<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>EVENT / VISIT</th>
<th>SECTION / MISSION</th>
<th>RESPONSIBLE OFFICER</th>
<th>SIGNIFICANCE / HOM PARTICIPATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Apr 11 - 12</td>
<td>IE Expo</td>
<td>SHNGI-PI</td>
<td>Yvonna Zou</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr 14 - 16</td>
<td>China International Peas and Flaxseed Conference in Qingdao</td>
<td>BEIJING-TD</td>
<td>Ha Nguyen</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr 19</td>
<td>Good Friday – BEIJING closed</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Apr 22 - 25</td>
<td>PLA Navy 70th Anniversary Fleet Review, Qingdao</td>
<td>BEIJING-DR</td>
<td>Col. Frank Ebner</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr 29 - May 2</td>
<td>Canadian Animation Delegation to visit China International Cartoon and Animation Festival (Hangzhou) and Beijing (May 2)</td>
<td>SHNGI-TD BEIJING-TD</td>
<td>Marc Mikhail Keith Kan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 8 - 18</td>
<td>Alberta Medical Devices/Senior Care and Health Mission to China – CMEF 2019, Beijing, Guangzhou, Shanghai</td>
<td>BEIJING-PI</td>
<td>Jessica Jiang</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 10 - 11</td>
<td>ECD/Alison LeClaire attending Arctic Circle China Forum, Shanghai (TBC)</td>
<td>BEIJING-GR SHNGI-GR</td>
<td>Angela Graham Jose Sia</td>
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<tr>
<td>May 14 - 16</td>
<td>SIAL (China) in Shanghai</td>
<td>BEIJING-TD</td>
<td>Vince Iacobucci</td>
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<tr>
<td>May 20</td>
<td>Victoria Day – BEIJING closed</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jun 2 - 5</td>
<td>ECCC/Minister McKenna in Hangzhou for Ministerial Dialogue on Environment and Climate Change and Annual General Meeting of CCICED</td>
<td>BEIJING-GR SHNGI-GR</td>
<td>Angela Graham Laurel Rasmus</td>
<td>Chargé participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun 12</td>
<td>Annual Staff Awards Ceremony</td>
<td>All programs</td>
<td>JF Belisle</td>
<td>Chargé participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 1</td>
<td>Canada Day – BEIJING closed</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Aug 22 - 23</td>
<td>2nd Canadian Healthy Aging Mission to China - Beijing Stop</td>
<td>BEIJING-TD BEIJING-PI</td>
<td>Christopher Loan Dana Duan</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
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## EMBASSY OF CANADA IN CHINA CALENDAR, April 12, 2019

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>EVENT / VISIT</th>
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<th>SIGNIFICANCE / HOM PARTICIPATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oct 1 - 2</td>
<td>National Day (China) – BEIJING closed</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oct 18 - 27</td>
<td>7th Military World Games in Wuhan with Canadian Armed Forces participation</td>
<td>BEIJING-DR</td>
<td>WO Richard Ivey</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Oct 31 - Nov 1</td>
<td>China Fish and Seafood Expo (CFSE) in Qingdao</td>
<td>BEIJING-TD</td>
<td>Vince Iacobucci</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nov 11</td>
<td>Remembrance Day – BEIJING closed</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nov 12 - 14</td>
<td>Food &amp; Hospitality Expo (FHC) in Shanghai</td>
<td>BEIJING-TD</td>
<td>Vince Iacobucci</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 20 - 22</td>
<td>ANU Foods in Beijing</td>
<td>BEIJING-TD</td>
<td>Vince Iacobucci</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Dec 25</td>
<td>Christmas Day – BEIJING closed</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dec 26</td>
<td>Boxing Day – BEIJING closed</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

For further information, please contact the event lead listed as the responsible officer.

For Embassy/China Network Weibo and Twitter input, please contact: BEIJINGMICROBLOG@international.gc.ca Lulu Xu, 3413271
All,

A few updates on the France Taiwan Strait transit:

1. As you know, we had been awaiting additional information from France on its recent transit of the Taiwan strait (example: the distance France maintained from mainland China’s coastline). This will be useful info given DND is planning a Taiwan strait transit in June (under consultation here in GAC presently).

2. Our attempts to secure additional info from France via PARS GR channels did not succeed and we were directed to use DA channels. Thus far, DND has not received an update from France via DA channels and DND continues to seek an update from France using a variety of channels.

3. In the meantime, analysis is that India conducted a Taiwan strait transit at a similar time as France’s transit, but sparking no reaction from China.

4. Finally, on the point from the May 2nd report from BEIJING (below) “The diplomat speculated that the US may have fed the story to media to provoke a reaction from China just ahead of the RRF (this was later confirmed by a DND has taken note of this, and this will factor into the communications strategy that is developed for the proposed June 2019 Taiwan strait.

Best,
Antoine
Thanks for this,

I find this a little odd, as it would seem to imply that they would draw baselines between the island and the mainland - something that would be very difficult to sustain, in my view. And, even there, I do not see how this is possible.

The formulation "Can you locate..." is very vague, and can be understood in various ways. It is necessary to pinpoint the issue to be sure to clarify what happened, in my view.

Have a good weekend,

Alain.

From: Nouvet, Antoine -IGR
Sent: May-03-19 9:47 AM
To: Ternorshuizen, Cindy -IGD; Norman, Giles -IGR
Cc: Tellier, Alain -JLO; Steil, Shawn -OPB
Subject: RE: BEIJING-2890: Political Round-Up - Mai 3, 2019

Thanks Cindy,
IGR was tracking this info, but is seeking more robust details from France. This is taking a bit of time, as PARIS was directed by France to channel our questions via the DA section rather than GR.

Best,
Antoine

From: Ternorshuizen, Cindy -IGD
Sent: May-03-19 9:06 AM
To: Nouvet, Antoine -IGR; Norman, Giles -IGR
Cc: Tellier, Alain -JLO; Steil, Shawn -OPB
Subject: FW: BEIJING-2890: Political Round-Up - Mai 3, 2019

Contains a bit of interesting analysis I had not previously seen re. the French transit of the Taiwan Strait:
9. French transit of Taiwan Strait provokes strong reaction from Beijing

A Chinese Ministry of Defense spokesperson accused France of "illegally entering Chinese waters" last week, referring to a transit of the Taiwan Strait on April 6 by the French frigate Vendémiaire. While this remark was removed from official transcripts of the MFA spokesperson press conference, analysts were quick to note that the language used implies that China considers the entirety of the Taiwan Strait as "Chinese waters". Moreover, characterizing such transits by foreign vessels as "illegal" would represent a significant shift in Chinese policy. The transit resulted in Beijing's withdrawal of an invitation to the French Navy to participate in the Qingdao commemoration of the 70th anniversary of the founding of the People's Liberation Army Navy. A French diplomat BEIJING-GR spoke to do not want to confirm this, but emphasized that there has been no change in France's position regarding freedom of navigation operations and that the French navy has conducted this type of transit in the past. The diplomat said that there had been communications between the two sides via various channels and at different levels following the April 6 transit, but that China had not taken a strong public stance until on the issue early last week. The diplomat speculated that the US may have fed the story to media to provoke a reaction from China just ahead of the BRF (this was later confirmed by [Redacted]).

Analysts note that China's response reflects its increasingly vehement opposition to the involvement of "outsiders" in the waters off its coasts, which has recently resulted in forceful responses to US and UK transits through waters claimed by China.

