bear the possibility that the US and the Soviet Union might become involved in military confrontation either in China or in Europe.

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Faced with Soviet intervention in China which the Russians would attempt to present to the United States as a fait accompli, US policymakers would be forced to either accept the Soviet action and await the outcome of the move or actively attempt to frustrate the Soviets by increasing support of anti-Soviet elements within China. Soviet escalation of involvement in China would be unlikely to evince many of the restraints which characterized US involvement in the Viet Nam War, and there would be strong possibility of US-USSR confrontation developing over American support of anti-Soviet elements in China, especially over direct US arms supplies to anti-Soviet elements in the midst of Red Army action. Consequently, because it is likely that either possibility would produce a serious destabilization of the equilibrium of the balance of power in the US-PRC-USSR triangle, US policy should aim at forestalling Soviet intervention.

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Moreover, Soviet intervention would cause undesirable repercussions in American politics as well. Successful Soviet intervention in China which was not deterred by firm US policy could result in an outcry about a "second loss of China" similar to the political explosion which followed the conclusion of the Chinese Civil War in 1949. However, at the same time, it would be difficult for any administration to obtain Congressional approval for massive support of anti-Soviet elements in China in the face of Red Army involvement in China, especially if that conflict promised to become a long-term struggle. Therefore, Soviet intervention in China, no matter what the results, would produce a dilemma for US leaders because of the repercussions the event would have on the US public.

In order to deter the Soviets from intervening in the Chinese political struggle, US policymakers can firmly indicate to the Soviet leaders that Soviet intervention in Chinese affairs would be against American national interests. By making the Soviet leadership aware, early in the Chinese succession struggle, that the development of US-USSR relations is directly linked to Soviet restraint in its dealings with the PRC during this period and by taking action (see Chapter V) to deter Soviet intervention, the threat of American action to frustrate Soviet objectives could become an important element in the debate of the Kremlin leaders concerning the possibility of Soviet military intervention in China. Because it is likely that the Soviets would be willing to intervene directly in the Chinese political struggle only in very specific circumstances in which they believed that their weight would effect a decisive conclusion of the conflict, the possibility of US support of the PRC, which could produce a 1968 Viet Nam-type involvement for the Red Army, would serve as a powerful deterrent against the formulation of an aggressive Soviet policy toward China.

The direction of Chinese foreign policy after the death of Mao is of crucial importance to the Soviet Union, and it will act to protect its interests. If the United States expects to maintain the current balance of power in the US-PRC-USSR triangle, it will have to take firm, early action to deter the Soviets from intervening in Chinese politics if the Chinese succession struggle breaks into open factional warfare. Failure to act decisively in the face of Soviet pressure upon the PRC would seriously jeopardize the future stability of that balance.

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