From: Donnelly, Joya -BEIJING-GR
Sent: May-02-19 10:28 PM
To: Bobish, Donald -OGM; Taylor, Sarah -OPD
Cc: IM Repository / Répertoire de GI (SIE C5); Murphy, Brendan -BEIJING-GR; Kellett, Victoria -BEIJING-GR; Graham, Angela -BEIJING-GR; Lauprecht, Florian -BEIJING-GR
Subject: BEIJING-2890: Political Round-Up - Mai 3, 2019

Classification: SECRET // CANADIAN EYES ONLY
Classification: SECRET // RÉSERVÉ AUX CANADIENS

Domestic Politics

1. Xi gives a speech about the May 4 movement

On April 30, Xi gave a speech at the Great Hall of the People, emphasizing the patriotic elements of the May 4th movement while downplaying the anti-authority student mobilization that featured so heavily 100 years ago. Xi said that "Chinese youth in the new era must obey the party and follow the party," calling those who are unpatriotic "a disgrace in the eyes of their own country and the whole world." Many China watchers view this as an attempt to reshape the narrative of the May 4th movement, away from one centered on the overthrow of the old regime, and towards one centered on patriotism for China and linked to the Party's own revolutionary past. Separately, this week Peking University installed new facial recognition scanners at campus entrance gates — perhaps underscoring the Party's worries about control on campuses.

2. More Marxist students disappear?

While still relatively unconfirmed, some western media outlets reported that yet another group of students associated with Marxist groups have been disappeared on the margins of the Labour Day holiday. This new group of six includes former president of the Peking University Marxist Society, who planned to join labourers during the holiday period. Before departing, he posted on social media that "If doing this kind of manual labor makes me disappear, everyone knows who did it." In December, Ciu was snatched from the campus of Peking University by unidentified men, suspected to be plainclothes police officers. BEIJING-GR will continue to monitor the plight of these students.
3. The Great Firewall grows taller? Bureaucrat disciplined for accessing foreign news on Twitter
A disciplinary notice circulated this week on social media, which criticised a deputy programming director of the Suzhou city TV broadcasting organization for having accessed "harmful information on illegal websites" via Twitter, which had "seriously violated political discipline and political rules." The notice indicates that the individual will be removed from his post at the broadcaster and have their pay docked. It is unclear whether this signals a new trend in monitoring Party cadres online behaviour, or is a one-off event, but fits into the broader trend of increased monitoring of Twitter by authorities inside the Great Firewall. BEIJING-GH will continue to monitor.

4. Xinjiang Digest
- Wives of Pakistani businessmen released: AFP reported that around 40 women, from Xinjiang but married to traders from Pakistan, were released from internment camps. However, the article quotes their husbands as saying that the women were forced to perform acts that are forbidden under Islam, both in the camps and post-release, including consuming pork and drinking alcohol. AFP interviewed nine of the husbands, who confirmed that their wives were released because they will not be permitted to leave Xinjiang for another "three months." According to the interviewees, the authorities demanded that the women demonstrate that they "no longer possess radical thoughts" by performing the non-halal acts mentioned above.
- Gutierres raised Xinjiang? A UN spokesperson confirmed that UNSG Gutierres raised Xinjiang during his visit to Beijing for the Belt and Road Forum (BRF) last week, however Reuters reported that the issue was raised only in a private meeting with Wang Yi. Al Jazeera's coverage criticised Gutierres for not raising it directly with Xi, nor in his speech at the BRF.
- Pompeo - Xinjiang an "enormous risk" for US business: Receiving an award from the Business Executives for National Security group, Pompeo gave remarks where he said "We watch the massive human rights violations in Xinjiang where over a million people are being held in a humanitarian crisis that is the scale of what took place in the 1930s." While he stopped short of calling for US business to avoid business with China or in Xinjiang, he said "...we see American businesses and their technology being used to help facilitate that activity from the Chinese government. It's something worthy of thinking about."
- HRW report on surveillance in Xinjiang: Human Rights Watch released a new report based on their original research into a smartphone app that authorities are using in Xinjiang to collect a "vast array of personal information" (including location, religion, finances, biometric data, whether a person uses WhatsApp, and flags people as "suspicious"). BEIJING has seen this app in use at police checkpoints in Xinjiang. HRW characterised the app as another part of the campaign of illegal mass surveillance and arbitrary detention of Muslims in Xinjiang.

5. Leadership updates

Central
- Qu Qingshan was moved up from vice president to president of the Central Party History and Literature Research Institute, replacing Leng Rong (April 29).
- Cheng Xiaobo and Zhao Chenxin were appointed deputy secretaries generals of the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC). Prior to that, Cheng was director of the National Information Center and Zhao was the director of the Economic Operations and Coordination Bureau of NDRC (April 28).
- Wang Aiwen was named member of the party group of the Ministry of Civil Affairs. Prior to that, he was head of the organization department of CPC Heilongjiang provincial committee (April 28).
- Li Guangyu was named spokesperson of the Supreme People's Court (SPC). Li is concurrently the deputy director general of the political department as well as the information bureau of SPC (April 25).
- Luo Hua was promoted from deputy editor-in-chief to editor-in-chief and vice president of People.cn, the website of the People's Daily (April 30).

Provincial
- Hu Yuting was appointed vice governor of Shanxi (April 28).
- Wang Shujian was promoted from vice governor to executive vice governor of Shandong (April 26).
- Jin Xiangjun was appointed director of the Management Committee of China (Tianjin) Pilot Free Trade Zone. Jin is concurrently vice mayor of Tianjin (April 29).
Li Zhong was appointed party secretary of Anhui Provincial State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission and nominated as the director. Prior to that, Li was deputy secretary general of the CPC Anhui Provincial Committee and director of its policy and research office (April 28).

Luo Yonggang was appointed secretary of CPC Hubei Political and Law Commission. Prior to that, he was secretary of CPC Inner Mongolia Political and Law Commission (April 26).

Ling Wen was appointed member of the party group of CPC Shandong Provincial Committee. Prior to that, he was deputy party secretary and general manager of National Energy Group (April 25).

6. Anti-corruption update

- **Gansu - a sharp rise in corruption in poverty alleviation**: The Central Commission for Discipline and Inspection (CCDI) announced that in the first quarter of 2019, Gansu Province had 376 cases of corruption in poverty alleviation, 233% increase compared to the same period of last year. 850 people were investigated and 406 people received Party punishment, increases of 260% and 625% respectively. The Gansu Supervision Commission said one of the reasons was a wider scope of people were included in supervision because of the National Supervision Law. In 2019, the province has set target to lift 850,000 people out of poverty and corruption in poverty alleviation will remain focus of all supervision organs in Gansu.

- **WSJ on Meng Hongwei's downfall**: The WSJ published a lengthy piece on the background to former Interpol President’s disappearance and eventual re-surfacing/arrest on corruption charges in China. According to the WSJ's investigation, Meng had displeased his Party bosses in Beijing by failing to deliver Interpol “red notices” on individuals that they wanted flagged, for instance the removal of the red notice on Dolkun Isa in 2018. The article details what appear to be attempts by Chinese agents to pressure or possibly abduct Meng’s wife, who remains under police protection in France.

- **Peng Yuxing**, vice governor of Sichuan, has been placed under disciplinary and supervisory investigation by CCDI/NSC for suspected severe violations of disciplines and laws (April 28).

- **Miao Rulin**, vice governor of Jiangsu, was expelled from the Party and removed from public office for disciplinary and legal violations. Following a CCDI investigation, Miao was found to have seriously violated political discipline and rules (April 28).

- **Xing Yun**, former vice chair of Inner Mongolia People’s Congress, was expelled from the Party and removed from public office for disciplinary and legal violations. He was accused by CCDI/NSC of political degeneration and deterioration (April 29).

- **Qian Yin'an**, former secretary general of the CPC Shaanxi provincial committee, was expelled from the Party and removed from public office for disciplinary and legal violations. CCDI/NSC has concluded their investigation into his case and referred it to state prosecutors, adding that he had refused to cooperate with the investigators (April 29).

- **Fan Jian**, former deputy director of the Beijing Municipal Committee of Economics and Information Technology, received a severe internal Party warning for accepting banquet invitations by automakers multiple times (April 29).

- **Chen Xiaoping**, deputy head of Shaanxi Poverty Alleviation Office, was expelled from the Party and removed from public office for disciplinary and legal violations (April 29).

- **Cai Pin**, former head of the political department of Chongqing Public Security Bureau, was expelled from the Party and removed from public office for disciplinary and legal violations (April 29).

- **Wang Yumin**, former head of the political department of Changchun Municipal Public Security Bureau, Jilin province, has been placed under disciplinary and supervisory investigation. Wang has been retired since November last year (April 30).

- **Zhan Shunzhou**, former party secretary of Dunhuang city Gansu province, has been placed under disciplinary and supervisory investigation (April 30).

- **Wang Fengshan**, former chairman of CPPCC and vice mayor of Erdos city, Inner Mongolia, stood trial for a continuous three days and was charged of corruption, accepting bribes, abuse of power and possessing huge amount of property of unclear origin. The court adjourned and will announce the ruling at a later date (April 30).
Foreign Policy Developments

7. Switzerland “joins” the BRI, reflects on the BRF

While initial reports and widespread media analysis indicated that Switzerland would “join” the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) during the Belt and Road Forum (BRF) in Beijing April 25-27, a diplomat from the Swiss Embassy said that the BRI agreement they have signed with China relates to cooperation in third-party markets. The MOU establishes that cooperation projects will adhere to recognized standards, which the Swiss count as a strong positive achievement. They note, however, that it remains to be seen how committed China is to this pledge, as the two sides have not yet embarked on any projects together. BEIJING’s contact also shared some of the difficulties encountered in negotiating the text of the BRF’s joint communiqué. While Switzerland advocated beginning with the text of the outcome document from the 2017 Forum, Chinese officials refused and insisted on starting from scratch. This allowed China to press hard for the elimination of any references to human rights as outside the scope of the BRI as a purely economic initiative, although such references appear in the 2017 text. The Swiss diplomat reported that his government was demarched on this issue five times in one week, both in Beijing and in capital. References to “reciprocity”, unobjectionable two years ago, were anathema this year, perhaps due to China’s trade disputes with the US. China’s insistence on other language was more anathema to the Swiss side until they heard President Xi’s speech at the opening of the BRF, which mirrored precisely many of the elements of the communiqué. Negotiation of the text was conducted bilaterally with the Chinese Chair, who organized and reflected back to the group the input provided by each participant. The Swiss diplomat characterized this process as “painful”, frustrating and inefficient. Similarly, the Swiss were struck by the organization of the discussion at the Leaders’ Round Table on April 27. President Xi was in complete control of the discussion, inviting each leader in turn to make remarks and providing commentary following each intervention. Overall, the Swiss characterized the BRF as primarily an exercise in pageantry, reflecting an approach which they call “multilateralisme à la Chinoise” and which a French diplomat refers to as “multibilaterisme”. This describes the hub-and-spoke model by which China negotiates bilaterally with a host of partners under a largely symbolic umbrella organization. This model can also be seen in the 16+1 mechanism and the Forum for China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), among other examples. China emphasized the openness, transparency and inclusivity of the BRI at this year’s Forum, but it evidently intends to remain firmly at the wheel.

8. Disorganization and frustration at the BRF

Despite its status as China’s premier diplomatic event of the year, a number of other countries expressed disappointment with poor organization that caused confusion and in some cases led to invited delegates opting out of events. Notable examples were shared by a Thai diplomat, who reported that at least two CEOs from top Thai companies were directed by their Chinese hosts to attend one of the 12 thematic sub-forums on April 25 rather than the CEO forum that was taking place concurrently. Invitations to the Ministerial banquet held at the Great Hall of the People on April 26 were also apparently mismanaged. Thai ministers received three separate invitations from different parts of the Chinese bureaucracy. A French diplomat reported that Foreign Minister Le Drian, who was accorded “special envoy” status on behalf of President Macron, was “upgraded” at the last minute and invited to sit at a more prominent table during the banquet in order to fill empty seats. Participants agreed that this disorganization was largely attributable to power imbalances within the Chinese system. Although MFA was ostensibly in charge of organization and logistics, in practice organizations with more clout, notably the NOFC and the CCDI, were independently making arrangements for specific invitees and/or portions of the program. Lacking the will or ability to exert authority over these competing organizations, MFA was left scrambling to cover unexpected gaps. In the eyes of the Thai embassy, at least, China and especially the MFA “lost face” as a result.

9. French transit of Taiwan Strait provokes strong reaction from Beijing

A Chinese Ministry of Defense spokesperson accused France of “illegally entering Chinese waters” last week, referring to a transit of the Taiwan Strait on April 6 by the French frigate Vendémiaire. While this remark was removed from official transcripts of the MFA spokesperson press conference, analysts were quick to note that the language used implies that
China considers the entirety of the Taiwan Strait as "Chinese waters". Moreover, characterizing such transits by foreign vessels as "illegal" would represent a significant shift in Chinese policy. The transit resulted in Beijing's withdrawal of an invitation to the French Navy to participate in the Qingdao commemoration of the 70th anniversary of the founding of the People's Liberation Army Navy. A French diplomat BEIJING-GR spoke to did not want to confirm this, but emphasized that there has been no change in France's position regarding freedom of navigation operations and that the French navy has conducted this type of transit in the past. The diplomat said that there had been communications between the two sides via various channels and at different levels following the April 6 transit, but that China had not taken a strong public stance until.

The diplomat speculated that the US may have fed the story to media to provoke a reaction from China just ahead of the BRF. Analysts note that China's response reflects its increasingly vehement opposition to the involvement of "outsiders" in the waters off its coasts, which has recently resulted in forceful responses to US and UK transits through waters claimed by China.

10. China backs down on listing Masood Azhar as a global terrorist
After blocking the initiative four times in the past, China has lifted its hold on the listing of Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) leader Masood Azhar as a global terrorist by the UN Security Council's 1267 Sanctions Committee. On April 30, China's MFA signalled that change might be coming, saying that discussions on the issue had seen "positive progress" and expressing confidence that the issue would be "properly resolved". China's previous refusal to allow the listing was widely interpreted as a sign of its support for its "iron brother" Pakistan. However, international criticism of China for this position intensified after the February 2019 Pulwama attack that killed 40 Indian security personnel, especially after Beijing signed off on a UN Security Council statement naming JeM as responsible for that attack. A contact at the Indian Embassy spoke to by BEIJING-GR stated that India welcomes China's decision and views it as promoting the global fight against terrorism. India provided a 91-page dossier of evidence for JeM's and Azhar's involvement in the Pulwama attack to both Pakistan and China, but emphasized that the listing, and China's hold on it, were matters for the UNSC to resolve. The Indian diplomat believes that China's status as the sole holdout on the UNSC, rather than concern for Indian criticism of China-India relations, was the determining factor in China's decision to reverse its position on the listing question.

Diplomatic Calendar

May 2019: Minister of Justice Fu Zhenghua in France this week to launch bilateral dialogue on legal issues
May 5-10: Osman Saleh, Foreign Minister of Eritrea, will pay a visit to China at the invitation of State Councillor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi
May 6-10 (tbc): UK will have a delegation of 14 Cabinet Secretaries (deputy ministers) visiting China. Visit will include Beijing and Shenzhen
May 6-10: Moon Hee-sang, Republic of Korea National Assembly Speaker, will lead a delegation to visit China at the invitation of Li Zhanshu, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress
May 12: Cai Mingzhao, President of China's Xinhua News Agency, will visit Israel (according to the Jerusalem Post)
May 16-25: Brazil's Vice President Hamilton Mourao will travel to China staying for 10 days with stops in Beijing and Shanghai
May 17-18 (tbc): Li Zhanshu, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, to visit Norway
May 2019 (tbc): President Xi may visit the DPRK
June 28-29 (tbc): President Xi will attend the G20 Summit in Osaka, Japan
July 1-3: World Economic Forum ("Summer Davos") Annual Meeting of the New Champions 2019 (Dalian)
2019 (tbc): President Xi will visit India for an "informal summit"
2019 (tbc): President of Brazil Jair Bolsonaro will visit China
2019 (tbc): Former President of Taiwan Ma Ying-jeou may visit China

BEIJING-GR

Bcc: *OPC <D-OPC@c.international.gc.ca>; Smith, Andrew (Drew) -MLD <AndrewDrew.Smith@c.international.gc.ca>; Bentley, Julia -KLMPR -HOM/CDM <Julia.Bentley@c.international.gc.ca>; Burchett, Ian -OSD <Ian.Burchett@c.international.gc.ca>; Fitchett, Janice
PACOM - China Daily-8 April 2019 (SIPR-REL)

April 10, 2019

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) PLAN Reaction to the French Taiwan Strait Transit (TST) Less than Typical Reaction to U.S. TSTs: Three unidentified Jiangdao FFLs were present inside the Taiwan Strait during the French Ship (FS) Vendemniere's northbound TST on 7 April, likely responding to the transit, according to ELINT. Two Jiangdao FFLs were present near FS Vendemniere during its approach towards the southern end of the Taiwan Strait. At least one of these two FFLs likely escorted the FS midway through the strait, and turned over escort to a third FFL. The third FFL continued to escort FS Vendemniere out of the strait and into the East China Sea. Of note, the PLAN very likely did not deploy coastal defense cruise missiles (CDCM) in support of this TST.

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) Comment: Limited reporting as compared to U.S. TSTs precluded us from making a detailed assessment of the reactions. However, based on the PLAN's reactions to U.S. TSTs, we assess the PLAN's response to FS Vendemniere was moderately decreased. The PLAN typically sends combatants to respond to foreign ships with like forces at a one-to-one ratio, and conducts a turnover midway through the strait. Also, since the beginning of 2018, the PLAN deploys YJ-62 (270 NM) CDCM batteries to up to three deployment sites during U.S. TSTs as a layered defense posture. The PLAN surface response was consistent with previous U.S. TSTs; however, the lack of CDCM activity in response to the French transit was one notable difference. POC – TSgt Justin Petros and Evan Hill, (808) 473-6858, #PA: JI0CCDDIVNavyInternal@coastal.gov

UK DI - East Asia Fortnightly

30 April 2019

The French Frigate Vendemniere was refused participation in the IFR following a Taiwan Straits Transit on 6 April, en-route to the IFR, with Chinese officials claiming that the French ship had entered Chinese waters. The Indian Navy transited the Taiwan Strait the same week with out any official Chinese reaction. [UK OFFICIAL]

138647-19

PRC Shore and Maritime Units React to French Navy Taiwan Strait Transit, April 2019 (S//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, USA)

(S//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, USA) Multiple PRC ships and shore stations reacted to a French vessel transitting the Taiwan Strait in April 2019. Units involved include multiple Jiangdao-class corvettes, Houbi-class fast patrol crafts, Jiangwei-class frigates, Jiangdao-class corvettes, and Jiangkai II-class guided missile frigates. Reactions were also observed from several Coastal Observation posts.
From: Nouvet, Antoine - IGR
Sent: February-04-19 9:27 AM
To: Payne, Nichola - OPB
Cc: Hanley, Meghan - IGR; Bergeron, Jean-François - OPB
Subject: RE: the draft action memo and letter for USS

Classification: SECRET // CANADIAN EYES ONLY
Classification: SECRET // RÉSERVÉ AUX CANADIENS

Thank you Nichola,
And for your reference, attached is the final copy of the Action Memo shared with o.USS Friday past.

Best,
Antoine

---

From: Payne, Nichola - OPB
Sent: January-31-19 3:30 PM
To: Nouvet, Antoine - IGR
Cc: Hanley, Meghan - IGR; Bergeron, Jean-François - OPB
Subject: RE: the draft action memo and letter for USS

Classification: SECRET // CANADIAN EYES ONLY
Classification: SECRET // RÉSERVÉ AUX CANADIENS

Version approved by Evelyn and now with Sarah.

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From: Nouvet, Antoine - IGR
Sent: January-31-19 1:40 PM
To: Payne, Nichola - OPB
Cc: Hanley, Meghan - IGR; Bergeron, Jean-François - OPB; Norman, Giles - IGR; Puxley, Evelyn - OPB
Subject: RE: the draft action memo and letter for USS

Classification: SECRET // CANADIAN EYES ONLY
Classification: SECRET // RÉSERVÉ AUX CANADIENS

Hi Nichola,
Latest rounds of comments from OPB have been received, and are now integrated in the Version 5 of this Action Memo package. Many thanks, and note that I am looking further into some of your comments (for example, on why DND did not respond to the fleet review, and will adjust content once I gather info). The attached package is now under review by IGD. Removing David, adding Giles and also adding Evelyn to alert of the increasing level of review.

The intent remains to get a version of this package into USS’s weekend reading package.

Best
Antoine
Thanks Nichola,

The latest action memo package attached here, with DND input included. Among other things, this version includes further detail on the nature of the "pause" in the winter training exercise (I have additional context if helpful/warranted).

The intent remains to get a version of this package into USS's weekend reading package.

Best,
Antoine

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Hi Antoine,

Please feel free to add the new input directly onto your current draft.

Thanks,
Nichola

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Hi Nichola,

I realize things are quite busy, and am simply checking in on the status of this product so that I can update others on realistic timelines: Has OPB had the opportunity to review the rest of this package (draft letter), whether at officer or higher level? I have new input from DND to address some of the questions you've flagged (mentioned below), but before inputting I'd like to check where the product sits in OPB to avoid working on multiple drafts.

Looping in David who is acting IGR director presently for pan-IGR awareness on this file.
Hi Nichola,

Thanks again for your input to the action memo today. Using input from you as well as from DND and acting director IGR, I've created a Version 3 of the Action Memo, attached herewith. I have reworked the draft letter, as well. The content attached herewith will be in IGD reading package for Wednesday 8am, and I have caved for IGD that OPB's input thus far is limited to the action memo and at DD level. I note that I have on-boarded some of your comments/questions, and relayed these to DND, and once I get more info from DND I'll integrate this input into the finalized product (for example: whether several Five eye countries have expressed concerns about knowledge transfer, versus the U.S. only).

Could you give the draft letter a look on Wednesday, and would this package then be ready for OPB director level review?

The intent remains to have this package included in USS's weekend package, and parallel I/O branch approvals will help to this end.

Best,
Antoine

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Hi Nichola,

I've addressed some of this further within the draft documents, attached herewith.

1. I've further elaborated the section in the memo that mentions Five Eye concerns regarding pause Winter Training. I can provide additional context if you wish on DND's general concerns with engaging with the PLA on Peacekeeping specifically, but I sense the current scope/depth of detail may be sufficient.
2. The next planned engagement between CAF/DND and PLA is identified in the attached (April 2019).
3. I did not touch on DND/CAF’s proposal to partake in a SCS Group Sail in September 2018, as the linkages are not as clear cut and this may steer us away from the current focus on DND/CAF collaborative bilateral engagements with PLA. This memo provides DND a steer on its standard bilateral engagements with China in 2019, and addressing SCS operations (or linking this in) could broaden the scope of this memo. In the meantime, DND already received a DM level steer in September 2018 that proposed activities in SCS such as Group Sails would require GAC approval. But if you see an angle to fit this in, I welcome your suggestion!

Our (hopefully modest) intent for today is to have a copy of this document that can be shared with IGD/OPD for consideration tomorrow, on the sidelines of the meetings they will both attend at Meech Lake.

Best,
Antoine

From: Nouvet, Antoine - IGR
Sent: January-29-19 8:46 AM
To: Payne, Nichola - OPB
Cc: Hanley, Meghan - IGR; Bergeron, Jean-Francois - OPB
Subject: RE: the draft action memo and letter for USS

Classification: SECRET // CANADIAN EYES ONLY
Classification: SECRET // RÉSERVÉ AUX CANADIENS

Hi Nichola,
I'll review with Meghan and share some content later this morning.

Thank you!
Antoine

From: Payne, Nichola - OPB
Sent: January-28-19 6:48 PM
To: Nouvet, Antoine - IGR
Cc: Hanley, Meghan - IGR; Bergeron, Jean-Francois - OPB
Subject: RE: the draft action memo and letter for USS

Classification: SECRET // CANADIAN EYES ONLY
Classification: SECRET // RÉSERVÉ AUX CANADIENS

Hi Antoine,

We are in the process of reviewing the draft, and had a couple questions/comments:

1) Does DND/CAF have any upcoming bilateral events/initiatives in the near future that have been planned and may be cancelled?
2) Our impression is that DND/CAF reluctance to engage with the PLA is not solely related to Ms. Meng’s arrest and the consular cases – that there are other reasons behind their interest in dis-engaging. From our perspective it also perhaps to be related to a desire to be fully aligned with FEYS, particularly the U.S., whose approach has shifted under the Trump Administration. We recall, for example, that back in December DND/CAF were keen to cancel the PLA’s participation in the winter survival training following the request from DOD to do so. We also recall CSS’s position on the SCS group sail back in September. From what I can tell, DND/CAF is also lukewarm about engaging on peacekeeping and the potential security implications, despite it being a leaders-
If you agree, we would suggest this be included in the memo. If you can take a first stab at drafting some appropriate language, that would be very helpful.

Many thanks,
Nichola

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From: Nouvet, Antoine -IGR  
Sent: January-24-19 5:26 PM  
To: Payne, Nichola -OPB  
Cc: Hanley, Meghan -IGR  
Subject: RE: the draft action memo and letter for USS

Classification: SECRET // CANADIAN EYES ONLY  
Classification: SECRET // RÉSERVÉ AUX CANADIENS

Nichola,
Adding Meghan to this chain for your response, as I will not have C6 tomorrow.
Cheers,
Antoine

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From: Nouvet, Antoine -IGR  
Sent: January-24-19 2:30 PM  
To: Payne, Nichola -OPB  
Subject: RE: the draft action memo and letter for USS

Classification: SECRET // CANADIAN EYES ONLY  
Classification: SECRET // RÉSERVÉ AUX CANADIENS

Nichola,
The latest version herewith, which Meghan is now reviewing.
Cheers,
Antoine

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From: Nouvet, Antoine -IGR  
Sent: January-24-19 1:35 PM  
To: Payne, Nichola -OPB  
Subject: the draft action memo and letter for USS

Classification: SECRET // CANADIAN EYES ONLY  
Classification: SECRET // RÉSERVÉ AUX CANADIENS

Nichola,
As promised, a first cut at the “frame” of the draft action memo and letter, for USS to DM Thomas. Sharing now to confirm if the structure looks good to you. And in the letter, I’ve identified two section in particular where I think OPB would lead in content.

If the structure looks good to you, I’ll spend the next half hour filling this out (with the exception of sections where I identified OPB as lead on content). Note that I have not included a Background and Considerations section for the memo, as I’d like to keep this pithy. But we may need to add this (will check).
In terms of timelines, IGD departs 125 Sussex at 3:45 pm, so we’d like to get this to her by 3:15 pm (even if to review the framing only, and understood if some OPB content would be placeholders).

Cheers,
Antoine
From: Nouvet, Antoine - IGR
Sent: January-29-19 8:48 AM
To: 'Maksimovic Uros'
Subject: FW: China: Request for info; plus Key Messages, New coordination inbox
Attachments: CAF-PLA_Engagements_2019_Triaged-u.docx

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Classification: NON CLASSIFIÉ

Uros,
I am reviewing the attached document – is it accurate that the only upcoming (next 3 months) engagement with China is
the fleet review in Qingdao?

Best,
Antoine

From: UROS.MAKSIMOVIC@forces.gc.ca [mailto:UROS.MAKSIMOVIC@forces.gc.ca]
Sent: December-20-18 4:51 PM
To: China Coordination / Coordination Chine (OPB); Marchuk, Leah -OPB
Cc: PATRICK.DESCHENES@forces.gc.ca; ERIK.BJORNSON@forces.gc.ca; Hanley, Meghan -IGR; Nouvet, Antoine -IGR
Subject: RE: China: Request for info; plus Key Messages, New coordination Inbox

Greater China colleagues, Leah,

As directed by Major-General Derek Joyce, DG International Security Policy at DND, please find attached the requested
list of anticipated National Defence engagements with China in 2019.

Of note: this is an updated version of a list that was initially provided to our DM’s Office yesterday, which was also
shared with GAC.

Please feel free to contact me if you have any questions or concerns, copying Erik Bjornson, Deputy Director of Asia-
Pacific Policy (also cc-d).

Regards,

Uros

Uros Maksimovic

Senior Policy Officer, Directorate of Asia-Pacific Policy
Director General International Security Policy
Department of National Defence / Government of Canada
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Agent principal des politiques, Direction de la Politique sur l'Asie-Pacifique
Directeur général, politique de la sécurité internationale
Ministère de la Défense nationale / Gouvernement du Canada
uros.maksimovic@forces.gc.ca / Tél.: 613-995-1323 / RCCC: 995-1323

A0645888_1-000024
Resending with correct attachment.

Dear Colleagues,

Thanks to everyone who attended yesterday’s Director General’s Committee on China meeting.

First, I’ve attached a message my colleague Melanie sent last night, requesting information on upcoming engagement from your departments with China. The Deputy Ministers Committee on China has requested a list of all upcoming activities to ensure coordination of messaging and approach on China in the short-term. If you have upcoming travel,
incoming visits, or ministerial correspondence (particularly during the first quarter of 2019), we would be grateful if you could let us know. We'll share an initial list with Deputies tomorrow (Friday Dec. 21), but this list will be kept evergreen, so do feel free to share additional information as and when things arise.

Your information on upcoming engagements, along with any questions about engagement with China in light of recent events, can be sent to ChinaCoordinationChine@international.gc.ca.

Please also find attached, for info, our current key messages on China issues.

Warmest,

Leah

Leah Marchuk  
Deputy Director, Greater China Division  
Directrice adjointe, Direction de la Chine élargie  
Global Affairs Canada | Affaires mondiales Canada  
Leah.Marchuk@international.gc.ca  
T: 343-203-3368 | M: 203-3368  
125 Sussex Drive, Ottawa ON, K1A 0G2
Thanks again Uros,
And will follow up with more on Points 3 and 4.
Cheers
Antoine

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From: Maksimovic Uros [mailto:UrosMaksimovic@Polhq.cmil.ca]
Sent: January-31-19 2:26 PM
To: Nouvet, Antoine - IGR
Subject: RE: Response to your question

classification: SECRET CANADIAN EYES ONLY

Antoine,

1. The fleet review was not agreed upon at the DCD. We reached out to Five Eyes partners in the fall to benchmark their levels of participation before crafting a response. As you know, the challenges in Canada-China relations intensified in December (as our consultations with Five Eyes were ongoing), and we have been holding this response since then. It would now fall under the “DG and above” category of the GAC guidance, as the Commander RCN is an ADM-level equivalent. Note also: as of early January 2019, our understanding is that the Five Eyes countries have not yet determined their levels of participation, but that they will likely not be represented by their Commanders of Navy.

2. This is at CAC’s discretion, but we will need to consider the topic within the next several weeks, as we would invite one PLA instructor and one student to the spring peacekeeping course serial (in May), and one of each to the fall serial (approx. in September/October). Those invitations would need to go out by the end of February 2019.

3. Which sit reps are you referring to? What is the intended audience and level within the Whole-of-Government community?

4. The DM China Committee is typically attended by Gordon Venner, Associate Deputy Minister of National Defence. The DG China Committee is typically attended by MGen Derek Joyce, Director General International Security Policy, and/or Philippe Lafontaine, Deputy DG. Depending on the topic, other meetings are also attended by other DND/CAF teams (e.g., S&I, export controls, etc.)

Uros Maksimovic

Senior Policy Officer, Directorate of Asia-Pacific Policy
Department of National Defence / Government of Canada
UrosMaksimovic@polhq.cmil.ca / Tel: 613-995-1323 / CSN: 995-1323

Agent principal des politiques, Direction de la Politique sur l'Asie-Pacific
Ministère de la Défense Nationale / Gouvernement du Canada
UrosMaksimovic@polhq.cmil.ca / Tél: 613-995-1323 / RCCC: 995-1323

From: Nouvet, Antoine - IGR
Sent: January-31-19 1:58 PM
To: Maksimovic Uros
Subject: RE: Response to your question

Classification: SECRET
Classification: SECRET

Hi Uros,

A few updates/additional questions as the China guidance works its way up to our DM for approval:

1. On the Fleet Review, was there any particular reason why DND did not respond to the September 2018 invitation?

2. Guidance on China provided by IFM to ADM pol emphasizes peacekeeping ("This includes peacekeeping related training, which GAC would need to ensure it is not being cancelled at this time.")...peacekeeping in DM level guidance still warranted, or is covered under the banner of the guidance that states: "it is essential that GAC be consulted (via IGR) before any of DND/CAF’s activities are cancelled/postponed"

3. Who within DND should receive the Daily China Sit Reps prepared by GAC?
4. Who from DND attends inter-departmental meetings on China?

Cheers,
Antoine

From: Nouvet, Antoine - IGR
Sent: January-30-19 2:54 PM
To: 'Maksimovic Uros'
Subject: RE: Response to your question

Classification: SECRET
Classification: SECRET

Also – I think you are correct that the DG level China committee meeting was in December. Will advise if I hear otherwise.
Antoine

From: Nouvet, Antoine - IGR
Sent: January-30-19 2:24 PM
To: 'Maksimovic Uros'
Subject: RE: Response to your question

Classification: SECRET
Classification: SECRET

Thank you Uros,
Antoine
From: Maksimovic Uros [mailto:UrosMaksimovic@Polhq.cmil.ca]
Sent: January-30-19 9:13 AM
To: Nouvet, Antoine - IGR
Subject: RE: Response to your question

classification: SECRET CANADIAN EYES ONLY

Antoine,

I will respond to your questions in numbered format.

1. The winter survival training will not take place this winter (2019). Future options have not been considered. The direction from General Joyce was that, when we do go back to China regarding engagement, we tailor a message (consulted with GAC) stating that we are not in a position to conduct the training “at this time” — or a similar message to this effect. We are happy to work with GAC to tailor the appropriate messaging.

2. The security concerns originated primarily from the US, as I pointed out in the email trail below. They may have originally been raised on the margins of a Five Eyes C-VEO CHODS meeting last fall. We do not have a record of other Five Eyes countries expressing these concerns to Canada.

3. Correct on all points.

4. We received the invitation in mid-September.

5. I was referencing the December 2018 DG China Committee, at which time both Cindy and Sarah acknowledged the status of the winter survival training and the approach highlighted above regarding eventually going back to the PLA (i.e., a carefully consulted message tailored in cooperation with GAC). I was not tracking a DG China meeting in January, but this may be because I was on leave until the 8th. When did this meeting occur?

Thank you,

Uros

Uros Maksimovic
Senior Policy Officer, Directorate of Asia-Pacific Policy
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UrosMaksimovic@polhq.cmil.ca / Tel: 613-995-1323 / CSN: 995-1323

Agent principal des politiques, Direction de la Politique sur l'Asie-Pacifique
Ministère de la Défense Nationale / Gouvernement du Canada
UrosMaksimovic@polhq.cmil.ca / Tél: 613-995-1323 / RCCC: 995-1323

From: Nouvet, Antoine - IGR [mailto:Artoine.Nouvet@C.international.qc.ca]
Sent: January-29-19 10:58 PM
To: Maksimovic Uros
Subject: RE: Response to your question

Classification: SECRET
Classification: SECRET

Hi Uros,
A few follow up questions to keep this process moving (and thank you for the content thus far).
On cancellation of Winter Training, is the training really a paused if it doesn't happen, or is it cancelled? We'd like to have our facts straight.

On security concerns expressed by Five Eye partners about Canadian engagements with the PLA (reference to example of Winter Survival Training, but could apply to other instances), are there additional countries than the U.S. that have expressed concerns? I seem to recall Australia may have voiced concerns about the Winter Training, but this seems to have dropped. Unless there are other countries voicing concerning to DND/CAF, it would seem concerns are from the U.S. rather than Five Eyes.

In the action memo to our Deputy, it is stated "CAF-PLA initiatives planned for 2019 are modest and non-sensitive (Annex 2), and most were agreed at the annual bilateral Defence Coordination Dialogue (DCD)". To confirm, the DCD took place in April 2018, at the two-star General/Flag Officer level, correct?

On the "Fleet Review in Qingdao", when did China make this invitation to the RCN/CAF to attend?

When referencing "the last Government of Canada DG China Committee", can you confirm this was in January (rather than Dec)?

All the best,
Antoine

-----Original Message-----
From: Maksimovic Uros [mailto:UrosMaksimovic@Polhq.cmil.ca]
Sent: January-29-19 12:29 PM
To: Nouvet, Antoine - IGR
Subject: RE: Response to your question

classification: SECRET CANADIAN EYES ONLY

Antoine,

In response to your questions:

The decision to pause the winter survival training was communicated to GAC at the D6 level on the margins of the last Government of Canada DG China Committee. General Joyce informed Cindy and Sarah Taylor that the CDS had decided to cancel the training due to security concerns, including Chinese opposition. Cindy and Sarah acknowledged this.

General Joyce, Cindy, and Sarah agreed that GAC would be consulted before this was communicated to China in order to shape messaging. The decision has not been communicated to China yet due to the ongoing sensitivities in bilateral relations and the DM-level direction that we are awaiting from GAC, which will greatly assist us in clarifying the way forward with respect to bilateral defence relations.

I hope that helps.

Cheers,

Uros

-----Original Message-----
From: Nouvet, Antoine - IGR [mailto:Antoine.Nouvet@c.international.gc.ca]
Sent: January-29-19 12:13 PM
To: Maksimovic Uros
Subject: RE: Response to your question
Hi Uros,  
Thanks for the below. Very helpful. 

One other question to ensure that we have our facts ducks lined up:

--Was the decision to pause winter training communicated to China yet?
--Is it safe to say the CDS's decision to pause winter training was in response to concerns expressed by Five Eye partners about knowledge transfer risks (rather than in response to the recent China-Canada spike in tensions)?

Thanks,
Antoine

-----Original Message-----
From: Maksimovic Uros [mailto:UrosMaksimovic@Polhq.cmil.ca]
Sent: January-29-19 11:10 AM
To: Nouvet, Antoine -IGR
Subject: Response to your question

classification: SECRET CANADIAN EYES ONLY

Antoine,

My original response keeps bouncing back so I am starting a separate email trail that we'll hopefully go through.

Here is my response to your email from this morning:

Yes, that is correct - but we have not returned to PLA with a response to this invitation. I also note that, under the recent GAC guidance on engagement with China, this would fall under the "DG level and above" category, thus requiring consultation with GAC (the invitation was to the Commander RCN, which is an ADM-level equivalent). Currently, the Commander RCN is not planning to attend, but there may be some flexibility if GAC views this as a priority.

More broadly, and as I have mentioned over the phone: given that discussions on China engagement within DND have been occurring at the DM level, we would be grateful for DM-level guidance from GAC. This would allow us to move forward on the remainder of the engagement plan (minus the winter survival training, which was paused).

Cheers,

Uros

Uros Maksimovic
MEMORANDUM FOR ACTION

TO: Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
CC: IFM, OGM

SUBJECT: Deputy Minister level guidance from GAC with respect to DND/CAF engagements with China's PLA

SUMMARY:
- On December 21, the Department of National Defence requested Deputy Minister level guidance with respect to Department of National Defence/Canadian Armed Forces (DND/CAF) bilateral engagements with China. DND/CAF is reviewing its postures and commitments to its engagement with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). In part due to China’s response to the U.S. extradition request for Ms. Meng Wanzhou, and the resulting Canadian consular cases. Thus far, the CAF Chief of Defense Staff (CDS) has unilaterally elected not to proceed with one bilateral military activity training exercise planned for 2019, a winter survival training exercise. China/PLA has not yet been informed of this decision.
- While resolving the consular cases is the Government of Canada’s top priority, ensuring a certain amount of continuity in other parts of the Canada-China relationship remains important. Given the heightened scrutiny, any decision by Canada to reduce/cut ties should be carefully considered to avoid sending any unhelpful or unintended messages.
- DND has been included in ongoing DG and ADM inter-departmental discussions about the current situation and is aware of the Government of Canada’s approach, but is seeking higher-level (DM level) guidance from Global Affairs Canada (GAC) to provide to the CAF. Absent this guidance, the CAF’s Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) may undertake further unilateral decisions concerning DND/CAF’s relations with the PLA. In the interest of avoiding such a scenario, a letter has been drafted on your behalf for DND’s Deputy Minister Thomas (adjourned Annex 1) that will provide DND/CAF guidance consistent with Canada’s current approach to China.

RECOMMENDATION(S):
- That you sign the attached letter to the Deputy Minister Thomas providing DND/CAF guidance on engagements with China.

☐ I wish to discuss
☐ I concur  ☐ I do not concur

Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
BACKGROUND:

1. DND/CAF is reviewing its posture and commitment to its engagement with the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in light of Canada's response to the US extradition request for Ms. Meng Wanzhou, and the resulting Canadian consular cases.

2. The review is also driven by concerns expressed by the U.S. military that at least one element of Canada's military activities planned for 2019 risks unintended and undesired knowledge transfer from Canada to the PLA in close alignment with Canada's Five Eyes partners. DND continues to ensure that bilateral defence engagements with China are balanced with security concerns and do not provide the PLA with any operational capability enhancements, including in areas such as Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response (HADR). China remains reliant on the acquisition of foreign military technologies and weapons systems to advance key aspects of its military modernization, including through cyber espionage and the unintended transfer of military and dual-use technologies.

3. CAF-PLA initiatives planned for 2019 are modest and non-sensitive (Annex 2), and were agreed to at the annual bilateral Defence Coordination Dialogue (DCD), which occurred in April 2018 at the two-star General/Flag Officer level (DG-equivalent). Agreeing to CAF-PLA initiatives at the annual dialogues has enabled both sides to plan appropriately and has made situations relatively rare in which activities are declined.

4. Among the various DND/CAF activities planned with the PLA in 2019, thus far the CAF CDS has directed to not proceed with one: Winter Survival Training with the PLA. While this decision was taken following Ms. Meng's provisional arrest, we understand that it was driven principally by concerns voiced by the U.S. that the training could result in unintended and undesired knowledge transfer to the PLA. As a result, DND/CAF has not invited the PLA to participate in the Winter Survival Training this year as planned, but has not yet informed the PLA of the actual decision. At a December 2018 Government of Canada DC China Committee meeting, DND agreed that GAC would be consulted before this decision is communicated to China, in order to shape messaging in advance and account for ongoing sensitivities in bilateral relations.

5. The next proposed engagement is for the Commander Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) or an RCN delegate to attend the PLA Navy Fleet Review in Qingdao in April 2019, in response to a September 2018 invitation by the PLA. DND/CAF has not provided the PLA a response to this invitation yet, and your letter to DM Thomas will emphasize the importance of consulting with GAC beforehand.

6. Given that any unilateral changes by DND/CAF to its planned engagements with the PLA may have implications for Canada's bilateral relationship with China and/or Canada's regional defence and security interests, GAC provided Director General level guidance to the inter-departmental community (including DND) on January 17. This guidance stressed the need to maintain an ongoing relationship with China and avoid initiating changes to planned bilateral engagements without consultation.

7. On January 21, DND requested that GAC provide DM level guidance on DND/CAF engagement with China.
8. IFM sent a holding message to his counterpart, ADM-POL Pete Hammerschmidt, on January 25 stating that until such guidance is relayed, there should be no change to the current approach, which was articulated by GAC at the DG level on January 17.

CONSIDERATIONS:

9. In general, DND/CAF ensures that all bilateral activities with China are non-sensitive, unclassified, evolve at a controlled and incremental pace, and do not enhance the PLA's operational capabilities.

10. In February 2018, GAC provided DND Foreign Policy guidance titled "Canada's Priorities for Security and Defence Engagement in Asia-Pacific", that was thoroughly consulted with DND. The document encourages DND/CAF to pursue bilateral cooperation with the PLA, as this helps Canada to build a positive, trust-based, but low-risk relationship with China on defence and security issues. In recognition of the complexity and risks associated with defence and security engagement with China, the guidance outlines that engagement activities should focus on non-sensitive areas and must not undermine Canada's national security or that of our like-minded partners and allies. Such DND/CAF engagements with the PLA are intended to encourage transparency and respect for global norms, and to build mutual trust, particularly in the areas of HADR.

11. The 2018 Foreign Policy guidance requests that DND/CAF consult GAC in advance of activities (and by extension, cessation of activities) that could impact the Canada-China bilateral relationship. This is even more important in the current context.

12. Unilateral decisions to postpone and/or cancel previously agreed DND/CAF cooperation with the PLA risk being interpreted by China or others in an unintended (and unhelpful) way. They could also damage Canada's long-term defence and security relationship with China.

13. Should DND/CAF decide to delay/cancel previously agreed initiatives for other reasons (e.g. concerns about unintended knowledge transfer), this should be paired with careful communications strategies to avoid becoming inadvertently linked to the current situation.

14. U.S. defence engagement with China has a long history of staff exchanges and joint military exercises, particularly in the area of HADR.

15. Should Canada make significant reductions in its military engagement with China, China will likely read this as a retaliatory move related to the Meng Wanzhou case. This is not least because China has used reductions in military engagement with the U.S. in recent years to signal its dissatisfaction with the U.S.-China trade relationship. Such reductions have included reported cancelled visits by senior military personnel and cancelled port visits.

RESOURCE IMPLICATIONS:

16. Nil direct resource implications foreseen for GAC.

COMMUNICATIONS IMPLICATIONS/ACTIONS:

17. Continuation or changes to DND cooperation with the PLA may intentionally or unintentionally result in media coverage.
18. Should media coverage arise, the guidance proposed in this memorandum ensures that decisions undertaken by DND/CAF concerning engagements with the PLA are consistent with Canada’s overall policy approach to China and can be explained in those terms.

PARLIAMENTARY IMPLICATIONS/ACTIONS:

ANNEX 1: DRAFT LETTER

February DATE 2019

Dear Deputy Minister Thomas:

At the request of your Department, I am writing to provide you with guidance with respect to Department of National Defence/Canadian Armed Forces (DND/CAF) engagement with China. This guidance may assist DND/CAF in making decisions in the context of recent events in Canada-China relations, including China's response to the U.S. extradition request for Ms. Meng Wanzhou and the resulting Canadian consular cases.

While resolving the consular cases is the Government of Canada's top priority, ensuring a certain amount of continuity in other parts of the Canada-China relationship remains important. Given the heightened scrutiny, any decision by Canada to reduce/cut ties should be carefully considered to avoid sending any unhelpful or unintended messages. In this context, DND/CAF engagements with China should be guided by the following principles:

- Canada does not want to be the partner that is reducing normal bilateral interactions.
- There is still a desire to maintain an ongoing relationship with China, while recognizing and managing the risks.
- In that context, it is essential that GAC be consulted before any activities are cancelled/postponed, particularly initiatives previously agreed to between DND/CAF and the People’s Liberation Army. This includes peacekeeping-related training. At this time, GAC would not support postponing/cancelling peacekeeping training.
- Should DND/CAF decide to delay/cancel initiatives due to newly identified risks (e.g. concerns about unintended knowledge transfer), this should follow consultation with GAC, and be paired with careful communications strategies to avoid becoming inadvertently linked to the current situation.
- With regard to events hosted in Canada by China, Director level attendance and below is at the discretion of the invited Department; Director General level and above should be consulted with GAC on a case-by-case basis.

The above guidance is consistent with the Foreign Policy guidance document relayed to DND by GAC in February 2018 titled "Canada’s Priorities for Security and Defence Engagement in Asia-Pacific," which was thoroughly consulted with DND, and requests that DND/CAF consult GAC in advance of activities (and by extension, cessation of activities) that could impact the Canada-China bilateral relationship.

I am available to discuss this topic further if useful.

Ian Shugart
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Canada
UNCLASSIFIED


ENGAGEMENT POTENTIALLY PAUSED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PLA in Canada</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Engagement: PLA members participate in winter survival training at CFB Petawawa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size/Level of Interaction: 6-8 personnel (section level) per country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date(s): Winter 2019</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ENGAGEMENTS NOT YET SCHEDULED OR CONFIRMED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PLA in Canada</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Engagement: Military Education Commanders Dialogue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size/Level of Interaction: 1-star or 2-star level-led delegation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date(s): 2019 (TBC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engagement: CAF-PLA Defence Coordination Dialogue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size/Level of Interaction: 2-star level-led delegation (DOS SJS is CAF lead)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date(s): October or November 2019</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CAF in China</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Engagement: DND-GAC HADR delegation to visit Beijing for staff talks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size/Level of Interaction: Working level delegation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date(s): 2019 (TBC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engagement: DND Peacekeeping delegation to visit Beijing and China’s Peacekeeping Training Centre for staff talks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size/Level of Interaction: Working level delegation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date(s): 2019 (TBC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engagement: Commander RCN or RCN delegate to attend the PLAN Fleet Review in Qingdao</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size/Level of Interaction: 3-star level (Commander RCN) or another RCN delegate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date(s): April 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engagement: DND Deputy DGIS Pol to attend the 9th Beijing Xiangshan Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size/Level of Interaction: Deputy DG-led delegation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date(s): October 2019</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
UNCLASSIFIED


ESTABLISHED AND/OR SCHEDULED ENGAGEMENTS

### PLA in Canada

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Engagement</th>
<th>Size/Level of Interaction:</th>
<th>Date(s):</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PLA members attend the Canadian Security Studies Program at CFC Toronto</td>
<td>2 PLA members, typically at the Sr. Col, Col, or LCol level</td>
<td>TBC; pending course slot availability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLA members instruct UN PK courses at PSTC Kingston</td>
<td>2 PLA members, typically at the Sr. Col, Col, or LCol level</td>
<td>TBC; typically spring or fall course serials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLA members attend UN PK courses at PSTC Kingston</td>
<td>2 PLA members, typically at the Major or LCol level</td>
<td>TBC; typically spring or fall course serials</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### CAF in China

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Engagement</th>
<th>Size/Level of Interaction:</th>
<th>Date(s):</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CAF athletes to attend the 7th CISM Military World Games in Wuhan</td>
<td>Working level delegation</td>
<td>October 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAF to observe US, AUS, NZ, and China Maritime SAR/HADR Exercise COOPERATION SPIRIT</td>
<td>Working level delegation</td>
<td>November 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAF to observe US-China HADR Disaster Response Exercise Exchange</td>
<td>Working level delegation</td>
<td>Fall 2019 (TBC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAF instructor for UN PK course</td>
<td>1 instructor, likely Col or LCol level</td>
<td>Likely fall 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAF student for UN PK course</td>
<td>1 student, likely Major or LCol level</td>
<td>Likely fall 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAF member to attend PLA National Defense University International Symposium</td>
<td>1 participant, likely incoming Canadian Defence Attaché (Colonel level)</td>
<td>Fall 2019 (TBC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RMC Cadets to attend International Cadets Week in China</td>
<td>Cadets delegation</td>
<td>Fall 2019 (TBC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFINTCOM Analyst to China</td>
<td>1 working level analyst</td>
<td>2019 (TBC)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>